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The purpose of this thesis is to provide a metaphysic for moral realism and moral 
perception. This thesis is in two parts. The first is concerned with basic ontology. I begin in 
chapter 1 with an analysis of causation, demonstrating that substance theory is superior to 
Humeanism at accounting for our observations; thus I defend a substance ontology. In 
chapter 2, I address human agency, demonstrating that reasons internalism does not allow for 
incompatibilist freedom; hence, I affirm reasons are states of affairs. I move on to qualia in 
chapter 3, demonstrating that arguments both for and against qualia realism involve question 
begging. In response, I argue that qualia realism is just as reasonable as anti-realism, and 
affirm realism. Given this, I address the mind-body problem in chapter 4, demonstrating the 
failure of physicalists to account for mental causation. I conclude that panpsychism, idealism, 
and substance dualism are equal reasonable alternatives: each allows for intrinsic properties, 
which are integral to substance ontology.  
The second part builds a moral ontology, along with an account of moral perceptual 
knowledge, compatible with the above basic ontology. In chapter 5, I reject moral properties 
as monadic since this would bar mapping moral concepts onto mind-independent reality. 
Instead, I argue that moral properties are relations. More specifically, in chapter 6, I make the 
case that they are features of relations, relations themselves being the total complex states of 
affairs between one or more substances. This allows moral properties to have their own non-
reducible phenomenal quality. To account for moral normativity, I argue that moral features 
are actually a class of causal features, and briefly argue that final causes determine the 
normative causal trajectory of all substances. In chapter 7, I conclude this thesis with 


















 The purpose of this thesis is to reconnect ethics and metaphysics in a serious way—a 
way that has been largely lost in post-enlightenment ethical and metaethical discussion—and 
to provide a careful and comprehensive ontological account of morality. The theory defended 
here holds that moral properties are a certain class of ordinary1 properties. Moreover, it will 
be argued that moral properties possess their own phenomenology so as to be perceivable to 
human subjects via ordinary sense perception. 
 It may be helpful to start by situating this thesis within the broader contemporary 
discussion of moral metaphysics. We can begin by asking whether my theory is cognitivist or 
non-cognitivist. Because my theory fixes moral properties externally, it is cognitivist: moral 
judgments are either true or false and what makes them so is situated in the external world. 
What is being offered here therefore is a new variant of moral realism. However, the theory 
developed does not fit cleanly on one side or the other of the naturalism versus non-
naturalism distinction between moral realist theories. This is because, although I hold moral 
properties to be a certain class of ordinary properties, these properties are not the objects of 
scientific inquiry, at least in any recognizable sense in which science is contemporarily 
practiced. Yet, neither are moral properties sui generis.2 They are ordinary features of the 
mind-independent world. This thesis therefore entails a rejection of both emotivism and 
constructivism as well as realist theories that ground moral truths via an internal appeal to 
rationality or practical reason. 
 
1 By ordinary properties, I mean concrete, natural, non-sui generis properties, such as color and shape 
properties. 
 
2 See Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 59, 66, 
for a fuller description of the definition of ethical naturalism and non-naturalism being referred to here. 
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Moreover, accounting for the moral imperative in this thesis is not as clear-cut a 
matter as contemporary normative reasons internalism versus externalism debate seems to 
suggest. Instead, the theory defended here holds that moral obligation and the imperative 
comes from a mixture of external and internal considerations. The former concerns the nature 
of external ontology, while the latter concerns the internal ontology of the agent herself. 
Hence, this thesis will not only address moral properties, but also the ontology of agency, 
mind, and perception. It is through these that the “ought” of “something ought to be done” is 
externally grounded, and that the “ought” of “the agent ought to do something about it” is 
internally grounded. Keeping these two moral grounds distinct helps clarify what otherwise 
might seem like a winding discussion of otherwise disconnected metaphysical and 
epistemological topics. 
i.i Mapping the Thesis—Part I: The Basic Metaphysical Framework 
Part I of this thesis builds the basic metaphysical framework onto which a moral 
ontology may be attached, and I start constructing this framework from a place of primary 
importance to any ontology: causation. In chapter 1, I defend a neo-Aristotelian view of 
causation—namely, E. J. Lowe’s substance causation—against Humean regularity theory and 
its contemporary iterations. Starting with a survey of Humean accounts of causation, I argue 
that Lowe’s substance causation is far superior to any Humean theory at accounting for a 
single instance of causal activity. However, Lowe’s theory is not adopted wholesale. 
Specifically, his notion of a noncausal power is rejected. Instead, an alternative analysis of 
the role of active and passive powers will be given and, moreover, an ontological analysis of 
power properties themselves will be provided and the notion of final causes will be 
introduced. The importance of this chapter is in its demonstration of the existence of 
substances, along with the kind of causal activity that an ontology of substances entails. 
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In chapter 2, I continue the causal analysis and address the issue of human beings as 
causal agents. The purpose of this chapter is to preserve incompatibilist freedom (or what 
some philosophers call “libertarian free will”) in an account of human agency. This is done 
by way of an analysis of motivating reasons, with the focus being on the causal role of 
desires. I argue that any theory that takes motivating reasons to be desires—or any other 
internal state—is deterministic and inconsistent with incompatibilist human freedom. Instead, 
I borrow from Jonathan Dancy in holding that reasons for actions are states of affairs. This 
allows the human agent to perform rational action and yet not have the reason for that action 
to be causally deterministic. 
I then move onto the question of the existence of qualia in chapter 3. In this chapter, I 
contend that arguments both for and against qualia realism involve question begging. This is 
because philosophers must decide what to do with introspective evidence—whether to grant 
it epistemic authority—before they begin argumentation. However, deciding what to do with 
introspective evidence requires evaluating it, and evaluating it prior to argumentation begs 
the question in one direction or another depending on one’s evaluation. In response, I argue, 
through an analysis of eliminativist theories, that qualia anti-realism is no more reasonable 
than qualia realism and therefore there is nothing barring us from adopting realism. I also 
provide a positive argument for the existence of qualia (although this argument assumes the 
value of introspective evidence). The function that this chapter performs in the thesis is 
twofold. First, it demonstrates the existence of qualia, which chapter 4 will later presume. 
Second, it provides the metaphysical framework in which phenomenal properties exist, 
which will be important to part II’s discussion of moral phenomenology. 
Chapter 4 deals with the mind-body problem. Given the assumption of the existence 
of qualia along with an assumption of a physical external world, I survey possible solutions 
to the mind-body problem. In the end, however, I commit to no one theory of mind, since 
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each have their own grave difficulties. I begin by dismissing substance dualism on the basis 
that it violates causal closure. Non-reductive physicalism is then rejected on the basis that it 
bars real mental causation. I then give a fair hearing to panpsychism and idealism. Both 
theories, however, have their own seemingly insurmountable problems. Lastly, I reconsider 
substance dualism and various dualist attempts to solve the interaction problem. I conclude 
that any theory which allows for the existence of intrinsic (to the substance) properties can be 
reasonably adopted. These would be panpsychism, idealism, or substance dualism. The 
reason why intrinsic properties are important is because their existence allows not only for 
real powers but also mental causation, thereby upholding both the substance ontology and 
incompatibilist human freedom demonstrated in chapters 1 and 2. 
i.ii Mapping the Thesis—Part II: Moral Metaphysics, Knowledge, and Perception 
 Using the framework constructed in part I, part II develops a theory of moral 
perceptual knowledge and a corresponding moral ontology. Moral truthmakers are situated in 
the mind-independent world, and an account of how moral agents can come to know moral 
truths is provided. The theory developed here does not deny that practical reasoning can 
discover moral truth. What is denied however is that practical reasoning is the sole avenue to 
moral truth and/or the ground of moral truth. 
I introduce part II in chapter 5 with the question of whether moral concepts map onto 
mind-independent reality. By way of analysis of Robert Audi’s theory of moral perception, I 
reject moral properties as monadic and supervenient since taking them to be so bars us from 
escaping a subject’s internal state and attaching moral concepts onto external entities. 
Instead, I argue we should take moral properties to be relational properties between 
substances. Moreover, I account for the failure of some subjects to recognize moral 
properties, not in terms of their failure to qualitatively experience moral properties, but 
because of their failure to possess the relevant moral concepts. 
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 Chapter 6 deals specifically with developing a moral metaphysics that allows for 
moral perception. I begin by demonstrating that relations—moral or otherwise—have their 
own phenomenology above and beyond that of the monadic properties involved in relations. 
Given this, I develop a novel theory of relations which holds that relational propositions do 
not actually pick out relations, but only features of relations. Relations themselves are the 
total complex states of affairs between one or more substances that provides the truthmaker 
for any number of relational propositions concerning that given state of affairs. Given this, all 
relations are non-reducible to monadic properties, thereby allowing them to have their own 
non-reducible (to monadic properties) phenomenology. I then move to argue that certain 
kinds of causal features of relations are what make them moral. In defense of this, I propose 
that final causes determine the normative causal trajectory of all substances, and that a moral 
agent acting to ensure that sentient substances causally trend towards their final causes is the 
definition of right moral action.  
 Chapter 7 deals with epistemological problems that arise in my account of perception 
developed in chapters 5 and 6. That is to say, in order to account for the fact that some 
subjects make correct moral judgments based upon moral perception while others fail to, I 
assume both the existence of non-conceptual content and non-conceptual knowledge. The 
existence of both non-conceptual content and non-conceptual knowledge is highly 
controversial in epistemology, however, so chapter 7 consists in a defense of these, in 
particular the latter. 
i.iii The Two “Oughts” 
 Recall my claim that the moral imperative is grounded both externally and internally, 
through the “ought” of “something ought to be done” and the “ought” of “the agent ought to 
do something about it.” Now we can discover how each of the concepts demonstrated in this 
thesis—the existence of substances, incompatibilist freedom, phenomenal properties, real 
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intrinsic powers, mental causation, moral (features of) relations, moral phenomenology, and 
non-conceptual knowledge—contributes to this grounding. 
 In terms of “something ought to be done,” substances and their final causes determine 
the quality of any moral relation into which said substances enter. If a substance finds itself in 
a situation where another substance’s causal activity, or even its own causal activity, 
interrupts its causal trajectory towards its final cause, then something ought to be done. We 
see this something ought to be done as consisting in causal relations, specifically causal 
relations that interrupt one or more substances movement towards its final cause. 
Of course, this doesn’t just pertain to any and all kinds of substances. There’s nothing 
immoral about oxygen causing steel to rust per se. What is necessary to make a situation 
moral is the presence of a moral agent—the moral agent being the human substance. 
Moreover, what also seems necessary is the presence of at least one organic and significantly 
sentient substance whose teleological trending is at risk of being interrupted.3 The presence 
of the moral agent himself fulfills this requirement, and thus, at the very least, a moral agent 
has an obligation to himself. 
But what makes it the case that “the agent ought to do something about it”?  The fact 
that something ought to be done doesn’t necessarily ground the notion that the agent 
specifically has the obligation. What does ground the agent’s obligation, however, is that the 
agent has both the causal ability to do something about it and the capacity to know that 
something ought to be done. 
 
3 It may be perhaps that the moral agent has a moral obligation to all organic substances regardless of 
sentience or non-sentience, or it may be perhaps that the moral agent’s moral obligation comes in degrees in 
accordance with how much sentience an organic substance possesses. Working out a specific theory in this area 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is important for present purposes is the notion that moral agents have 
moral obligations towards other substances, but not all other substances. Clearly moral agents have obligations 
towards other moral agents, and clearly moral agents do not have obligations towards inorganic substances. This 
doesn’t mean that things like destroying statues or defacing natural inorganic beauty is always morally neutral. 
But these things are only wrong insofar as they affect the teleological movement of the agent himself, other 
moral agents, or lower sentient substances. 
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The causal ability comes from the agent being a substance and thereby possessing 
intrinsic causal powers. However, it is not enough just to possess causal power unless one is 
able to direct it towards certain goals. Therefore, the fact that the human agent has 
incompatibilist freedom—meaning that he possesses the ability to internally originate 
external physical causal chains and rationally direct them—means that the human agent can 
be a morally responsive agent. 
However, this is not all that is necessary. What also is needed is the capacity to know 
that something ought to be done. Included within this idea is the capacity for the agent to 
know that he is able to make a causal difference. This knowledge can come through practical 
reasoning, but it also can come immediately through perceptual knowledge. The fact that this 
is a capacity is important: all normally functioning agents possess the ability to see moral 
phenomena, and moral formation involves mapping concepts onto these phenomena.  
Thus, that something ought to be done comes by way of the existence of substances 
with real causal powers, including final causes. That the agent ought to do something about 
it comes by way of incompatibilist freedom, real mental causation, and perceptual moral 
knowledge gained conceptually and non-conceptually via the experience of moral 
phenomenal properties. This is the theory of moral realism that will be developed over the 
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1. A Case for Substance Causation 
1.1 Introduction 
Debates carried out by those investigating the fundamental ontology of causation have 
historically revolved around the question of what properties, entities, or relations are primary 
in the occurrence of causal change.1 Those theorists who have held to event views of 
causation maintain that primacy belongs to the causal event itself, this event being comprised 
of a relation between what would be considered cause and effect events. Critics of event 
views, however, argue that the notion of the primitiveness of events has left too much 
unexplained in terms of how causes generate the effects that they do, that is, why particular 
events are followed by the events that they are followed by, and how we can explanatorily 
establish a cause and effect relationship between events to begin with. In response, some 
event causalists have proposed various means by which we can give an account of an effect 
as rightly being a product of an event playing a causal role. Such attempts have included 
David Lewis’ notion of events having counterfactual dependence on other events, or Timothy 
O’Connor’s notion of effects coming about due to a cause’s probabilistic dispositionality. 
Counter to the event views, others have rejected causal primacy holding extrinsically between 
causes and effects—such as through correlative regularity—and have argued that true causal 
agency lies intrinsically within the objects that are involved in causal relationships 
themselves. Such are what I call the powers views of causation,2 with various versions 
 
1 See also E. J. Lowe, “Personal Agency,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 (2003): 211, 
where Lowe puts this is terms of what “ontological category or categories the items related by causal relations 
should be conceived to belong.” 
 
2 To clarify: I am utilizing the terms powers and dispositions interchangeably, as it fits with the 
ontology that I develop in this chapter, and for simplicity of discussion I will be conflating powers and 
dispositional views of causation in order to distinguish them from event views of causation. However, I 
recognize that not all philosophers do use these terms interchangeably but rather make a distinction between 
powers and dispositions in their ontologies. One such philosopher is Alexander Bird. He holds disposition to be 
a term used in macro level objectual dispositional predication—a term which carries no real ontological 
commitments. On the other hand, powers for Bird are properties which are essentially dispositional, and when 
used in causal predication, are indicative of necessary connections between objects. For Bird, it is questionable 
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holding that the powers belong simply to the objects that possess them or fundamentally to 
the properties that said objects bear. Thus, causal theorists have historically fallen into one of 
two wide yet internally diverse camps: either they hold to a form of event causation that 
places causal primacy on the event level of causation, or they hold to a view of powers that 
places causal primacy at the object level. 
In this chapter, I will be defending a powers view of causation. More specifically, I 
will be proposing a neo-Aristotelian view of powers, as opposed to any type of Humean view 
of causal regularity. In order to motivate a neo-Aristotelian view specifically, I will begin this 
chapter by analyzing Hume’s event regularity theory, as well as providing a brief analysis of 
a variety of recent event causation theories that attempt to mitigate the failures of Hume’s 
theory to explain why certain events tend to be followed by the events that tend to follow 
them. I will reject Humean-style event causation on the basis that, even though it is 
epistemologically useful, it does not provide a reasonable metaphysical account of causation.  
Next, I will present an account of causation similar to the one that I ultimately wish to 
defend, that is, E. J. Lowe’s substance causation theory, which adheres to a neo-Aristotelian 
view of powers. I will begin this section by presenting Lowe’s theory as he espoused it, 
followed by providing argumentation for why certain aspects of Lowe’s view, namely his 
notion of non-causal power, should be rejected. Last, I will analyze powers views of 
causation in general in order to derive a theory of powers that provides a reasonable account 




that powers can be used in causal predication since he is skeptical that powers really have this kind of causal 
role. See Alexander Bird, “Overpowering: How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself,” Mind 125 
(2016): 360-361 and Alexander Bird, “Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental Powers,” Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary 92 (2018): 247-248, 253-254. 
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1.2 Humean Causation 
Hume held that causation consisted in the spatial contiguity, temporal succession, and 
constant conjunction (that is, regular observed concurrences) of existents.3 For example, we 
can say that, in a particular instance, water causes salt to dissolve because the water and the 
salt are spatially contiguous, the salt dissolves after (temporally) it comes into contact with 
water, and we have observed this happen to water and salt in the past. Moreover, what we 
perceive of as “powers” intrinsic to the objects involved in causal events or the “necessity” of 
causal relations is merely a product of, and internal to, the human mind.4 However, as pointed 
out by Molnar, whether or not Hume himself held that real, but unknowable, causal 
connections existed mind-independently between objects is indeterminate from Hume’s own 
work.5 
 Molnar identifies Hume’s position as deriving from his splitting all objects of human 
inquiry into two classifying groups: “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact.” The former are 
known a priori, the latter a posteriori.6 Since necessary causal connections cannot be 
naturally deduced from other known concepts (i.e., known a priori) or empirically observed 
(i.e., known a posteriori), then necessary causal connections as a concept cannot be applied 
to anything in the external world.7 Thus, a Humean conception of causation is not so much 
concerned with the ontological as it is with the epistemological, that is, with providing a 
 
3 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), 
75-76, 87. 
 
4 Ibid., 165. 
 
5 George Molnar, Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, ed. Stephen Mumford (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 114-115. 
 
6 Ibid., 116. 
 
7 Ibid., 116-119. 
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deductively arrived at explanation for why certain events are observed to follow others (given 
that necessary causal connections themselves remain unobserved). 
More recent Humean views of causation also generally take causal primacy, in any 
instance of causation, to be located at the event level as opposed to the object level of 
causation. That is, primary causal activity belongs to the relation between a cause and effect 
event, and thus is situated extrinsic to objects. This is opposed to the prime causal concern 
being with the objects themselves—or any intrinsic property held by the objects—involved in 
an instance of causation. Therefore, causation is not viewed as a concept that explains any 
metaphysical relations between objects, but one that defines and explains the nomological 
relations that exist between events. In other words, causal relations follow some form of 
principle in their instances and reoccurrences; however, there is nothing necessarily 
grounding these causal regularities at any level deeper than the causal occurrences at the 
event level itself. 
 Unqualified, basic Humean regularity theory is rife with problems, however. Because 
the prime source for causal explanation is the relation between events—and because 
nomological explanations require more than one instance of observation in order to provide a 
pattern that can be considered law-like, from which causal principles can be derived—
regularity theorists have difficulty in providing adequate analyses of instances of singular 
causation (i.e., a single instance of a single cause and its effect). Take for instance the 
example of billiard ball A rolling into a stationary billiard ball B, causing B to be set into 
motion. A basic regularity theory would state that spatial and temporal proximity is indicative 
of one event being causally relevant to the other, and our regular observance of billiard balls 
smacking into each other would deem this behavior nomological, and therefore causal. 
However, can we supply an adequate causal explanation of this singular event without 
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reference to others like it? What if we lacked epistemic access to other events of this kind, 
would we then have to deny that this was an instance of causation?8 
 Closely related to this problem, and also stemming from the causal primacy of 
nomological relations, is the problem of determining causal relevance. Suppose at the same 
exact moment the billiard ball A hit B, a sound wave C coming from the ambient noise of the 
pool hall, and also from the voices of surrounding billiard players, also made contact with 
billiard ball B. Can we really say that the A caused B to move, and that C only had a minimal, 
if not null, effect? A and C had the same spatiotemporal proximity to B, and, considering that 
sound waves seemingly regularly hit billiard balls that tend to move in pool halls, we would 
be hard pressed to deem A as causally relevant while denying that C is. Thus, on a basic 
regularity theory, such contrastive explanations—that is, explanations that excludes some 
factors but acknowledges others—of causation are hard to come by.9 
 What follows is a survey of how contemporary Humean theorists have attempted to 
address these problems. I’ve identified three main approaches these Humean causal theorists 
take: (i) qualify regularity theory in some fashion so as to account for single instances of 
causation, (ii) have counterfactual causal outcomes bear on actual world causal outcomes, 
and (iii) utilize the probability of events occurring as causal explanations. This survey is by 
no means exhaustive, and the philosophical theories highlighted here are just representative 
samples. However, I think the weakness of their theories reflect a weakness of Humean 
causation in general, and thus my objections to these representative theories can be applied to 
Humeanism more broadly. 
 
 
8 See also Molnar, Powers, 118, where Molnar points out this same problem of deriving a causal 
explanation from a single instance of causal observation. 
 
9 See also David Lewis, “Causation,” The Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 556-557, and Donald 
Davidson, “Causal Relations,” The Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 691-703, where Lewis and Davidson also 
point out that unqualified Humean theory has difficulty in providing such contrastive explanations. 
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 1.2.1 Contemporary Regularity Theory 
 Because analyzing single cases of causation does pose such problems for a regularity 
conception of causation, modern regularity theorists tend to make sense of causation via an 
analysis of causation in general, as opposed to particular instances of causation. All cases of 
singular causal events therefore must be analyzed in light of the kinds of events they are, and 
therefore event theorists generally focus on explicating the effects of causal types as opposed 
to token causes. An example of this approach to causation is the regularity theory of Michael 
Baumgartner.10  
In order to resolve the problems inherent in the basic Humean view of causation, 
Baumgartner refuses to analyze causation in terms of a single cause for any one effect—
instead, Baumgartner argues that an effect event is said to be caused by what he calls a 
“complex cause,” that is, the sufficient aggregation of all joint causes of an effect event under 
review.11 Thus, with these parameters of the analysans, Baumgartner attempts to make sense 
of a single case of causation as follows: 
Singular Causation (SC): An event a is a cause of an event b iff a instantiates a factor 
A and b instantiates a factor B, such that 
 
(a)  A is a non-redundant part of a minimally sufficient condition AX of B and 
every factor contained in AX is causally relevant to B according to (V) [see 
below], 
(b)  a ≠ b, and a and b occur within the same spatiotemporal frame, 
(c)  Every factor in X is instantiated coincidently with a.12 
 
In other words, if a is an instance of event type (or what Baumgartner calls a “factor”)13 A 
and b is an instance of B, and if it can be shown AX (i.e., the “complex cause”)14 is minimally 
 
10 Michael Baumgartner, “Regularity Theories Reassessed,” Philosophia 20 (2008): 329. 
 
11 Ibid., 330. 
 
12 Ibid., 347. 
 
13 Ibid., 329. 
 
14 Ibid., 330. 
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sufficient for B, then we can demonstrate that event a caused event b. Since complex causes 
may contain unknown and thus unaccounted for components, these are accounted for via 
variable X; thus AX would denote the complete condition that is sufficient for B. If A is 
contained, non-redundantly, within the set of conditions AX, then A is causally relevant to 
B.15 Further, if in the instance of the singular causal event under review, we see that X is 
instantiated along with A as instantiated in a, we know that a must have caused b since AX 
deterministically causes B. Thus, according to Baumgartner, we have demonstrated a caused 
b in an instance of singular causation. 
 Has Baumgartner assuaged the problem of singular causation? It doesn’t seem so. 
This is because his principle of causal relevancy, which consists in a logical schema to place 
relational constraints on what would be relevant versus irrelevant regularities and causal 
conditions, leaves much to be desired. It is as follows: 
(V) (a) A is directly causally relevant to B iff the following conditions hold: 
 
(1)  A is a part of a minimal theory F of B, 
(2)  A stays part of F across all extensions of F’s factor frame. 
 
(b) A is indirectly causally relevant to B iff there is a sequence of factors Z1, Z2, ...,  
      Zn, n≥3, such that A= Z1, B= Zn, and for each i, 1 ≤ i < n: Zi is directly causally   
      relevant to Zi+1 in terms of (Va).16 
 
The problem with this conception is that it relies on the notion of “factor frames.” Factor 
frames consist in the set of known minimally sufficient conditions for any complex cause to 
produce any one effect (i.e., a set of the individual and/or jointly sufficient minimal 
conditions known to bring about the same effect). Factor frames are expanded as scientists 
conducting repeated observations discover previously unknown sufficient conditions for 




16 Ibid., 342. 
 
17 Ibid., 340-341. 
 9 
questionable, since it can be argued that this logical schema is supposed to be determining 
that for us. Instead, the contents of a factor frame must be in place before the above logical 
schema can even be applied, and even Baumgartner himself recognizes that this presents an 
epistemological problem concerning the status of minimal scientific theories prior to factor 
frame expansion.18 
 Baumgartner seems to believe that scientists determine what an event’s sufficient 
cause is solely in terms of what has been repeatedly observed. However, this does not seem 
to be the case in the practice of science. Scientists determine cause and effect relationships 
not only based on what has been observed across similar events, but also what has been 
observed concerning the nature of the behavior of individual materials as they are involved in 
all the events they are involved in. Hence, in the case of billiard balls A and B and soundwave 
C, even though in every case of A and C coming into contact with B, B starts to roll, we 
would know that C has little to nothing to do with causing B to roll because we can observe 
C’s behavior in the circumstances where A is absent. The typical behavior of the objects 
involved in the event seem more salient in explaining what is causally relevant to the event 
than the observations of events of the same type. In any case, Baumgartner’s schema fails to 
distinguish what is causally relevant without having to presuppose the causal relevancy of 
some objects beforehand, and we are left with the same problem we started out with. 
1.2.2 Counterfactual Causation 
 A more popular event causation solution to the problem of a single instance of 
causation is that of David Lewis’. In his seminal 1973 article “Causation,” Lewis utilizes the 
concept of counterfactual dependence in order to give an account of a singular instance of a 
cause and its effect. Drawing upon the considerations of possible world theory, Lewis 
 
 
18 Ibid., 341. 
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maintains that certain causal outcomes depend counterfactually on the causal outcomes of the 
same circumstance in all nearby possible worlds.  
Counterfactual dependence as a concept pertains to the truth-making principles for 
conditional propositions under the theory of counterfactuals. Thus, the truth of the 
proposition A □® C in the actual world depends on the truth of proposition C at all nearby 
worlds where A is true.19 This dependence relation can be viewed as causal dependence when 
it comes to the analysis of singular causal events. Specifically, in causal analysis, 
counterfactual dependence holds between events’ corresponding propositions. For example, 
Lewis expresses the proposition of event e occurring as O(e), and this proposition is true at 
all possible worlds e has occurred. If we want to say c caused e in a singular causal instance 
in the actual world, the truth of this statement depends on whether O(c) and O(e) (and, by 
extension, ~O(c) and ~O(e)) counterfactually depend on each other. If they do, then O(c) □® 
O(e) and ~O(c) □® ~O(e) is true, and e has causal dependence on c. This causal dependence 
implies c caused e.20 
 Lewis himself later addressed a problem inherent in a counterfactual analysis of 
causation, that is, the problem of preemptive causation. This problem comes to light when 
analyzing an event that has two would-be causes present and both are equally sufficient to 
bring about the event, although only one did. A theory’s task is therefore to determine which 
of these two potential causes actually did the causing. However, as counterfactual causation 
stands, it cannot make a determination; if any one of the causes was absent, including the 
cause that actually did the causing, the effect would still be present, thereby leading to causal 
overdetermination.21 
 
19 Lewis, “Causation,” 560-561. 
 
20 Ibid., 562-563. 
 
21 David Lewis, “Causation As Influence,” The Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 182-183. 
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 Lewis’ proposed solution to the problem of preemptive causation is the notion of 
trumping. That is, one potential cause trumped the other cause in bringing about the effect in 
question.22 For example, if both X and Y are present and are both sufficient causes for Z, but 
X is what caused Z, it can be said that X trumped Y in causing Z. However, as Lewis points 
out, this alone doesn’t quite make sense because it implies that X was able to cut short Y’s 
causal chain somehow, and this cutting would be left unacceptably unexplained.23 The 
solution he advances in response depends on the notion of modal fragility: slight differences 
between possible events make them distinct (that is, slight differences in causal events help 
determine when effect events occur and in what manner they occur).24 Therefore, when 
analyzing the trumping cause, it is not that X cuts Y’s causal chain to go on and cause Z. What 
is happening is that X causes Z in a counterfactually dependent way as usual. If it was the 
case that X was not present to trump Y, then Y would have caused Z to occur at a different 
time and in a different manner.25 With this solution the counterfactual dependence between X 
and Z is left intact without the causal cutting of Y.  
However, this solution does not quite work with Lewis’ view of counterfactual 
causation due to Lewis’ own notion of fragility itself. As Neil McDonnell points out, it is too 
fragile: any change leading up to an effect would make the effect event too different, and thus 
arguably numerically distinct.26 Therefore, effect events would have counterfactual 
 
22 Ibid., 183. 
 
23 Ibid., 184. 
 




26 Neil McDonnell, “Events and their Counterparts,” Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 1303. See also 
Lewis, “Causation As Influence,” 186-188, where Lewis specifically denies that his view leads to numerically 
distinct events between counterfactuals. He assumes his confinement of fragility to matters of time and manner 
is enough to keep events numerically the same. McDonnell, however, holds that changes in time and manner is 
enough to numerically change events. 
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dependence on things that they should not have counterfactual dependence on.27 Take for 
example again our billiard balls and sound waves. If ball A caused B to roll in a silent room 
this would be a numerically distinct event than if A caused B to roll and soundwave C was 
present. However, factoring in C into a causal explanation if C is present is undesirable. 
In response to this problem for counterfactual causation, McDonnell attempts to make 
events less modally fragile by adopting a context-sensitive theory of events combined with 
his own notion of event counterparts (that is, events that exhibit sameness across possible 
worlds).28 McDonnell explains this context sensitivity as follows: 
When the context triggers a counterpart relation which assigns relatively many 
counterparts for a given event, then that event is taken to be robust, and when the 
context triggers a counterpart relation in which the event has relatively few 
counterparts, then that event is taken to be fragile. So, the components of a double, or 
rather fluctuating standard are present in the [counterpart-theoretic treatment of events 
combined with a counterfactual theory of causation] view offered here.29 
 
McDonnell argues that this notion of event robustness will prevent things such as soundwave 
C being considered a cause since the events where C occurred and where C did not occur will 
exhibit enough sameness to warrant C not being considered causally relevant. 
 There are a few problems with McDonnell’s view. First, there is a huge 
epistemological barrier. How do we distinguish what is causally relevant? It does not seem 
that you can rely solely on McDonnell’s view. This is because we do not have epistemic 
access to these counterpart events, and therefore have no idea how many there are for any 
given single event. Moreover, you need to presuppose what is relevant in order to provide an 
explanation for its relevancy utilizing McDonnell’s theory. For example, in the case of Billy 
and Suzy being two sufficient causes involved in the event of a window breaking, McDonnell 
 
27 McDonnell, “Events and their Counterparts,” 1303.  
 
28 Ibid., 1291-1292. 
 
29 Ibid., 1304. 
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argues that “ [i]f we take the event to be fragile enough to tell Billy and Suzy apart…but no 
more fragile than that requires,” then only relevant causes will be taken into consideration.30  
Hence, the event should be considered fragile enough to exclude Billy as a causal contributor, 
but robust enough to include Suzy, the relevant cause.31 However, this way of determining 
what is causally relevant, especially given our lack of epistemic access to counterfactuals, is 
indicative of McDonnell having what is required in mind even before considering what 
counterpart events to consider. He’s presupposing what is causally relevant even before he 
gets to counterfactual considerations. Lastly, McDonnell maintains that although counterpart 
events exhibit some form of sameness, they still are to be maintained as numerically 
distinct.32 If this is so, then fragility across the board still stands, and the counterfactual 
causalist, like the regularity theorist, cannot make sense of causal relevancy. 
1.2.3 Probabilistic Causation 
 Probabilistic theories of causation hold that a cause increases the probability of the 
effect’s occurrence—thus, probabilistic causation distinguishes itself from a traditionally 
Humean theory in that it admits the indeterminacy of an effect event the face of what a 
traditional Humean would consider a sufficient cause. I do not want to spend too much time 
addressing probabilistic causation for a couple of reasons. First, not all probabilistic theories 
analyze causation via a Humean reduction to non-causal observables; some merely give an 
account of probability as it pertains to causation, however causation may be cashed out.33 
Therefore, a probabilistic theory of causation cannot always be rightly called a theory of 
 




32 Ibid., 1292-1293. 
 
33 Michael Tooley, “Probability and Causation,” in Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic 
World, ed. Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof (New York: Routledge, 2004), 77, 82. 
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causation per se without some further qualification, nor are all probabilistic theories even 
Humean by design. 
Second, probabilistic theory, when taken as a reductionist theory of causation, seems 
to falter under the same criticism as the above theories. As with other theories that place 
causal primacy at the event level, probabilistic causation as a causal theory has a difficult 
time accounting for causal relevancy, and more specifically, with providing contrastive 
explanations, although it does so for different reasons than regularity theory and 
counterfactual causation. Take for example Timothy O’Connor’s argument utilizing the case 
of syphilitic patients contracting paresis. O’Connor points out that only syphilitic patients can 
contract paresis, but not all syphilitic patients do contract paresis—paresis seems to only 
occur in about 28% of patients with syphilis. O’Connor argues that it is the case that syphilis 
causes paresis, although it causes it indeterministically. He concludes that contrastive 
explanations are not necessary since there may not be such an explanation available to the 
situation; nothing is determining which patients come down with paresis.34  
 In response, I argue that O’Connor conflates the epistemological usefulness of these 
types of explanations for belief formation and justification with the ontological necessity of 
certain causal processes in the production of effects that these types of explanations reflect. 
Yes, we may not know why a certain patient developed paresis while another did not, and, 
considering the limits of modern medical science, the explanation that syphilis caused this 
disease is sufficient as a reasonable explanation to conclude that a patient contracted paresis 
because he had syphilis. But this epistemological concession does not mean the disease was 
really caused indeterministically, or at least, it is insufficient as an argument for this 
 
34 Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2002), 91-93. 
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conclusion. It may just mean we do not know the determining factors of the disease’s coming 
to be in the patients that it did come to be in. 
 Further, how do we determine causal relevancy based on this probabilistic 
conception? O’Connor seems to argue that it can be concluded that syphilis causes paresis 
because it occurs in 100% of paresis patients. But how is it determined that syphilis is 
causally relevant versus other considerations that also apply to 100% of the patients in 
question? All of them are human beings, all of them drink water on a regular basis, and all of 
them receive treatment for syphilis. How is it determined that these factors are not causally 
relevant, especially in terms of causal explanation, based on O’Connor’s conception of 
probability theory? It seems either that we have entered some muddied causal waters, or we 
must claim probabilistic explanations cannot properly be considered causal explanations. 
 The analysis of probabilistic theory highlights a problem that has been latent 
throughout all of our discussion concerning causation thus far: the problem of conflating 
acceptable causal explanations with adequate metaphysical accounts of causation. Causal 
explanations are a matter of epistemology: acceptable causal explanations are belief 
justifying and of instrumental value. If I come into a large dark room full of people at the 
other end and turn on the light switch by the entrance, everyone in the room, if they had 
knowledge of where the light switch was located and were thinking reasonably, would 
attribute the light coming on to someone new coming into the room, namely, to my coming 
into the room. The whole event could be summarized by stating that I caused the light to 
come on in the room. Therefore, my coming into the room and turning on the switch is an 
adequate as explanation for the light coming on, and not only that, it warrants belief that I 
have just now come into the room.  
 This explanation however is not a metaphysical account of the causal processes 
involved in my flipping on a switch and light flooding a dark room. In fact, it makes a very 
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poor metaphysical explanation. What about the other objects involved in this causal process, 
such as the metal wiring in the walls and ceiling, and the electrical current running through 
them, not to mention the filaments in the light bulbs, or even the photons radiating from 
them? These cannot be ignored. Do we need an adequate account of these in order to accept 
the claim that I caused the light to come on in the room? Of course not. But we would need to 
factor them into the causal process if we had any desire to come away with an account of 
causation that had adequately reflected the full reality of the mind-independent universe. 
 The Humean picture, however, has ignored the question of metaphysics. Those 
philosophers who hold to Humean causation have found adequate epistemological 
explanations and repurposed them as metaphysical theories of causation. Yet, these theories 
leave too much of what we experience of the cause and effect relationship unexplained, with 
their adherents attempting to redesign them over and over again in order to fit our most 
common intuitions concerning the causal relevancy of objects involved in causal events. And 
here lies, I argue, the beginning of an adequate theory of causation: in the analysis of the 
objects that are involved in causal events, and in the real powers that these objects possess. 
1.3 Substance Causation 
 In order to provide an adequate metaphysical explanation, as opposed to 
epistemological explanation, of the causal relationships inherent in cause and effect events, I 
will be arguing for a neo-Aristotelian view of real causal powers inherent in the objects 
involved in causal relations; it is only through the acknowledgement of these powers that 
causation as a metaphysical reality, as opposed to an explanatory tool, makes any sense. 
Thus, the view I am for the most part defending is that of E. J. Lowe, which he dubbed 
substance causation. This section provides an analysis of this view. However, as will later 
become apparent, Lowe’s theory has some weaknesses, which I will identify before 
developing an improved account of substance causation. That said, Lowe’s view is a good 
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starting point for developing an accurate view of the metaphysically real causal relationships 
that exist between entities. 
The very nature of substance causation as a view of causation, especially as Lowe 
presents it, requires the discussion of human persons as causal entities. However, it is not the 
purpose of this section to provide a thoroughgoing ontology of human persons as causal 
agents: this subject will only be touched upon insofar as Lowe utilizes it to frame his theory 
of causation. Human persons as causal entities shall be more thoroughly treated in the next 
chapter. 
1.3.1 Lowe’s View 
 To begin, it is important to understand what is meant by substance in order to discuss 
substance causation. According to Lowe, individual substances are concrete (as opposed to 
abstract) basic particulars, and includes things such as ordinary material objects (e.g., rocks, 
trees, billiard balls, etc.) as well as human persons.35 Individual substances are persistent in 
that they are able to undergo and survive change.36 For example, a sapling that grows into a 
large oak tree is still considered the same substance although it has taken on mass and 
changed its shaped. Therefore, from what can be inferred from Lowe’s definition of a 
substance, an object that fails to survive change can be said to no longer be the same 
substance, but now is a new substance or substances, the old substance having gone out of 
existence. A large boulder that has been broken up and split into paving stones has ceased to 
exist, while the several paving stones made from the constitutive material of the boulder have 
now come into being. 
 
35 E. J. Lowe, “Substance Causation, Powers, and Human Agency,” in Mental Causation and 
Ontology, ed. S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 154. 
 
36 Ibid., 154-155. 
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Lowe adds that individual substances have ontological independence, meaning they 
do not depend on any other entity or entities for their identity. This claim doesn’t preclude 
that individual substances do depend other entities for their existence, however.37 Each of the 
brand new paving stones depend on the atoms and molecules that materially comprises it for 
its existence. I myself depend on the cells that make up the tissues and organs of my body for 
my very own existence. However, a paving stone will survive a few atoms being abraded 
away from its surface, and I can and do survive cellular and tissue changes. I can even 
undergo massive changes, such as organ and limb removal. We would not say, however, that 
I am a numerically different substance, that is, an entirely different person if I happened to 
lose one of my arms, but we would also not say that I still existed if all there is left of me is 
an arm. Existence and identity are distinct concepts. 
Not only do individual substances have this ontological independence when it comes 
to identity, but they also cannot be causally inert—that is, all individual substances possess a 
power or multiple powers.38 Therefore, differing kinds of substances are primarily 
differentiated by their identity conditions and the power or powers they possess.39 In other 
words, how an individual substance persists through time and what changes it can be the 
cause of will differ from substance kind to substance kind. The conditions under which I am 
said to persist through time and the changes that I am able to bring about are different than 
that of the paving stones, and this is because the paving stones and I are different kinds of 
substances. But the paving stones themselves all share similar identity conditions and powers, 
because they all belong to the same substantial kind. 
 







In explicating the ontology of powers themselves, Lowe makes a distinction between 
power types and power tokens. Token powers are those particular powers that are possessed 
by any particular individual substance and that substance alone.40 A particular billiard ball is 
going to have its own particular power to roll and knock into other billiard balls; this power 
is, ontologically speaking, numerically different than any other power in existence. However, 
the token power of this particular billiard ball is of the same type of power shared by all other 
similarly constituted billiard balls.41 Further, as in the case of every substances’ possession of 
a token power, each particular billiard ball possesses its own particular power essentially; a 
particular power cannot be transferred from one billiard ball to the next, or to any other  
individual substance.42 
All powers, regardless of their being a type or token, are differentiated by the nature 
of their manifestation (i.e., by the characteristics of the actual exercise of the power in 
question). There is only one manifestation type per power, that is, a power can only perform 
one kind of effect and none other.43 However, there are higher-order powers that consist in 
the power to gain lower-order powers. The example Lowe uses to illustrate this point is 
magnetizability: this power consists in the ability to gain the power of being magnetic, itself 
the power to attract ferrous metal.44 Moreover, because they are themselves concrete 
particulars (i.e., individual properties possessed by individual substances), token powers can 
be further differentiated by the individual substance that possesses them and by the time at 
 
40 Ibid., 155; E. J. Lowe, “The Will as a Rational Free Power,” in Powers and Capacities in 
Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, ed. Ruth Groff (New York: Routledge, 2013), 173. 
 
41 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 155; Lowe, “The Will,” 173. 
 
42 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 155; Lowe, “The Will,” 173. 
 





which they are possessed (i.e., the time at which they exist).45 It is important to note that a 
token power that never manifests is still said to exist since it is nevertheless possessed by its 
bearer. How this can be is easily demonstrated through an example: a copper wire that fails to 
ever conduct electricity is still said to possess the power of electrical conductivity.46 This is 
why Lowe argues that powers should be individuated by manifestation types as opposed to 
token manifestations, since it is possible that power tokens can fail to manifest during their 
entire existence.47 
In further explicating his ontology of powers, 
Lowe makes categorical distinctions between different 
types of powers, claiming that all manifestation types 
are either passive or active and either causal or non-
causal (see chart).48 Lowe defines a passive power as 
one whose manifestation is dependent on an outside 
substance or substances acting upon and triggering its 
manifestation in the individual substance that possesses it.49 Examples of passive powers—
what Lowe also calls liabilities50—include salt’s power to be dissolved in water and water’s 
own power to dissolve salt. Both the substances of salt and water in this case need to be 
appropriately triggered by the other substance in order for the event of dissolution to occur.51 
 
45 Ibid., 156-157. 
 




48 Ibid., 160. Chart adapted from Figure 6.1. 
 
49 Ibid., 153, 158-159; Lowe, “The Will,” 174. 
 
50 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 159. 
 
51 Ibid., 159-160; Lowe, “The Will,” 174. 
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An active power’s manifestation, on the other hand, is not caused by any outside substance or 
substances acting on the possessor and trigger the manifestation of the active power. This 
kind of power is what Lowe calls a spontaneous power, due to it occurring without having to 
be caused. The example Lowe gives is that of a radium atom undergoing radioactive decay. 
The atom emits particles spontaneously, with nothing acting upon the atom and causing the 
particles within to be emitted.52 
A causal power’s manifestation is constituted by the possessing individual substance 
acting upon and effecting a change in one or more other substances.53 An example causal 
power that is that of water’s power to dissolve salt.54 (This power’s being causal, on top of 
this same power’s also being passive, makes water’s power to dissolve salt a passive causal 
power). On the other hand, a non-causal power’s manifestation is not constituted by the 
possessing individual substance acting upon and bringing a change in any substance. Lowe’s 
prime example is that of a ball rolling down an incline, since this power consists in merely 
translational motion.55 This movement can result in a change, however: the ball could crush 
an object in its path on the way down the incline. The difference however is that, unlike a 
causal power, the non-causal power of the ball’s rolling is not constituted by the crushing of 
another object.56 Therefore, it seems that, according to Lowe’s definitions, the main 
indication of whether or not a power is causal or non-causal power is whether or not its 
exercise is constituted by bringing about a change in another substance. In reference to the 
examples we have been examining, water’s power to dissolve salt cannot occur without salt 
 
52 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 153, 159-160; Lowe, “The Will,” 174. 
 
53 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 153, 157; Lowe, “The Will,” 173. 
 
54 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 157; Lowe, “The Will,” 173. 
 
55 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 158; Lowe, “The Will,” 174. 
 
56 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 158; Lowe, “The Will,” 175. 
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being dissolved and therefore cannot occur without another substance changing—but a ball 
can roll down an incline without bringing about any change in another substance. 
 This notion of non-causal power, as innocuous and mundane as a ball rolling down an 
incline seems, is not unimportant to Lowe’s causation theory, but indeed holds a central place 
in it. This is because, according to Lowe, the human will is an active non-causal power: not 
only is the manifestation of the human will uncaused, but it also does not consist in any 
effects.57 Moreover, human action is considered to be substance causation, in accordance 
with Lowe’s theory, in that it is the human person who holds causal primacy concerning any 
effects she happens to generate through the exercise of her will.58 This stands in contrast to 
those theorists who would claim that an agent practices agency through causing her will or 
intentions. For Lowe, to will is just to exercise agential power.59 
Further, because this non-causality of the will seems to prima facie curtail the agent’s 
causal ability, Lowe attempts to account for agential efficacy by appealing to the idea that 
one power type can result in the manifestation of another. In other words, the manifestation 
of a non-causal power can and does regularly result in change since it has the ability to result 
in another type (active or passive and causal or non-causal, whatever it may be) of power 
manifesting. Lowe argues that such is the example with the ball rolling down an incline 
having the ability to crush an object in its path, and such is the agent when she exercises the 
power of her will.60 
Through this characterization of agential power, Lowe attempts to account for 
incompatibilist agential freedom, that is, the ability of the agent to originate a causal course at 
 
57 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 160-161; Lowe, “The Will,” 174-175. 
 
58 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 162; Lowe, “The Will,” 175-176. 
 
59 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 162; Lowe, “The Will,” 176, 178. 
 
60 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 161; Lowe, “The Will,” 175. 
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any given point of decision making, as opposed to agent action being causally determined by 
forces extrinsic to the agent’s exercise of her power, including the agent’s own set of beliefs 
and desires.61 Lowe reasons that if the exercise of the will did consist in agential effects, then 
it could not be rightly described as free; on the other hand, if the will failed to ever result in 
change, then there is reason to doubt that it could not be rightly be described as the agent’s 
power. Thus, through the notion of the will being an active non-causal power, Lowe wishes 
to retain the freedom and power of the will, and thus to account for the causal primacy and 
efficacy of human persons.62 
1.3.2 Problems with Non-Causal Power 
The notion of agent power being active seems intuitive enough, and acceptable 
enough for those philosophers willing to forego a completely deterministic view of reality. 
But is the notion of agential power being non-causal likewise acceptable? I argue that it is 
not, and, further, that this unacceptability stems from the internal incoherency involved in the 
very notion of a non-causal power. 
I will begin my criticism of a non-causal power in one of the places Lowe begins an 
argument in favor of it, that is, with the example of the radium atom. According to Lowe, the 
radioactive decay of a radium atom is a good example of an active non-causal power in that it 
is clear that nothing is causing the atom to undergo this decay—to Lowe, the atom emits 
particles spontaneously—and likewise this decay does not result in any effects. Lowe seems 
especially pleased with this example, since, according to him, it demonstrates an occurrence 
of an active non-causal power in nature, and therefore its existence should be wholly 
acceptable even to those who are hardened naturalists.63 
 
61 E. J. Lowe, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 159, 175-176. 
 
62 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 163-164; Lowe, “The Will,” 176-178. 
 
63 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 153. 
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First, to characterize this power as active in the sense that Lowe means active—that 
is, spontaneous and undetermined—is somewhat oversimplified. The radium atom—by the 
fact that it is a radium atom—possesses the essentially characteristic half-life of all radium 
atoms of the same isotope. Along with this comes a fixed and objective probability for that 
atom to decay within a certain timeframe.64 To claim that the particle emission of decay is 
“uncaused” is to mischaracterize the nature of isotope decay. If it was truly as spontaneous 
and uncaused as Lowe wants to make it out to be, especially in light of what he wants to say 
about the exercise of human free will, it seems as if it would be just as likely for the atom 
emit eukaryotic cells, since there would be no physical or causal constraints on what is 
possible;65 but since we want to deny this unlikely scenario, or, at least not let it hinder our 
developing a theory of causation, we should not be so quick to dub this power as active in the 
sense that we want to say the exercise of the human will is active.66 In the case of the radium, 
it is not so much a question of what will happen, but if and when it will happen—only the if 
and when are really undetermined, leaving particle emission unpredictable. But for a human 
being, we want to leave the power of what also open for the agent herself to determine, thus 
making her power truly active. In any case, the “spontaneity” of this type of micro event 
seems to have little bearing on the discussion of causation as witnessed in macro objects, and 
so should not be given such a big role in our theory of causation.67 
 
 
64 Ibid., 159. 
 
65 Ralph D. Ellis, “Three Arguments Against Causal Indeterminacy,” Philosophia Volume 31, Issue 3-
4 (October 2004): 339-343. I am not arguing here that a human agent isn’t physically constrained in what she 
can do, only that she is not physically or causally constrained in what she can determine to do. 
 
66 Not only are eukaryotic cells possible, but, as Ellis concludes, it is just as likely for an electron to 
turn into a pigeon and fly away as it is for a causal event not to occur in light of causal preconditions that, 
barring the question of quantum indeterminacy, would be sufficient for it. See Ellis, “Three Arguments Against 
Causal Indeterminacy,” 343. 
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More importantly against Lowe’s theory, however, is that the power of the radium 
atom to decay cannot rightly be called non-causal. Remember that being non-causal means 
that the manifestation of the power does not consist in bringing about change in any 
substance or substances. However, the emission of particles does consist in changing the 
nature of the atom in question in that, after an emission, the atom has in the very least less 
energy. In some cases, these types of emissions result in an atom changing from one element 
to another. Further, the particles that were emitted are no longer under the purview of the 
essential nature of the “mother” atom. They have become their own substances, with causal 
powers of their own. It seems therefore that it is wholly rational to hold that radioactive decay 
is not a non-causal power. 
But even if my claim concerning the radium atom’s causal power is met with 
skepticism, we can also demonstrate the unviability of non-causality using what Lowe 
considers to be another typical example of a non-causal power: a ball rolling down an incline. 
Lowe claims that the power to roll down an incline is non-causally manifested by a spherical 
object which possesses it. Again this would mean that this manifestation does not consist in 
any change occurring to any substance or substances. However, an object can be crushed as a 
result of the spherical object rolling over it, and this would be an instance of this power 
causing an effect; what’s important to note for Lowe, though, is that the ball can roll without 
causing any effect, therefore making it a non-causal power.68  
The problem with this account is that what we are left with is a non-causal power’s 
operation resulting in an effect being brought about, but without an explanation of how an 
effect can indeed be caused without causal power operating. How exactly is it that a non-
causal power’s operation can be translated into causal power? In other words, what causal 
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power’s manifestation resulted in the crushing of an object? Indeed, on Lowe’s view, this is 
left a mystery. In an attempt at explanation, Lowe claims that the non-causal power is able to 
trigger the manifestation of another kind of power if that other power is passive and able to 
be triggered in the appropriate way. Thus, Lowe explains that a ball’s power to crush an 
object underneath it can be manifested through the manifestation of its power to roll 
triggering its power to crush. How exactly rolling triggers the manifestation of crushing, or 
how any non-causal power can trigger the manifestation of another power for that matter, is 
left unexplained.69 Nevertheless, it does seem intuitive and true to experience that a ball 
rolling down an incline can cause an object to be crushed under its weight, and certainly we 
can accept the truth of such a causal connection between rolling and crushing on theoretical 
grounds. But how can the truth of this be reconciled with the idea of something non-causal 
having caused something? 
My solution involves an affirmation—yes, a spherical object can crush objects that it 
happens to roll over—but also a denial: what is at work in this scenario is not Lowe’s notion 
of non-causal power, but several causal powers working in tandem. Remember that Lowe 
dubs this non-causal power the power of translational motion—the moving of the sphere 
from one point in space to another.70 However, we can also make sense of this translational 
movement utilizing purely causal language without having to appeal to anything as abstruse 
as a non-causal power, thereby rendering any change that occurs as a result of the ball’s 
rolling consistent with causal activity.  
The spherical object, because it is a spatially extended object, is an object that 
possesses the property of having mass. All objects that have mass have causal powers 
entailed by mass, including the powers to be attracted and to attract other objects that also 
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possess mass. This force, which is a natural and essential feature of objects with mass, is 
otherwise known as gravitational force. The gravitational pull of the earth causally acts upon 
the spherical object, pulling it downwards towards the earth’s center of gravity. Likewise, the 
sphere also pulls on the earth, but this force is negligible in comparison to that of the earth’s 
power. Furthermore, because of it being spherical in shape, the sphere only comes in contact 
with the flat plane of the incline at a relatively small point in comparison to its overall surface 
area. As the sphere comes into contact with the incline, the surface tension of each object 
acting on the other causes resistance to be applied to the sphere at the relatively small contact 
point. Since the sphere is spherical, this easily puts the sphere into a spin if the sphere is in 
motion. If the earth’s gravity is pulling the sphere downwards, then it is indeed in motion, 
and furthermore, the resistance against the earth’s pull provided by the incline redirects this 
motion laterally. Hence, the sphere moves from one point to another as it rolls down an 
incline. As can be seen, it is reasonable to hold that this is not a manifestation of the sphere’s 
non-causal power to roll. We can view it as several causal powers acting in tandem to move 
the sphere from one location to another. Characterizing this motion as the singular non-causal 
power to roll is to mistake a higher-order explanatory expression (i.e., the ball “rolling down 
an incline”) for the fundamental first-order causal powers at work—e.g., the gravitational pull 
of the earth and the ball, the resistance force being applied to the ball and the incline, etc.—in 
the substances involved in this causal scenario. 
Lowe may counter that, due to the bare fact that the ball’s rolling down incline does 
not consist in anything more than translational motion, we can still rightly consider this 
rolling as a non-causal power. However, a ball’s rolling down an incline does consist in more 
than just translational movement. In addition to all the effects involved in my above account, 
micro changes, and perhaps imperceptible macro changes, occur in the structures of both the 
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incline and of the ball when a ball rolls down an incline.71 To deny these changes is to deny 
something fundamentally valuable to the substance theorist about substances in relation to 
their composite materials and to their interaction with other physical materials. These 
materials are ever changing in nature, yet the identity conditions of substances allow them to 
survive such changes. Even though the ball rolls down the incline seemingly with no 
changes, this does not mean changes have not occurred, and the substance theorist should 
readily admit them. Further, to perhaps characterize the difference between my account and 
Lowe’s account as merely a difference in semantics, and thus unimportant, is to muddle the 
issue of developing a metaphysical account of causation. We need to be able to distinguish 
between actual first-order causal movers and the second-order expressions we utilize to 
describe their activity. We are attempting to develop a theory of causation, in the 
metaphysically weighty sense, not a theory of how events should be talked about.  
This lack of a theoretically defensible, empirical account of non-causal power in 
nature puts Lowe’s theory of human agency into jeopardy. Recall that Lowe believes his 
theory requires the exercise of the human will to be a non-causal power in order explain how 
the exercise of the human will is not deterministic in nature. Lowe wants the agent to be able 
to exercise her will without having to commit to any action that would be causally 
determinable, which would lead to subsequent determined effects. In essence, Lowe wants 
the manifestation of the will to result in only modally unnecessary actions being committed 
by the agent in order to preserve her incompatibilist freedom at any given point in decision 
making. The way he attempts to accomplish an account of incompatibilist human freedom is 
by postulating that the manifestation of the will does not consist in any action—that is, it is 
non-causal. However, without a plausibly held example of a non-causal power operating in 
 
71 I want to credit David S. Oderberg for pointing this out.  
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the observable, material realm, it is more difficult to accept that such a power would exist in 
the unobservable mental realm than Lowe would like.  
A further problem for Lowe is that the agent needs to be able to affect some kind of 
change, or how else could an agent be considered to have agency? Lowe recognizes this need 
for an explanation and postulates that non-causal powers can somehow trigger other powers 
into manifesting. However, in light of his holding that the manifestation of the will is, indeed, 
a non-causal power, he fails to explain how this could possibly be. Despite what Lowe is 
attempting to accomplish with it, this conception of agency seems as if it could only allow the 
agent to produce change per accidens, that is, as an uncontrolled and not necessarily intended 
side consequence of the agent manifesting her will, and therefore not a product of any kind of 
agential causal determination.  
Some supporters of Lowe’s view may counter that this is an acceptable consequence 
of Lowe’s theory of agency—it is better to trade an agent’s ability to strictly determine what 
effects she causes for her ability to freely choose her actions in the incompatibilist sense. 
Some may even point out that our experience with exercising our powers seems to reflect 
this—we don’t always end up with the effects that we were after when we have acted. First, 
in response to this objection, the unattended effects that our actions sometimes result in may 
not necessarily have anything to do with the ontology of our causal power and may wholly 
have to do with our epistemological limits: perhaps we just do not always know what actions 
will result in our desired effects. Since these are both plausible explanations for the same 
common experience, it would be unwise to accept one explanation over the other without the 
basis of further evidence.  
Second, and more importantly, despite the prima facie suitability of trading agential 
control of agential effects for incompatibilist free will, the benefits of this tradeoff still fails 
to justify our accepting an ontology of non-causal powers. Indeed, if all agent effects were 
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fundamentally change per accidens, then Lowe’s entire theory of substance causation itself 
would be undermined, at least in the case of human agents. This is because the theory of 
substance causation—like all similar views that hold to the existence of causal powers—
maintains that causal primacy belongs intrinsically to the entities that are involved in any 
given cause and effect relationship. Characteristic of the substance view, the entity doing the 
causing is the substance itself, as it exercises the powers that are either first-order properties 
or derivative from the first-order properties that the substance possesses.72 The notion of non-
causal powers, however, seems to place causal primacy—at least in the case of an agent 
manifesting a non-causal power that results in change—outside of the realm of substances 
and into the realm of relations. It is now no longer the agent herself causing change, that is, 
the agent substance’s intrinsic causal power. It is the agent’s extrinsic non-causal 
manifestations triggering the manifestation of other powers accidentally that are the real 
prime movers in any given causal scenario. This calls into question if whether causal effects 
can really deterministically originate within human agents. 
A further conceptual problem also arises because, as a concept that is proposed to 
account for how an agent possesses incompatibilist freedom, non-causal power alienates the 
agent from her actions to an unacceptable degree. This alienation results in problems 
explaining (1) how an agent ensures a causal link between his willing and action, and (2) how 
any action can be rightly attributed to the agent who caused it. (1) is indicative of an 
unacceptable lack of causal power possessed by an agent. We want to be able to say that we 
as rational agents have a higher degree of causal ability than merely causing the outcomes we 
wish to achieve per accidens; we want to say we determine our actions. (2) has to do with 
action ownership, that is, responsibility. How can I be responsible and know that I am 
 
72 Lowe, “Substance Causation,” 157-158; E. J. Lowe, “On the Individuation of Powers,” in The 
Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and their Manifestations, ed. by Anna Marmodoro (New York: 
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responsible for the outcome of my actions if my actions are not entirely within my causal 
control? Obviously, a lot of moral and ethical considerations ride on this ontological issue. 
But barring any debate on what degree of control is necessary for moral responsibility and 
accountability, it is intuitively believed that human beings are responsible for their actions. 
Non-causal powers seem to weaken the basis for such accountability. 
More importantly for formulating a theory of general causation, the notion of non-
causal power, especially as observed in Lowe’s natural examples, falters in the same fashion 
as Hume’s regularity account of causation: it mistakes an epistemologically valuable, higher-
order expression—one that is good for belief formation and justification—for what is actually 
occurring on a causally fundamental level of causal powers. Yes, the ball may be moving 
from one point in space to another, and yes it may not crush an object during its trip. 
However, we cannot ignore the very real causal powers at work in this instance of causation 
in order to formulate multi-applicable causal generalities concerning the movement of rolling 
objects, and how they may or may not crush objects, however epistemically valuable this 
may be for the discussion of such activities. Moving forward, it is clear that the notion of 
non-causal powers should be dispensed with. But what about the notions of passive and 
active powers? How do we make sense of powers in relation to each other, or the entities that 
possess them? The next section seeks to ontologically define and categorize powers, in order 
to clarify the nature of causation in general. 
1.4 Making Sense of an Ontology of Powers  
 In order to develop a reasonable ontology of powers, it is important to clarify what 
powers are. There seems to be a consensus amongst those who hold powers views of 
causation (or disposition views, depending on the philosopher in question)73 that powers are 
 
73 I favor the “powers” terminology due to clarity it provides in highlighting the existence of certain 
properties possessed by substances, although I use both terms interchangeably. See note 2 of this chapter. 
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properties possessed by concrete particulars. There is not as much agreement, however, 
concerning whether or not all properties are powerful in nature, that is, whether or not there 
are such things as purely categorical or purely qualitative properties. Further, as was the 
trouble with Lowe’s theory, questions surround how powers manifest themselves, whether or 
not there are causal pairings, so to speak, between different types of powers, or if these 
pairings are indeed subject to a Humean law-like regularity themselves. And last, questions 
surround what these concrete particulars that possess these properties are, fundamentally 
speaking—whether they are merely material objects or, as Lowe held, substances. Obviously, 
this last question is of significant importance to developing an adequate neo-Aristotelian 
view of substance causation, which is the goal here. 
1.4.1 Powers and Qualitative Properties 
 Consider a ball with the property of sphericity. Arguably, this property not only gives 
the ball a certain look to it—it is round in shape—but it also conveys to the ball the power to 
roll down an incline, such as in the previous thought experiment. It seems then that the one 
and same property gives the ball two features, one qualitative (i.e., a round shape) and one 
dispositional (i.e., the power to roll). Does this mean that, fundamentally speaking, all 
qualitative properties (i.e., categorical properties) are dispositional properties, and vice versa? 
Or are some properties purely qualitative?  
Some theorists favor a qualitative or categorical interpretation of properties in part 
because dispositional properties are empirically unobservable. Armstrong, in arguing against 
the powers view of causation, insists that all properties, regardless of the seeming behavior 
they confer on their objects, are fundamentally categorical in nature.74 Thus, he denies the 
metaphysical reality of powers. Similarly, Kristina Engelhard denies the existence of wholly 
 




dispositional properties, yet nevertheless holds that all properties have both categorical and 
dispositional features to them.75 So unlike Armstrong, she maintains the reality of powers, 
but argues that the knowledge of a property’s dispositional features can only be abstracted 
“from the fact or state of affairs which [the property] is part of.”76 John Heil also equates 
dispositional properties with qualitative properties, but he holds this relation as a strict 
identity relation.77 He argues that the idea of objects without qualities makes no sense; 
qualities are how entities possess power (i.e., entities possess power through their qualitative 
properties).78 Furthermore, without qualities, there are no individuators for powers, thereby 
precluding causal relations.79 
Then there are those theorists who favor a dispositional interpretation of properties 
over a qualitative one. Alexander Bird argues all properties are indeed dispositional—
essentially dispositional: the dispositional manifestation of a property is de re necessary for 
that property, determining its trans-world identity.80 Lowe himself holds that qualitative 
properties are not what confer power, but nevertheless may be part of what grounds a power. 
Moreover, the relation between a grounding qualitative property and a grounded power isn’t 
one-to-one.81 To go back to an example of his discussed earlier, a ball possesses the power to 
 
75 Kristina Engelhard, “Categories and the Ontology of Powers: A Vindication of the Identity  
Theory of Properties,” in The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and their Manifestations, ed. Anna 
Marmodoro (New York: Routledge, 2010), 41. 
 
76 Ibid., 53. To consider the categorical aspect of that same property, the property should not be 
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80 Alexander Bird, “The Regress of Pure Power?” The Philosophical Quarterly Volume 57, No. 229 
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81 Lowe, “On the Individuation of Powers,” 18-19. 
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roll because of its qualitative property sphericity. However, soap bubbles also possess 
sphericity but have no power to roll. Thus, sphericity itself cannot confer the power to roll; 
some other appropriate property is needed—such as rigidness—in order for an object to 
possess the power to roll.82 
Whether (at least some) power properties find their grounds in qualitative properties 
or whether they can be considered independent properties in their own right does not seem to 
affect the view being developed here. What is important to an account of substance causation 
in general, however, is that the power is possessed and wielded intrinsically by the substance 
that possesses it. This is especially true since powers are an essential part of a substance’s 
identity conditions.  
1.4.2 The Manifestation of Powers 
 How is it that the manifestation of a power results in the effect or effects that it does? 
For example, how is it that water’s power to dissolve salt and salt’s power to be dissolved in 
water actually ends up manifesting in the dissolution of salt in water? One way philosophers 
have accounted for this is through the notion of mutual manifestation. 
 The mutual manifestation thesis holds that each and every power or disposition is 
ontologically paired with its associated manifestation partner or partners and only by these 
dispositional pairings or groups do manifestations of power occur. Or, more simply, as 
Austin puts it, “there is no such thing as a manifestation of a single dispositional property.”83 
A power can only manifest when it is manifested with its manifestation partner.  
 The upshot to holding to the mutual manifestation thesis, its adherents believe, is that 








is negated.84 There is no limit to what can be considered a manifestation partner, and 
therefore all manifestations in any given causal scenario can be considered causally 
relevant.85 Furthermore, appealing to mutual manifestation provides an account of how a 
single power can have a wide variety of effects—one power can have varying manifestations 
based on whichever manifestation partner is present.86 
 The notion of manifestation partners, however, is incompatible with a true substance 
view of causation. This is because the manifestation of power is not the activity of 
intrinsically located power properties. Instead, manifestation is solely an extrinsic matter. 
Toby Handfield admits as much when, describing the manifestation of a rock shattering glass, 
he states that “[t]he explanation for why the rock and the glass have these two mutually 
complementary powers is that there is one manifestation kind—the shattering of a rock by a 
glass—in which both being a rock and being a glass are constituent properties.”87 It is clear 
by this view of causation that manifestation is not determined by anything intrinsic to the 
substances involved. Thus, according to the mutual manifestation thesis, it would seem that 
in a world without glass, the rock’s power to shatter glass is non-existent, since the rock’s 
power to shatter glass is constituted by properties of both the rock and the glass. Without the 
existence of glass, rock lacks this power. 
 
84 S.C. Gibb, “Mental Causation and Double Prevention,” in Mental Causation and Ontology,  
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 The mutual manifestation thesis is also rife with conceptual problems. Austin, in his 
analysis, points out two: an epistemological one and a metaphysical one. Regarding the 
epistemological problem, Austin explains:  
[I]f dispositional properties are to be individuated according to an entire array of 
wholly distinct possible manifestations, how could we ever come to know when we 
have an instance of a particular dispositional property? For we can no longer pick-out 
a disposition by means of knowing its characteristic manifestation conditions (nor its 
characteristic stimulus conditions, mind), because its “characteristic” manifestation is 
perhaps only its most frequent, or perhaps its most theoretically interesting 
manifestation.88 
 
The epistemological problem may be worse than Austin is characterizing it, however, since 
we could never attribute to a power a characteristic manifestation: its manifestation could 
never be isolated from its partners, and we therefore would never know what 
functional/behavioral contribution it is making. The metaphysical problem is closely 
connected to the epistemological one: if a single power has so many qualitative ways it can 
manifest, what metaphysically ties these differing manifestations together in the single 
property they arise from? Proponents of the mutual manifestation thesis, Austin argues, have 
no explanation.89  
Further, an ontology where everything is causally relevant leaves everything of equal 
causal importance. This is especially true if we take all manifestations in a causal scenario to 
be contributing to the outcome of the event in question. But do we really want this to be the 
case? It would seem to hinder our ability to provide useful causal explanations, and, further, 
it would leave our intuitions concerning what is useful about these explanations unaccounted 
for. For example, Maslen argues that causal explanations that are more explicit are more 
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pragmatic.90 He advocates utilizing Yablo’s process of “screening” in order to arrive at more 
pragmatically valuable causal explanations. Take for instance a death that is explained by 
“being hit by a red bus” that can be better explained by “being hit a by bus;” the fact that the 
bus was red can be “screened off” considering that if the bus was of any other color, the death 
would have still occurred; this process of screening helps us arrive at a better causal 
explanation.91  
Whether or not true explanations can be arrived at reliably through this screening 
process is beside the point. What is important to recognize is the intuitive appeal this process 
has. This intuition is completely mitigated, however, if every property in a scenario is equally 
causally contributing and/or the effects of singular properties are epistemologically 
inaccessible. We would have no way of arriving at useful causal explanations except to 
provide a detailed account of every property involved in an event, such as including the fact 
that the bus is red in the example above. Proponents of mutual manifestation would have to 
be committed to the bus’ redness being causally relevant since to deny that it is is to 
distinguish between true causes and background conditions, which the mutual manifestation 
thesis isn’t equipped to do. 
1.4.3 Arriving at Causal Understanding 
Obviously, what is noteworthy about a substance view of causation—as opposed to 
merely a generic powers view—is the fact that what is doing the causing is a substance, as 
opposed to object or property. Why is this significant, and how does it help account for 
causation? 
 
90 Cei Maslen, “Pragmatic Explanations of the Proportionality Constraint on Causation,” in Making a 
Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, ed. by Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Huw 
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Appealing to substances, for one, helps in causal explanation, due in part to way 
substances retain their identity through change. As we have seen Lowe argue above, 
substances have, unlike objects, ontological independence, and therefore do not depend on 
any objects for their identity. This ontological independence also allows them to persist 
through non-essential material changes.92 When we formulate causal explanations on the 
level of substances, we are able to track better the effects entities involved in causation are 
responsible for. 
Relatedly, it is important to note specifically that artifacts cannot be substances. 
According to Richard J. Connell, true substances are the independently existing substratum in 
which properties adhere. Therefore, substances can change some (i.e., non-essential) 
properties—like shape—and remain the same substance. Artifacts, on the other hand, do not 
withstand this kind of change well and further depend on substances for their own 
existence.93 In other words, unlike substances, artifacts lack ontological independence.94 
Hence, they cannot be substances. 
Taking artifacts to be non-substances like this aids in identifying causal powers at 
work in any given causal scenario. As a case in point, in arguing against powers having an 
immediate role in the causal behavior of macro objects, Bird gives an example of a steel ball 
and a wooden ball being exposed to fire. One ball has the property being composed of steel, 
the other has the property of being composed of wood. One catches fire and the other does 
not. Bird concludes that the constitutive properties of the balls are causally relevant to one 
catching fire and the other not, but that neither of these properties can be dispositional since 
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they are both constitutional of the balls.95 A better account of this causal event, however, 
would be to attribute properties not to the balls as objects, but to the wood and steel as 
substances. Wood has the property of being flammable at a lower temperature than steel 
catches flame, while steel is flammable (and melts as opposed to burns) at a higher 
temperature than wood. Powers of flammability belong to the constitutive materials that 
make up the balls, however—not to the balls. The shape of the balls—spherical—is also a 
contingent property held by both the individual wood and steel particulars. In that sense, Bird 
is getting the property-possessor relation backwards. What is doing the causal work is not the 
balls per se but the pieces of wood and steel which both happen to be ball-shaped. Taking the 
ball, an artifact, itself to be a substance—i.e., a possessor of power—would hinder us from 
identifying true causal dispositions at work. Such was also the problem with Lowe’s 
explanation of the causal powers at work with the ball rolling down an incline. 
Appealing to a neo-Aristotelian view of substances also allows us to take final causes 
into consideration, which is conducive to better causal understanding. What are final causes? 
David S. Oderberg, in defining final causes, distinguishes them from efficient causes by 
specifying that they “are the precondition of the very possibility of any efficient causality.”96 
He goes on to add: 
If fire burns wood but not pure water, if beta particles can penetrate a sheet of paper 
but not a sheet of lead, this can only be because the agents are ordered to some effects 
rather than others: they each have their own finality, which restricts the range of their 
effects… Remove the finality and you remove efficient causation altogether.97 
 
This ordering of effects was what theorists were getting at when they appealed to mutual 
manifestation. Mutual manifestation allowed for the idea that the quality of a manifestation 
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was due to the presence of a certain pairing or group of powers. The mutual manifestation 
thesis, however, was inherently untenable, and further, unfit for the purposes of explaining 
substantial causation since it drew too much of what causally motivated an event outside the 
substances involved. The notion of final cause, however, does much to explain the ordering 
of effects and, further in its favor, appeals only to the essential nature of a substance in 
question, thereby keeping all causal motivation intrinsic.98 
 It seems therefore that with a notion such as final causation, causal pairings do not 
need to be appealed to at all. This is even counter to Lowe’s view of “active” and “passive” 
causal power pairings. We can conclude that all that is necessary for an effect to occur is the 
triggering and manifestation of a power, which itself is contained wholly within a substance. 
The triggering conditions and the quality of the manifestation is determined wholly by the 
essential nature of the substance whose power it is. Granted, the triggering may occur as a 
response to the presence of powers belonging to one or more other outside substances. 
However, the manifestation of a power is wholly a product of the substance in question 
whose power it is, however mixed in with other manifestations it may be during a causal 
event. And thus, a reasonable theory of neo-Aristotelian substance causation can be provided, 
one that reflects a reasonable metaphysical account of causation while allowing for the 
generation of better causal explanations than any Humean regularity theory could generate. 
 
98 Much more will be said about final causes, especially regarding their role in a moral ontology, in 
chapter 6. 
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2. The Metaphysics of Human Agency 
2.1 Introduction 
 In Chapter 1 I briefly discussed human agency in the broader context of defending my 
view of a powers ontology as well as a point of contention with E. J. Lowe’s notion of 
noncausal power. I briefly mentioned in that chapter that, in order to preserve his theory of 
incompatibilist free will, Lowe rejects that beliefs and/or desires causally factor into rational 
action. Indeed, if a belief or desire of an agent determines her action, then the integrity of 
self-determination—and any ability to do otherwise in any given instance of decision-
making—is called into question.1 However, does not rejecting this role of internal states 
render agent action arbitrary? If agent actions are arbitrary, then they cannot be rational.  
In this chapter, I will expand on the topic of human agency, developing an account of 
agency that allows for the agent to be both rational and free. I will reject reasons internalism 
on the same basis that Lowe does, in that it bars incompatibilist human freedom.2 Instead, 
borrowing from Lowe, I will account for rational action via reasons externalism, based on 
Jonathan Dancy’s notion of reasons as states of affairs. The goal of this chapter is to provide 
an account of human agency and rational action that allows for the agent to be completely 
self-determined, i.e., undetermined by causal forces—including desires—outside agential 
control.  
I will start with an analysis of reasons internalism, beginning with Bernard Williams’ 
seminal theory. Because this theory calls into question incompatibilist freedom, I will look at 
attempts to rectify problems, focusing on Timothy O’Connor’s causal analysis of the role of 
desires. I will reject O’Connor’s theory on the basis that it fails to reconcile freedom, both 
 





compatibilist and incompatibilist, with an internalist understanding of rationality. Then I will 
provide an account of externalism, largely adopting Lowe’s view of rational agency. I will 
also provide an account of states of affairs as motivating, utilizing Dancy’s analysis.  
Note that for the purposes of this chapter, I am concerned with the question of reasons 
as causes or causal conditions for action, and thus whether reasons are causally efficient 
mental states.3 More specifically, I will be determining whether desires are the causal origin 
of human action, or, in other words, if motivating reasons are desires. So whereas the 
literature on agential reasons reflects a much broader philosophical issue, the concern with 
the topic of reasons here is narrowly focused on the metaphysical status of so-called 
“motivating” reasons and how to reconcile reasons with incompatibilist free will. Any other 
issue having to do with reasons, such as their normativity—e.g., their rightness or wrongness 
given a certain situation or agent, etc.4—will be secondary to the metaphysical issue at hand. 
2.2 Reasons Internalism 
According to Bernard Williams’ theory of rational action, an agent has a reason to 
perform an action if the agent has some desire that would be satisfied by performing said 
action, or a belief that his desire would be satisfied by performing said action.5 The way that 
deliberation serves practical reasoning, according to Williams, consists in either finding new 
actions which one has a reason to perform or in finding new reasons to perform a certain 
action under review.6 It is through this internal conception of reasons that Williams attempts 
to account for both the causal and rational origin of agential effects.7  
 
3 Maria Alverez, Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 50. 
 
4 Ibid., 9. 
 
5 Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 101. 
 
6 Ibid., 104. 
 
7 Ibid., 102-103. 
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Reasons internalism is in contrast to reasons externalism, which Williams understands 
to be the position of taking of reasons to be independent of agent desire.8 According to 
Williams, externalism is an untenable position: 
If something can be a reason for action, then it could be someone’s reason for acting 
on a particular occasion, and it would then figure in an explanation of that action. 
Now no external reason statement could by itself offer an explanation of anyone’s 
action…The whole point of external reason statements is that they can be true 
independently of the agent’s motivations. But nothing can explain an agent’s 
(intentional) actions except something that motivates him so to act. So something else 
is needed besides the truth of the external reason statement to explain action, some 
psychological link; and that psychological link would seem to be belief. A’s believing 
an external reason statement about himself may help to explain his action [emphasis 
original].9 
 
Williams goes on to argue that belief alone cannot motivate action.10 Therefore, Williams 
maintains that an externalist account of reasons needs to explain how certain beliefs can 
beget new motivations if it is to be taken seriously. However, Williams does not think such 
an account is possible without having to utilize internalistic claims, and as such externalist 
accounts are liable to collapse into internalism.11 He concludes that the only genuine reasons 
for action are internalistic ones,12 that is, those that consist in desires.13 
 The difficulty with internalism, as presented without further development, is that the 
notion of reasons as desires—or beliefs about desires—is in natural tension with free, self-
determining human agency. This tension arises from holding that rational actions are only 
 
 
8 Ibid., 101. 
 
9 Ibid., 106-107. 
 
10 Ibid., 107-108. 
 
11 Ibid., 108-109. 
 
12 Ibid., 111. 
 
13 Ibid., 101. See also Neil Sinclair, “Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons,” 
Dialectica 71 (2017): 209. Sinclair defines internalism as the position that affirms a necessary conceptual 
connection between a normative reason and an agent’s having rational cognitive access to existing motivation. It 
is the position of this paper, however, that to be motivated is just to be in a desire state, as will be clarified 
below. As such, defining internalism as the position that holds that reasons are desire states, as Williams does, is 
a simple and accurate reflection of the internalist position. 
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those actions that serve to fulfill our desires. As Joseph Raz points out, in the simplest 
understanding of the desire-belief model of reasons, practical reasoning would have to consist 
solely in determining what one desires to do most.14 In this sense, our strongest desires, in a 
primitive way, determine our actions. It seems like we would not even have the power to 
refrain, since refraining itself would have to be born of our desires to refrain. So unless my 
desire to refrain from performing is stronger than my desire to perform some action, it is 
certain I shall perform said action. Otherwise, I would be irrational since I would be acting 
contrary to my only reason for action. Due to this constraint on rational action, I do not have 
the ability to do otherwise let alone choose my course of action in the incompatibilist sense.15 
Thus, I lack incompatibilist free will.  
 Of course, many internalist theories aren’t this simplistic. Michael Smith’s theory, for 
example, holds that whether or not we should perform some action depends on what “our 
fully rational selves” would advise us to do given our actual situation.16 Further, the goal of 
deliberation is not to determine which desires to drop or adopt per se, but to build a coherent 
set of desires.17 The way this set is formed is by determining whether our desires are 
“systematically justifiable.” As Smith explains: 
What do I mean when I say that we sometimes deliberate by trying to find out 
whether our desires, as a whole, are systematically justifiable? I mean just that we can 
try to decide whether or not some particular underived desire that we have or might 
have is a desire to do something that is itself non-derivatively desirable, and that we 
do this in a certain characteristic way: namely, by trying to integrate the object of that 
desire into a more coherent and unified desiderative profile and evaluative outlook.18 
 
14 Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 50.  
 
15 See Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 120-121, for a discussion of how incompatibilism requires both the ability to do otherwise and the ability 
to originate a course of action. 
 
16 Michael Smith, “Internal Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 112. 
 
17 Ibid., 113-115. 
 




This coherence and unity of desires out of which the agent operates itself gives the set of 
desires rational preference; moreover, it guards against holding onto or adopting desires that 
cannot rationally fit within the desire set.19 
Unlike Williams’ theory, Smith’s theory isn’t agent relative. In other words, Smith 
doesn’t hold along with Williams that individual desires, privately held, only have rational 
force for individual agents that possess them. On the contrary, Smith believes that the rational 
requirement for desires to be coherent in each individual agent rationally ensures, in the 
Kantian sense, that all desires of all agents will converge onto a single desire set; therefore all 
desires will have rational force for all agents.20 Any given reason will be a reason for 
everyone, although reasons may apply differently to different people relative to given 
circumstances.21 
 If we understand internalism correctly, then we have to conclude that rational actions 
are those actions that fulfill our desires. Therefore, the notion of our fully rational selves 
would be the notion of ourselves as acting in order to perfectly serve our fully informed and 
maximally coherent desires. We still have not gotten away from the idea that our desires are 
so deterministic that we lack the ability to do otherwise and, by extension, lack free will. We 
still seem to be brutely following our desires, such as with Raz’s simple version of the belief-
desire model.22 Smith almost gets around this criticism by appealing to a coherent desire set 
that arises via systematic justification. We would have a commitment to our desires so long 
as they are coherent, and acting rationally would be acting to fulfill the desires of our 
 
19 Ibid., 115. 
 
20 Ibid., 118-120. 
 
21 Ibid., 120-122. 
 
22 Raz, Engaging Reason, 50.  
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rationally formed desire set. However, we still wouldn’t have the ability to do otherwise 
during a decision-making event in light of our desires. 
 A further problem is accounting for how systematic justification is able to override 
desire, which it would need to do in order to form a coherent desire set. Upon reflection, 
Smith’s commitment to systemic justification, in order for it function, would end up running 
counter Williams’ contention that belief itself has no ability to motivate.23 Indeed, how can a 
belief about a desire, regarding its coherency with other desires, override said desire? It could 
only do so if it was self-motivating or accompanied by a desire to have coherent desires. If it 
was self-motivating, then there’s no reason to be committed to systematic justification and 
the existence of a desire set to motivate an agent. And if it was accompanied by a desire to 
have a coherent desire set, then agents in this case still merely brutishly follow their desires. 
So what’s to prevent agents from brutishly following their desires in all cases? Why appeal to 
systematic justification and the formation of a desire set at all? Moreover, given that desires 
are the only things that can motivate, how can it be assumed that all agents are converging on 
the same desire set given that it would need to be our overriding desire for coherent desires, 
not rationality, that dictate what desires we adopt? It seems as if Smith’s theory may also 
falter at the point of desires being deterministic. More needs to be said about the causal role 
of desire in order to make sense of an internalist schema that retains some semblance of self-
determining agency. 
2.2.1 O’Connor’s Reasons Internalism  
Like Williams, O’Connor defines reasons as agential desire (however, he claims his 
theory can work with other conceptions of internal reasons).24 He lays out the conditions for 
rational action (in terms of desire) as follows: 
 
23 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 107-108. 
 
24 Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 85-86. 
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The agent acted then in order to satisfy his antecedent desire that Θ if  
 
1. prior to this action, the agent had a desire that Θ and believed that by so 
acting he would satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire; 
2. The agent’s action was initiated (in part) by his own self-determining causal 
activity, the event component of which is the-coming-to-be-of-an-action-
triggering-intention-to-so-act-here-and-now-to-satisfy-Θ;  
3. concurrent with this action, he continued to desire that Θ and intended of  
this action that it satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire; and  
4. the concurrent intention was a direct causal consequence (intuitively, a 
continuation) of the action-triggering intention brought about by the agent, and 
it causally sustained the completion of the action.25 
 
Condition (2) is what O’Connor considers to be the agential decision point;26 this is where 
indeterminism supposedly comes to bear on agential action. 
O’Connor clarifies how these conditions work in tandem by addressing the 
Davidsonian contention that a reason for an action held by an agent prior to performing said 
action can still fail to be the reason for which said action was performed. Through an 
exposition of his conditions, O’Connor explains how intentions are freely formed and how, 
once formed, they cannot fail to result in action: 
The answer [to Davidson’s challenge] draws on all of the conditions. First, note that 
condition (3) is met only if I intend of my action that it satisfy the desire in question. 
(Recall that the relevant kind of intention is precisely an intention that triggers and 
sustains the action.) If I am conscious of a desire that I believe would be satisfied by 
my action but do not intend that my action satisfy it—maybe it is not a great concern 
to me or I have a desire that conflicts with it—then I do not truly act to satisfy it. 
Conditions (2) and (4) ensure that the intention is not undercut or short‐circuited in 
some way, thereby making it explanatorily irrelevant. In connection with (2), recall 
my argument in chapter 3 that an agent‐causal event could not itself be directly 
produced, either by the agent himself or by any other factor. This precludes some 
external factor’s initiating my action, independent of my having had those reasons to 
which the intention refers. Condition (4), by requiring that that intention causally 
sustains the completion of the action, suffices to rule out any scenario in which some 
external factor takes over at this later state, independent of my having begun to act on 
reasons I had prior to acting.27 
 
 




27 Ibid., 87. 
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Thus, Davidson’s challenge does not even come to bear in that an agent’s intention, and thus 
reason, cannot fail to result in the action that the agent intends. 
Another Davidsonian issue that O’Connor deals with consists in the claim that the 
agent can be wrong about her reasons especially when she has two or more in conflict. This 
would call into question an intention’s ability sustain the action, as per condition (4), which 
would seemingly be mitigated if the agent was mistaken about her reasons for acting. 
O’Connor addresses this issue by admitting that the agent’s awareness of her motivations 
comes in degrees, and, further, that the agent sometimes is not aware of the reason or reasons 
for which she acts. Since she can be genuinely mistaken or even deceive herself about her 
reasons, she may not know the contents of her action-triggering intention. As a consequence, 
O’Connor concedes that if the agent is wrong about her intention, then she does not act 
freely.28 
O’Connor goes on to deal with the case of the agent believing that her reasons did not 
favor her chosen action, but favored another course of action—yet, despite these reasons, the 
agent chose her action. This would seemingly force us to judge that the agent’s action was 
arbitrarily chosen, an undesirable assessment when trying to give an account of action that is 
rational. In response to this, O’Connor argues that his theory does not, in fact, require that the 
agent’s action is judged arbitrary in this circumstance. The restrictions on rational choice that 
would warrant such a judgment are too great; they would not leave room for the possibility of 
more than one equally rational choice is available to the agent.29 O’Connor points out that 
when selecting a gallon of milk from a row of indistinguishable gallons of milk at the 
supermarket, the choice is seemingly arbitrary: no one gallon of milk is better than the 
 
28 Ibid., 87-88. 
 
29 Ibid., 89-90. 
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other.30 It would be wrong, however, to say that the picking of the one chosen gallon of milk 
over all the others renders the whole action of picking a gallon of milk arbitrary; the agent 
still performs the action for a reason since the agent desires milk, and the action is considered 
rational. 
Relatedly, O’Connor also addresses the common conflicts that arise between moral 
duties and desires. The example he gives is that of deliberating between working or spending 
time with a friend in need. Perhaps one is too absorbed with work and should therefore spend 
more time with friends, etc. However, O’Connor argues that whatever one chooses in this 
instance would be “subjectively rational” since the action “fits” with one’s character.31 
O’Connor further extends this problem to include when the agent is confronted with the 
possibility of two or more courses of action—each with different kinds of motivations but of 
the same level of reasonableness. The example he uses is choosing between what leisure 
activities to engage in while taking a break from work. Again, O’Connor argues that 
whatever one chooses, since it is in line with one’s character, is rational.32 A subtype of this 
case, according to O’Connor, is when the agent has many conflicting, yet equally regarded, 
values. It is in this instance that, in order to account for agent rationality in this type of 
decision-making, O’Connor admits the agent needing to rank values.33 
To account for the importance of reasons in agent causation without giving them 
causally determining power (with the hopes of thus maintaining agential free will), O’Connor 
argues that reasons fulfill a structuring role, as opposed to a causally efficient role, in agent 
causation.34 This structure also consists in persistent states of the agent’s character, which 
 




32 Ibid., 90. 
 
33 Ibid., 90-91. 
 
34 Ibid., 95. 
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include the agent’s “relatively fixed dispositions and long-standing general intentions and 
purposes.”35 According to O’Connor, an agent’s action arises out of and is guided by her 
structured propensity. Specifically, the agent exercises her free power when she generates her 
intentions on the basis of her propensity. O’Connor explains this as follows: 
[I]t is as cause that the agent may be said to carry a propensity to generate a specific 
type of intention. We may suppose, that is, that recognizing a reason to act induces or 
elevates an objective propensity of the agent to initiate the behavior. One large 
independent advantage of thinking of tendencies as being carried in this way on the 
cause, not the effect, side of the equation, is that we needn’t mysteriously invoke 
chance when asked to explain why a particular tendency is realized. Instead, the agent 
himself brings about the intention’s obtaining.36 
 
Since it is the agent herself bringing about the intention, and not the reason, the agent 
maintains free agency. As O’Connor clarifies further: 
In any plausible construal of the causal theory of action, the agent’s coming to have, 
or to recognize, reasons to act do not immediately trigger the intention. They set in 
motion a deliberative process that involves many other factors and culminates in 
forming the intention…The claim [being made here], in the position now entertained, 
is that when the wider context is right—when the agent is so internally constituted and 
externally situated as to be capable just then of exerting active power—then the 
uniformly characteristic influence of the state of having or recognizing reasons to A 
is ultimately transmitted into an influence on the agent’s causal capacity, giving it a 
propensity structure in the manner indicated.37 
 
Although it is not entirely clear what O’Connor means by “influence,” it seems O’Connor is 
arguing that since reasons don’t have a direct role in causation then they can be considered 
not strictly determining. What does have a direct causal role, according to O’Connor, is the 
agent’s own “causal capacity,” seemingly exercised through intentions that the agent forms. 
Thus, the agent remains a free self-determining agent. 
 
 
35 Ibid., 97-98. 
 
36 Ibid., 97. 
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O’Connor also considers the scenario where the agent has only one reason to commit 
one action, a scenario which would seem to result in the said reason being deterministic. 
O’Connor answers this problem by reference to Duns Scotus, who held that an agent always 
has the ability to refrain from an action. However, the question remains as to whether an 
agent has a reason to refrain, since if she does not, she would not. O’Connor simply replies 
that the agent could possibly refrain for a time.38 With this answer, however, there still 
remains a question of whether or not this action is ultimately causally determined. In 
response, O’Connor admits that his view does not include “that agents always act freely, only 
that when they do, their acting was not then inevitable.”39 Thus, in a scenario where the agent 
has only one reason, even O’Connor himself admits that her freedom is largely limited. 
2.2.2 Problems with O’Connor’s View and Internalism in General 
Problems with O’Connor’s view stem from his basic project of trying to give an 
explanation of actions in terms of an internalistic conception of reasons while maintaining 
that reasons do not cause action. This would allow agents’ actions to be explainable via 
internal states—and therefore rational—but also allow agents themselves to be causal 
originators of their actions—and thus free. Giving an account of how actions can causally 
originate with the agent and yet be explainable via internal states is the basic project of any 
internalist trying to maintain some semblance of agential freedom. 
The way O’Connor addresses the issue at hand is through specifically analyzing the 
role of the agent’s desire in the formation of an intention. Recall O’Connor’s conditions for 
reasonable action:  
The agent acted then in order to satisfy his antecedent desire that Θ if  
 
1. prior to this action, the agent had a desire that Θ and believed that by so 
acting he would satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire; 
 
38 Ibid., 100. 
 
39 Ibid., 101.  
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2. The agent’s action was initiated (in part) by his own self-determining causal 
activity, the event component of which is the-coming-to-be-of-an-action-
triggering-intention-to-so-act-here-and-now-to-satisfy-Θ;  
3. concurrent with this action, he continued to desire that Θ and intended of  
this action that it satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire; and  
4. the concurrent intention was a direct causal consequence (intuitively, a 
continuation) of the action-triggering intention brought about by the agent, and 
it causally sustained the completion of the action.40 
 
Conditions (1) and (2) seem to indicate that the agent’s reasons merely consist in the desires 
that are the focus of an agent’s intention formation. Condition (2) precludes anything, 
including the agent herself, of forming an intention independent of her desires—otherwise the 
subsequent action is considered unreasonable. In order to give an account of free agency, 
O’Connor claims, as per condition (2) that the agent generates her intention in virtue of the 
reasons she has, that is, in virtue of her desires. So, under O’Connor’s theory, it is in the 
generation of intentions that both reasons come to bear and agential freedom comes into play. 
According to O’Connor’s view, it is irrational for an agent to form an intention 
counter to her reasons—reasons being her desires that factor into forming of intentions. More 
specifically, O’Connor’s definition of free action, according to his conditions, requires that an 
agent act in accordance with her desires in order for her actions to be considered not only 
reasonable, but self-determined. Any action considered free and reasonable will involve 
intention-generating desires, making it impossible for an agent not to form an intention in 
accordance with her desire if we are to consider her “free” and “reasonable.” There are two 
ways we can preserve free action given this rational stipulation: 1) give the agent the ability 
to choose between desires, and 2) allow the agent to refrain from fulfilling her desires. 
O’Connor attempts both avenues but subsequently fails to preserve freedom. This failure is a 
failure of internalism generally.  
 
40 Ibid., 86. 
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Concerning the first avenue, the ability to choose between desires: it would only be 
reasonable, in the sense that O’Connor theory explicates reason (as desire-based), to allow 
strong desires to negate weaker ones. If we didn’t allow this, we would be basing rationality 
of action on something other than desire, thereby negating O’Connor’s whole project. 
Therefore, the agent would always be rationally obligated to act in accordance with her 
strongest desire at any given moment. If she fails to act on her strongest desire, her action 
cannot be considered reasonable, according to O’Connor’s internalist definition of 
reasonable. And if the agent’s action cannot be considered reasonable, it cannot be 
considered free.  
Moreover, according to O’Connor’s conditions (2) and (4), the action-triggering 
intention—which is caused by the agent—causes a concurrent intention necessary to follow 
said action to completion; consequently, the agent has no power to put a stop to an intention 
once it is formed. Thus, even if we were to accept it is the case that a desire does not lead to 
action is when a stronger desire overrides it (and that this overriding is sufficient for agential 
freedom), the agent needs to be aware of her stronger desire before she forms her intention. 
Otherwise, if her intention is formed before full awareness of desires is reached, the agent is 
mistaken about her intention. And O’Connor does not allow the agent to be mistaken about 
her intention and retain agential freedom.41 Therefore, our actions must always be determined 
by our strongest desires in order to be considered free—yet, this is incompatible with the  
notion of freedom we’re trying to preserve. It seems as if O’Connor’s view collapses into 
Raz’s crude and simplistic version of internalism, an undesirable outcome. 
O’Connor might counter that the agent can still be free to choose between competing 
desires of equal strength. However, this seems to confine freedom, according to O’Connor’s 
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view, exclusively to the domain of cases like taking milk off the dairy case in the 
supermarket, that is, to cases of choosing between completely indistinguishable low-value 
options. This is because, arguably, the set of desires surrounding anything more significant 
seems to have more contrastive gradations. Even if we did allow for the agent to choose 
between equally competing desires (thereby narrowing the scope of O’Connor’s account 
severely), according to O’Connor conditions, the subsequent action would fail to be 
reasonable and thus free. This is due to the causal activity of an agent inherently stemming 
from her reasons, i.e., the commitment that internalists have to internal reasons as a 
necessary condition for causal activity. In the case of O’Connor, whatever would be 
overriding a competing desire could only be another desire, and not the agent herself, since a 
desire is needed for the activity to get off the ground, so to speak. Therefore, the agent would 
have only the option of following her strongest desires, and we’ve reverted back to Raz’s 
crude notion of internalism. 
Now concerning the second avenue, the agent’s ability to refrain: in addressing the 
scenario where the agent only has one reasonable option available, O’Connor admits that all 
he strictly contends is that any action at any given moment is not inevitable.42 In other words, 
O’Connor contends that his theory, at the very least, preserves the agent’s ability to refrain 
from acting. Counter to O’Connor’s contention, however, his theory does not even allow 
refraining. Since refraining would essentially be the agent refusing to act on her desire 
without reason (i.e., with no desire), it would be considered unreasonable—and subsequently 
unfree—on O’Connor’s theory of free and rational action. The only way an agent could 
choose to refrain is if her desire to refrain was stronger than her desire to commit the action 
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in question, and we are once again back to Raz’s undesirable caricature of internalism where 
the strongest desire wins. 
Now it has become clear why internalism has a natural tension within it that is 
impossible to escape. In order for an action to be considered free, it must not be determined 
by internal states. In order for an action to be considered free, it must not be arbitrary, which 
would be inconsistent with its being rational. In order for an action to be considered rational, 
it must be determined by internal states. Thus, when internalist set out to demonstrate free 
will, they set out to demonstrate a contradiction: that actions can both be determined and not 
determined by internal states.  
2.3 Reasons Externalism 
It is the very notion of rational actions as needing to originate from belief-desire states 
that leads to the above metaphysical problem; the internalist constraint on what can be 
considered rational is too restrictive, thereby leading to desire determinism. Either the agent 
sacrifices her freedom in order to be rational, or her rationality in order to be free. Instead of 
putting the agent in this bind, I argue along the same lines as Lowe when he states that 
“although a belief can sometimes cause or help to cause some of an agent’s behavior, a 
rational action is precisely one that isn’t caused by an agent’s beliefs and desires. Rather, it is 
one that the agent chooses to perform ‘in the light of’ his or her beliefs and desires, which is a 
very different matter.”43 Therefore, a better conception of reasons is that of Lowe’s, who 
holds that reasons are the external circumstances that bear upon the agent’s consideration, 
giving an agent a certain awareness upon which she bases her judgments.44 Because reasons 
are placed outside of the agent, the notion that a rationally disruptive break can occur 
 
43 Lowe, Personal Agency, 181. 
 
44 E. J. Lowe, “The Will as a Rational Free Power,” in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New 
Aristotelianism, ed. by Ruth Groff and John Greco (New York: Routledge, 2013), 181. 
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between an agent and her reasons—which was seen consistently demonstrated in the above 
analysis of O’Connor’s theory—is mitigated. Externalism allows the agent’s actions to be 
considered more consistently rational and the agent herself more reliably free. 
According to Lowe’s theory, which largely makes use of Jonathan Dancy’s work,45 
what makes an action rational is that the action is performed in light of a reason that was 
chosen by the agent.46 This choosing of a reason is a freely made choice by the agent—a 
choice uncaused by prior events and able to causally determine future events.47 Hence, on 
Lowe’s theory, reasons themselves do not risk becoming causally determining; the agent 
herself is self-determining in choosing the reasons in light of which she acts. This, 
importantly, maintains incompatibilist freedom under externalism.48 Moreover, the reason “is 
a fact or state of affairs which justifies a particular course of action,”49 and hence is rationally 
able to explain said action. 
This view does not deny that beliefs and desires can have any role in agential 
deliberation. It merely places the criterion of what makes an action rational outside the 
internal states of the agent. As Lowe explains: 
[I]t is not the fact that S believes that the slate is falling [off the roof] that constitutes a 
reason for S to jump out of the way: rather, it is the fact that the slate is falling—
although, once more, S must be aware of this fact and so believe, or at least suspect, 
that the slate is falling if he is to be in a position to act upon that reason. The mistake 
that is characteristically made by those who favour an ‘internalist’ view of reasons for 
action is to regard such psychological states themselves, rather than the contents of 
such states, as constituting reasons for the agent to act—where those ‘contents’ are 
the facts or states of affairs whose existence is revealed to the agent in virtue of his 
being in such psychological states.50 
 
45 Lowe, Personal Agency, 181, 186, 199. 
 
46 Ibid., 182. 
 
47 Ibid., 183-184. 
 








So it isn’t the psychological states of the agent themselves that constitute an agent’s reasons, 
as internalism would hold, but the states of affairs that those psychological states give the 
agent access to.51 The external circumstances that the agent finds herself in is what 
constitutes the reasons for which she acts in the way she does when she acts in light of them. 
As Maria Alvarez points out, internalists about the belief-desire model make the mistake of 
thinking that motivation needs to come from an internal state of desiring as opposed to the 
external things which are desired.52 Internal states do not need to be invoked to account for an 
agent acting in light of a desire or belief. 
 What if the agent has false beliefs about her external circumstances and acts in light 
of this false belief? This case would seem to render any subsequent actions performed by the 
agent irrational. Lowe argues that the agent, in order to be rational, only needs to be aware of 
her reason for acting. However, this awareness “doesn’t necessarily require that the reason 
should actually obtain.”53 As Lowe explains: 
In [the case of the agent acting on a false belief], the agent might well have done 
better to have acted differently, but he did not act irrationally, since he still acted for a 
reason that he chose to act upon. Since reasons are not causes, it does not matter that 
an agent’s reason for acting in a certain way may on occasion be a state of affairs 
which does not obtain and hence which is not a fact.54 
 
In the case of a false belief, Lowe contends it could be argued that the agent acted for no 
reason, since a reason did not actually obtain; however, the agent would still have acted 
rationally.55 Lowe justifies this position as follows: 
We could say that if an agent jumps out of the way in the light of a mistaken belief 
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that way on that occasion. At the same time, however, we can and should insist that 
such an agent is not acting irrationally merely insofar as his belief is false—for if it 
had been true, he really would have had a reason to act in precisely the way that he 
does. On this view of the matter, only facts—that is, states of affairs which obtain—
can actually be reasons for action, but an agent can, nonetheless, act for a would‐be 
reason which does not actually obtain and in doing so act rationally in precisely the 
same sense in which an unmistaken agent can.56 
 
Hence, Lowe makes a distinction between reasons, which are external states of affairs, and 
rationality, which is the agent’s ability to apply reasoning skills to her perceived situation and 
determine her actions.57 
Utilizing this external notion of reasons helps us arrive at better explanations of agent 
actions when those agents have diminished mental capability. For example, someone 
undergoing an episode of psychosis commits a murder. Perhaps she believed the victim was a 
reptoid (i.e., lizard person) in human disguise. The internalist would have to say that this 
event either occurred for no reason—since the agent’s internal state was irrational, given her 
irrational belief—or that the reason it occurred was that the agent desired to rid the world of 
reptoids. The externalist, however, can attribute the murder to the murderer’s ill mental 
health, which is an external factor more relevant to the explanation of her actions than her 
internal mental state.58  
Someone like O’Connor may counter this by saying that, on his view, the agent has 
no discernible rational intention and therefore has acted involuntarily (rationality being a 
necessary condition for free action). This seems to cohere with how we think about actions 
born out of mental illness. However, O’Connor’s view does not allow for mental fitness to be 
taken into consideration when explaining agent actions. For explanation of action, he only 
appeals to agent intentions, whether or not those are rationally aligned with the agent’s 
 
56 Ibid., 185. 
 
57 Ibid., 182-183, 185. See also Alvarez, Kinds of Reasons, 24, 140-144. Alvarez also argues that the 
agent who acts in light of a false belief acts for no real reason, but for what she calls an “apparent reason.” 
 
58 See also Lowe, Personal Agency, 180-182. 
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desires (and arguably the agent’s intentions are rationally aligned with her desires to rid the 
world of reptoids). The most O’Connor could hope to do to account for mental illness is to 
state that it is part of the agent’s propensity to behave a certain way. However, mental illness 
is not a propensity of an agent, especially if the illness is caused by external factors—such as 
chemical imbalances—that are unmitigated by agent habituation (habituation being part of 
what seems to establish an agent’s intention for O’Connor).59 A full and thorough 
explanation of the agent’s action in this scenario cannot be given using O’Connor’s 
internalism. 
This highlights an important distinction to be made between reasons and causal 
explanation, as also pointed out by Alvarez. Those who hold to the internalist belief-desire 
understanding of reasons as causally accounting for agent action are conflating reasons with 
causal explanation. However, reasons and causal explanation are two different things in the 
same fashion that metaphysical causal accounts and the explanation of events are two 
different things (see chapter 1, section 1.2.3). As Alverez argues, if one has a paranoid 
delusion that one is being followed by MI5, one has the apparent reason to go around in 
disguise. However, what one really has reason to do is see a psychiatrist. Nevertheless, that 
one has such a paranoid delusion helps explain one’s behavior.60 
In addition to providing a better account of action, reasons externalism is in better 
accord with our phenomenology as deliberators and agents. As Lowe contends, the 
phenomenal experience of rational agents doesn’t seem to support the notion that beliefs and 
desires are the causes of our actions; it seems to us that we’ve freely chosen what to do in the 
face of our beliefs and desires.61 This accords well with an experimental philosophy study—
 
59 O’Connor, Persons and Causes, 97-98, 105. 
 
60 Alvarez, Kinds of Reasons, 29, 48-49. 
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conducted by Oisin Deery, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols—which was able to show that, 
through educating people on what philosophers mean by determinism and by utilizing their 
self-reports regarding deliberating between choices, people’s experiences of deliberation not 
only do not reflect determinism, but they also do not reflect compatibilism. Phenomenology 
of deliberation, according to Deery et al., is strictly an experience of incompatibilist 
deliberation,62 even when deliberation involves choices that are moral in nature.63 More 
pointedly, people reported their experiences of agency as reflective of being able to make 
decisions counter to their desires.64 Phenomenology of deliberation thus supports an 
externalist, incompatibilist view of agency and not an internalist or compatibilist view. 
 What about the objection that, if our actions are free in the incompatibilist sense, and 
if our desires or beliefs do not have causal influence on our choices, then our choices are 
arbitrary? Lowe specifically addresses Peter van Inwagen’s thought experiment of an agent, 
Alice, who is able to go back and “replay” an instance of choosing between two available 
choices—one to tell the truth, the other to lie. Opponents of incompatibilism will argue that 
the probability of any one of the agent’s choices coming up again in the replay runs from 
unity (strictly determined) to 50/50 (pure chance).65 What is clear, they argue, is that the 
agent herself does not have determining ability over her choices—she is either determined 
from without or her choice is arbitrary. Lowe answers this objection as follows: 
The way in which the thought experiment is set up requires us to suppose that in all 
‘replays’ of her situation her deliberations proceed in exactly the same way that they 
actually did, but that at the end of some of these replays she still chooses to tell the 
truth while at the end of others she chooses instead to tell a lie. However, if Alice 
deliberates and chooses rationally, at the end of her deliberations she will have 
 
62 Oisin Deery, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols, “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the 
Experience of Agency,” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1, ed. David Shoemaker 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 148. 
 
63 Ibid., 139. 
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formed a judgement as to whether the reasons in favour of telling the truth are better 
than those in favour of telling a lie. Now, certainly, if Alice’s choice was genuinely 
undetermined, it was possible for her to have chosen to tell a lie in spite of having 
formed such a judgement. On the other hand, there is a clear sense in which, in the 
light of that judgement, Alice would have been acting irrationally in telling a lie. A 
libertarian should happily accept that our freedom to choose is a freedom even to 
choose irrationally—and we all recognize, I think, that sometimes we do make 
irrational choices.66 
 
I do not agree with Lowe at this point. Conceding that the agent makes an irrational choice in 
this instance falls to the objection that, if the agent fails to make a rational choice, then the 
agent fails to be free (rationality being a necessary condition for agential freedom). As such, I 
think Lowe is assuming a narrower view of rational action than is necessary.  
Counter to Lowe, I argue that the choice made by the agent, no matter what the choice 
is, is rational as long as the choice is made in light of some reason.67 In order to maintain this 
position, I argue that the rationality of an action admits of degrees and, as such, some reasons 
for action are better suited to a situation than others. Take for instance an individual who is 
deciding whether to focus on athletics instead of academics in high school. This agent knows 
that being a professional athlete pays more than a white-collar job, and therefore she has a 
reason to focus on athletics. However, choosing to focus on academics is a safer bet since 
landing a white-collar job is significantly easier than getting a sports contract. It would be 
tempting to say that focusing on academics is the rational choice while focusing on athletics 
is irrational, given all available information. Nevertheless, her actions, no matter what she 
chooses to do, are rational since there is some reason for each course of action. Hence, even 
 
66 Ibid., 192-193. 
 
67 Those who are concerned with normative reasons may have issue with my definition of rationality 
here given that they may hold bad reasons are irrational reasons. I respond that some bad reasons border on 
irrationality; however, I want to make a distinction between a completely irrational reason—and thus a non-
reason leading to non-free action—and a bad reason. For example, someone whose reason for getting a haircut 
is because his favorite color is blue is acting irrationally. On the other hand, someone whose reason for getting a 
haircut is because he wants to make all his co-workers envious is acting for a bad reason. For one, it is arguably 
morally not good to try to make others envious. Secondly, it is probably the case that none of his co-workers 
care about how he looks anyways and therefore they will not be prone to envy. Still, this agent is acting 
rationally—if it were the case that his co-workers were prone to envy, then perhaps an astounding haircut would 
cause them to be envious. 
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if the agent comes to believe that the more rational course of action is focusing on academics, 
if she chooses to focus on athletics she does not act irrationally.  
This seems to cohere with how we make distinctions between agents and evaluate 
their actions, especially in criminal courts. There is a difference between completely 
irrational agents and agents who fail to act for reasons the law requires they act on. The 
former are not legally responsible for their actions while the latter are. In general, it seems 
that agents—who are more often than not rational—can always choose to act on reasons that 
are more or less proper to their circumstance (that is, the conditions for an action to be 
rational is easier to meet than is the conditions for said action to be considered proper). In this 
sense, even though agents usually always act in light of reasons, the quality of the reason they 
choose to act upon, or the quality of the course of action they choose in light of a reason, can 
vary. This explains why some courses of action are favored over others, but why more than 
one course of action may be considered rational given a situation. 
2.4 Motivating States of Affairs 
 I now want to provide an account of states of affairs as motivating. To do so, I will 
draw upon the work of Jonathan Dancy. Dancy specifically addresses the problem of whether 
an externalist conception of reasons can be thought of as motivating in the same way that 
internalists take desires, fulfilling the role of reasons, to be motivating, considering that 
desires are the only kind of thing that seem to naturally motivate an agent.68 Dancy seeks to 
provide an account of how reasons, as distinct from desires, can indeed motivate an agent to 
action and, furthermore, how reasons can only be thought of as states of affairs. 
First, Dancy rejects the internalist assertion that, since only desires give rise to 
motivation, reasons must consist in desires. He does this by drawing out the distinction 
 
68 Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10-12. 
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between desires and reasons. For starters, Dancy rejects the assumption that desires give rise 
to motivation to begin with,69 clarifying that “to desire is just to be motivated.”70 Then Dancy 
argues that desires, i.e., motivations, are formed in light of reasons, not reasons in light of 
desires.71 As he points out, “if someone wants something that there is no reason to want, his 
desire does not give him some reasons for doing it, a reason that was not there before,”72 and 
moreover, that “[i]f an action is silly, wanting to do it does not make it any less silly.”73 Since 
desires don’t seem to determine the quality of reasons in the way that one would expect, but 
that reasons seems to dictate the quality of desires, we must conclude that reasons are distinct 
from desires, and further that reasons are the basis of desires. 
Dancy concedes that there are inclination and urges, special kinds of desire that don’t 
seem to be based on reasons but are still the basis for some actions. However, he argues that 
inclinations only come to bear on agency when reasons fail to be decisive enough to 
determine action—moreover, urges without reasons are pathological.74 This assessment 
seems to cohere with how we evaluate an agent who acts on impulse but who lacks any 
coherent reason, or even possesses a counter reason, for her action. Hence, neither 
inclinations nor urges make good candidates as reasons when giving an account of rational 
agency. Thus, Dancy is able to make a distinction between reasons and desires, one that is 
incompatible with internalism. 
 
69 Ibid., 13-14. 
 
70 Ibid., 14. See also Alvarez, Kinds of Reasons, 119-120. Alvarez clarifies that the internal state of 
desiring just is the internal state of being motivated, as opposed to desiring being an internal state that is 
motivating and thus separate from desiring. 
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 In order to argue his case that reasons, without the need of desires, are motivating, 
Dancy borrows the distinction that some philosophers make between motivating reasons and 
normative reasons. Dancy defines motivating reasons as the “considerations in light of which 
[the agent] acted…which we can think of as what persuaded him to [act].”75 This seems to be 
the typical notion of reasons that we have been working with up to this point, that is, the 
expressed criterion of rational action: an agent acting in response to a reason. On the other 
hand, normative reasons provide normative explanations for actions. As Dancy explains, 
some reasons are normatively good reasons for action (i.e., they “speak in favour of the 
action,” in Dancy’s words) and some good reasons are better than others. These are 
normative reasons.76 I claimed at the end of the previous section that actions can be more or 
less reasonable considering a given circumstance; this seems to reflect what Dancy says here 
about normative reasons. Along with Dancy, I deny that there is a real distinction between 
motivating and normative reasons, as my proposed theory in the previous section reflects. 
However, Dancy contends that this distinction must be utilized in order to demonstrate its 
ultimate unintelligibility.77 
When we speak of normative reasons for an action, we speak of reasons that favor the 
performance of that action, i.e., external normative states. On the other hand, when we speak 
of motivating reasons, we speak of our beliefs or desires, i.e., psychological states, that gave 
rise to said action.78 This presents a problem when giving an account of reasons by putting “a 
constraint on any theory about the relation between normative and motivating reasons,” that 
is, any theory must “show that and how any normative reason is capable of contributing to 
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the explanation of an action that is done for that reason.”79 Dancy calls this the explanatory 
constraint. An easy way of meeting the constraint, according to Dancy, is to hold that 
normative reasons explain the motivating reasons that explain the action. For example, an 
agent’s actions can be explained by his belief, and his belief itself can be explained by the 
truth of the belief. Thus, there is transitivity to explanations of agential action, what Dancy 
calls a “three-part story.”80 
However, as Dancy points out, there is also the option of bypassing motivating 
reasons altogether. In order to do this, normative reasons would themselves have to be 
motivating. Dancy argues that this in indeed the case: the reason why an agent should take a 
certain course of action can also be the reason why he does. This reason will both motivate 
the agent and make the action the correct course of action to take. Furthermore, Dancy takes 
these reasons to be constituted by what the agent believes about a situation, i.e., its state of 
affairs. Thus, if states of affairs themselves can be demonstrated to be motivating, then belief-
desire states do not need to factor into explanations of agent action, and externalism will be 
demonstrated to be a plausible alternative to internalism in this regard.81 
 Dancy presents three objections to the three-part story in favor of his bypass theory. 
In order to support his first objection, he proposes another constraint besides the explanatory 
constraint, what he calls the normative constraint. Dancy defines this constraint as 
“requir[ing] that a motivating reason, that in the light of which one acts, must be the sort of 
thing that is capable of being among the reasons in favour of so acting; it must, in this sense, 
be possible to act for a good reason.”82 In other words, there must exist motivating reasons 
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amongst normative reasons. The reason why Dancy thinks this can be is because, if 
normative reasons are such that they can contribute to motivating reasons and thus help in 
explanation, then motivating reasons must be such that they can possess normativity. As 
Dancy argues, this new constraint makes the three-part story untenable in that the three-part 
story bars normative reasons from being amongst the motivating reasons that an agent can 
choose from.83 Dancy doesn’t deny that some psychological states have normative status and 
therefore can add to the normative evaluations of an agent’s actions;84 he merely denies that 
psychological states alone can carry normativity and thus normative evaluation cannot be 
done on the basis of psychological states alone.85 Normative reasons and motivating reasons 
are just too ontologically distinct.86 
 Dancy’s second objection is similar to the first. He points out our tendency as agents 
to explain our actions via good reasons, i.e., reasons that favor our acting. Again, Dancy 
highlights the fact that states of affairs, and not psychological states, are the kind of things 
that can favor action.87 Further, Dancy clarifies that this isn’t so much a new objection as it is 
a generalization of the first: if a reason for acting “must be the right sort of thing to be a good 
reason,”88 then it must be normative. Moreover, since only normative reasons can be more or 
less good, then they must comprise all reasons and therefore be motivating.89 
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 Dancy’s third objection, borrowed from Arthur Collins, holds that an explanation of 
an action cannot possibly be given by an agent without her committing to the truth of the 
beliefs she counts as relevant to the explanation. This is because the role of an explanation is 
not to convey the agent’s perspective per se, although explanations are formulated from the 
agent’s perspective. It is rather that explanations seek to clarify the state of affairs that an 
action was performed in light of.90 In order to argue for this claim, Dancy makes a distinction 
between an explanation and a psychologized restatement of said explanation. A 
straightforward explanation is of the form “I am performing this action because p,” while a 
psychologized restatement of the same explanation is of the form “I am performing this 
action because I believe that p.” Dancy maintains that regardless of whether the agent offers 
the above straightforward explanation or the psychologized restatement, she is affirming the 
truth of p.91 Dancy therefore argues that a psychologizing restatement of an explanation 
meets two conditions: 1) “[i]t does not introduce new subject-matter,” i.e., a new thing to be 
explained, and 2) “[i]t does not delete the agent’s endorsement,” i.e., the ontological 
commitments expressed by the original statement.92  
Under a three-part account of reasons and actions, however, a psychologized 
restatement made by a third-party cannot meet these two conditions, thereby rendering third-
party explanations misleading. This is due to a disconnect of commitments between an 
agent’s explanation of her actions and a third-party explanation of those same actions. 
Consider the nature of the parts of an explanation, according to the three-part theory: there is 
the factor that consists in the psychological state which gave rise to the action—what Dancy 
calls the proximal explanation—and the factor that consists in the circumstances that gave 
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rise to the psychological state—the distal explanation. The three-part account attempts to 
leave third-parties free to provide proximal explanations without committing to the truth of 
any distal explanations. However, the agent herself cannot do this; whenever she provides an 
explanation, whether proximal or distal, the explanation assumes the truth of the beliefs 
expressed in the distal explanation. Thus, a third party psychologized restatement of an 
explanation will possess a different subject matter than an agent’s own, rendering said 
explanation misleading if considered identical to the subject’s own psychologized 
explanation.93  
Dancy addresses the notion that third-party explainers should not take distal content 
into account when formulating explanations especially since an agent can be wrong about 
what she takes to be the case. Dancy answers that, regardless of the truth of distal content, to 
ignore it is to mischaracterize the agent’s reason for her actions. In order to faithfully 
preserve the agent’s reasons when formulating an explanation, we must take into account the 
circumstances in light of which she acted, regardless of whether those circumstances actually 
obtained.94 Therefore, if Dancy’s argument is to be accepted, then it seems that not only are 
reasons distinct from desires, but they are also motivating without needing to appeal to 
internal states. This must be the case because the agent herself invokes the object of her 
beliefs (i.e., states of affairs) as reasons for her action without consideration of her internal 
belief-states themselves; those states of affairs must have been motivating for her. 
2.5 The Current Picture 
 In chapter 1, I argued that substance causation best accounts for our causal 
observations, thereby demonstrating an ontology of substances. In this chapter, I contend that 
the human substance is not causally determined by her desires, leaving her free and rational 
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to originate causal chains. I am partly on my way to demonstrating incompatibilist human 
free will, but there is still the question of whether the human substance is determined by her 
ontological makeup, that is, whether her physicality has any causal bearing on her mental 
choices. Before I can deal with this mind-body problem, however, I need to demonstrate that 
phenomenal properties exist. Otherwise, we cannot say that there are mental properties that 
would need to be reconciled with physical ones, if there is indeed this distinction between the 
mental and physical. Thus, for chapter 3, I turn to the question of qualia and seek to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of holding its existence. 
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3. The Reasonableness of Qualia 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will address the well-trodden question of whether or not qualia exist. 
This is an important question to cover since in the next chapter, on the mind-body problem, 
the existence of qualia will be assumed. This chapter, however, will not demonstrate 
definitively that qualia exist or do not exist, since I do not believe that the existence of qualia 
can be definitively demonstrated or refuted (a claim about that I hope to support through the 
course of this chapter). The goal of this chapter therefore is to demonstrate the reasonableness 
of holding qualia as existent (i.e., non-eliminativable) against those who claim the 
unreasonableness of holding such a position, in order for the assumption of qualia in the next 
chapter to be a reasonable one. 
I will be demonstrating a cumulative case for the reasonableness of qualia via two 
lines of argument. First, starting in section 3.3, I discuss epistemic issues surrounding the 
question of qualia—namely, the treatment of introspection as evidence—in order to clarify 
the inherent ineffectiveness of arguments against (and, reciprocally, for) qualia. I hope to 
accomplish two things in this section: 1) demonstrate that eliminativist discussions on qualia 
rely on begging the question of qualia’s non-existence prior to argumentation, as apparent in 
eliminativists treatment of introspective evidence (reciprocally, pro-qualia theorists are also 
guilty of begging the question in favor of qualia’s existence in a similar manner, as will be 
discussed); and 2) demonstrate that eliminativists’ rejection of introspective evidence does 
not hold up under the framework within which eliminativists attempt their rejection. The goal 
of this section is not to positively demonstrate the reality of qualia, but to defend the 
plausibility of qualia against those making positive arguments against it. At the end of this 
section, I conclude that, in light of eliminativist arguments against qualia, the question of 
qualia is left unanswered. 
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Second, starting in section 3.4, I attempt to provide a positive argument in favor of 
holding qualia realism. For clarification, throughout this section I will be assuming, without 
argument, a Kripkean theory of reference. This may be troubling for some philosophers, but 
rather than arguing for a theory of reference, I will, for expediency’s sake, be assuming one. I 
will also have to assume the authority of introspective evidence. Although this does beg the 
question of qualia realism, the question will need to be begged in order to get the argument 
off the ground, and section 3.3 should provide justification for this. Last, I will assume a 
naturalistic ontology—an ontology thought to be incompatible with qualia realism—and 
subsequently provide a plausible account of qualia within it. However, as will be apparent in 
the next chapter, I am not committed to a naturalistic ontology. Nevertheless, if it can be 
shown that the existence of qualia is compatible with naturalism, then it is shown to be 
compatible with any ontology. 
3.2 Defining Qualia 
 I define qualia as the qualitative properties and features of subjective experience. By 
qualitative, I mean those features which, if qualia realism is true, cannot be reduced to, or 
eliminated by, a qualitative or quantitative description of non-experiential aspects of reality. 
In other words, qualia are features of consciousness that are not constituted by what we 
would think of as material or physical mechanistic properties.1 Hence, we would say that my 
experience of the color red is indeed my experience of a phenomenal property. Moreover, it 
distinguishable from and not eliminated by any description of the mechanical and causal 
processes behind the generation of my color experience. When I see red, there is something 
about my experience that is above and beyond the description of causal and mechanistic 
processes: my phenomenal experience of red.  
 
1 In the classic Cartesian sense of the material or physical as distinct from the mental. There are, of 
course, contemporary philosophers who take the material and mental to be one and the same. See chapter 4, 
sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, where I discuss theories that the notion of a distinct physical realm, namely 
panpsychism and idealism. 
 72 
Color is commonly used as the perennial example of qualia (indeed, color qualia is 
largely used as the focus of this chapter), but qualia includes intrinsic (to the subject’s first-
person perspective) qualitative content of any kind, such as the taste of garlic, or the sound of 
a glass breaking, the feel of soft suede, the smell of sulfur, the feel of ambient coldness 
outside during winter, and the experience of distressing emotional states during traumatic 
events, amongst other things.2 Certainly, there are mechanistic and causal processes involved 
in these experiences; this is not being denied here. What is being denied, however, is that the 
experience of qualia is wholly constituted by, and thereby eliminativable to, mechanistic 
processes and properties extrinsic to the subject’s first-personal conscious state. 
Inherent in this definition of qualia is the subjective nature of experience, and the 
experiential nature of consciousness (indeed, these are what constitute the first-personal 
conscious state in which qualia operate). These notions are so important to my definition of 
qualia that, as George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, if there are no such things as 
qualia, then there are no conscious mental states as we know them, or seem to know them.3 
Consciousness just seems to be constituted by qualia; without qualia, consciousness—or at 
least, how human beings experience consciousness—could not exist since there would be 
nothing to constitute it.  
3.3 The Ineffectiveness of the Qualia Debate 
Eliminativism of the phenomenological nature of consciousness in general, and of 
qualia in particular, attempts to reduce what is seemingly phenomenally experienced by a 
subject first-personally to what can be mechanically, materially (as matter is thought of by 
developed theories of the natural sciences), and third-personally explained. A straightforward 
 
2 See also David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 4. 
 
3 George Graham and Terence Horgan, “Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents,” in 
The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 89. 
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way of doing this is to just to locate qualia in extended physical space. Such are the theories 
of Harold Brown, who claims that qualia are displays internal to the brain,4 and Edward 
Averill, who argues that phenomenal properties are really just non-dispositional properties of 
certain cellular activity.5 Even though these philosophers do not think that qualia can be 
functionally accounted for (i.e., they affirm that qualia real), they still attempt to account for 
them as some type of spatially located physical property.6 However, asserting that qualia is 
located in the brain or identifying phenomenal properties with certain aspects of the nervous 
system merely pushes the problem of qualia back an explanatory step, while simultaneously 
failing to provide any explanation as to why a subject would have a seemingly qualitative 
experience in light of purely physical processes.  
David Chalmers calls this subjective experience the “key explanandum” in the study 
of the mind: what needs to be accounted for by any theory of consciousness is the intrinsic 
nature (or at least seemingly intrinsic nature) of the subjective experience of qualitative 
sensations—such as when one experiences seeing the color red—and not just what structural 
mechanisms occur along with experience.7 This question is difficult for theorists to provide 
an answer for, however—indeed it is what Chalmers has labeled the “hard problem of 
consciousness.”8 One reason for the difficulty, as Paul Churchland points out, is that we have 
 
4 Harold I. Brown, “The Case for Indirect Realism,” in The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond Wright 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 47-49, 53-54, 56. 
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prima facie reason to believe in qualia realism based on the first-person introspection of our 
own experiences.9  
 Therefore, the problem with determining the reality or unreality of qualia lies with the 
problem concerning what to do with evidence gained from introspection—in fact, 
determining the ontological status of qualia seems solely dependent on how this evidence is 
handled. This is because, if qualia are real, the only way qualia are observed is first-
personally. In other words, evidence for the existence of qualia can only be gained via first-
personal observation—i.e., introspection—if it can be gained at all. Evidence affirming 
qualia’s existence seems to rely solely the knowledge that can be gained via introspection and 
only introspection. Likewise, evidence against eliminativism arrives solely via the avenue of 
introspection.  
Is the evidence gained via introspection even epistemically valuable as it is presented, 
so to speak, or can we dismiss it? Because introspective evidence is the only evidence for 
qualia, answering this question one way or another begs the question of whatever position the 
answer favors. That is, if we take first-personal evidence as authoritative, then our 
deliberations will favor the conclusion of qualia realism. On the other hand, if we dismiss the 
authority of first-personal evidence, then our ruminations will be skewed towards 
eliminativism. This is because determining whether to dismiss introspective evidence 
requires evaluating the contents of introspection. However, evaluating the contents of 
introspection is the primary goal of inquiry to begin with. In this section, I seek not to 
evaluate the contents of introspection, but to analyze how various eliminativist theorists have 
attempted to dismiss the contents of introspection as evidence. I aim to show that attempts to 
dismiss such evidence have failed to be justified. 
 
9 Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of 
Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 25. 
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3.3.1 Tactics for Dismissing Introspective Evidence 
 3.3.1.1 Collapsing First-Person to the Third-Person 
One way of dealing with first-personal evidence is to reduce it to third-personal 
evidence, thereby eliminating the problems that theorists face when accounting for the 
seemingly phenomenally intrinsic nature of first-personal introspective evidence altogether. 
This is the tactic of Paul Churchland, who argues that phenomenal experience just is the 
subject’s experience of her own brain states. In other words, the subject gains knowledge of 
her own brain states when she is introspectively aware of her experiences.10 For Churchland, 
the content of subjective introspection just is what is predicated by neuroscience in 
descriptions of physical brain states.11 Likewise, the subject’s supposedly phenomenal 
experience of the color red just is her coming into contact with a surface of an object that 
reflects a certain wavelength of light.12 Thus, any phenomenal introspective experience is 
accounted for via objective, physical processes and features of the subject’s brain, along with 
her environment. If we accept this definition of introspective experience, then what seems to 
be sui generis first-personal accounts of internal states just are third-personal accounts of 
physical processes. 
We can clarify Churchland’s first-person/third-person collapse by looking at his 
claims. To begin, Churchland argues that it is possible great amounts of knowledge 
concerning physical states can be gained through introspection: 
I suggest, then, that those of us who prize the flux and content of our 
subjective phenomenological experience need not view the advance of 
materialistic neuroscience with fear and foreboding. Quite the contrary. The 
genuine arrival of a materialist kinematics and dynamics for psychological 
states and cognitive processes will constitute not a gloom in which our inner 
life is suppressed or eclipsed, but rather a dawning, in which its marvelous 
 
10 Ibid., 60, 64-66. 
 
11 Ibid., 54-55.  
 
12 Ibid., 56. 
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intricacies are finally revealed—most notably, if we apply ourselves, in direct 
self-conscious introspection.13 
 
If introspection gains knowledge of physical processes like this, then it is capable of gaining 
empirical evidence, and therefore is a third-person vantage point. But whether Churchland is 
indeed collapsing the first-person/third-person distinction is still unclear. However, later 
Churchland is explicit concerning the nature of what we consider “first-person” accounts. He 
states: 
The intricacies of brain function may be subjectively opaque to us now, but 
they need not remain that way forever. Neuroscience may appear to be defective in 
providing a purely “third-person account” of mind, but only familiarity of idiom and 
spontaneity of conceptual response are required to make it a “first-personal account” 
as well. What makes an account a “first-person account” is not the content of that 
account, but the fact that one has learned to use it as the vehicle of spontaneous 
conceptualization in introspection and self-description [Churchland’s italics].14 
 
The idea that the first-person vantage point consists in “only familiarity of idiom and 
spontaneity of conceptual response,” and the fact that Churchland implies that these are 
unnecessary for description, is indicative of how little the first-person perspective is valued 
according to Churchland’s theory. But can the first-person vantage point be done away with 
and replaced with the third-person vantage point? According to Churchland, it can and 
should. Since first-personal “spontaneous conceptualization” is so misleading as descriptions 
of physical processes, Churchland advocates that we change the way human beings discuss 
their psychological and mental states: 
Old ways die hard, and in the absence of some practical necessity, they may 
not die at all. Even so, it is not inconceivable that some segment of the 
population, or all of it, should become intimately familiar with the vocabulary 
required to characterize our kinematical states, learn the laws governing their 
interactions and behavioral projections, acquire a facility in their first-person 
ascription, and displace the use of [folk psychology, i.e., the way of 
communicating that presumes the reality of phenomenal experience] 
 
13 Ibid., 66. 
 
14 Ibid., 74-75. 
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altogether, even in the marketplace. The demise of [folk psychology’s] 
ontology would then be complete.15 
 
A change in language use would equate to the end of first-person ascriptions, thereby 
making the collapse of the first-person into the third-person complete.  
This collapse, however, is only justified if it can be said that the content of first-
personal introspection is indeed physical processes. But is it? Churchland does specifically 
address this problem via a discussion of qualia, since qualia are quintessentially considered 
the content of first-personal introspection. However, due to his eliminativist project, he 
defines qualia as such: 
Qualia…are not an ineffable mystery, any more than colors or temperatures are. They 
are physical features of our psychological states, and we may expect qualia of some 
sort or other in any physical system that is sufficiently complex to be functionally 
isomorphic with our own psychology. The qualia of…a robot’s states are not 
“absent.” They are merely unrecognized by us under their physical/electronic 
descriptions, or as discriminated by the modalities of outer sense rather than inner 
sense.16 
 
Churchland goes on to claim that the existence of qualia need not be denied, as long as qualia 
are thought of as fulfilling his physical definition;17 thus, according to Churchland’s theory, 
qualia are extrinsic, scientifically quantifiable properties and third-personally observable. 
The question remains, however, whether Churchland’s reductive redefinition 
of qualia is warranted. It seems that it is not unless we beg the question against qualia 
realism in the classic sense. Churchland does address this issue while considering an 
objection concerning qualitative subjective state kinds, specifically pain states that are 
reported and observed correlating with a variety of physical states. He admits that it 
seems unlikely that animals’ various functional pain states share a common physical 
 
15 Ibid., 18-19. 
 





nature. However, he maintains that, given evolutionary theory, dualism is 
implausible. Therefore, given the empirical evidence, we should presume against 
natural kinds of psychological states. To give into our intuitions otherwise begs the 
question against functionalism.18 
What seems unadmitted here, however, is that qualia realism as classically thought of 
is not just exclusive to dualism, but is also compatible with non-reductive physicalism, 
panpsychism, and monism. Even if evolutionary theories are incompatible with dualism 
(which has yet to be firmly established), it has yet to be shown that they are exclusively 
compatible with reductivist physicalism. But more to the point, to presume against 
psychological state kinds may be presuming so much that it is begging the question of 
eliminativism, especially without providing an evolutionary theory that firmly disallows 
qualia. This is because empirical evidence can only be used against introspective evidence if 
first-personal introspective evidence was of an empirical (i.e., scientifically quantifiable) 
nature. But classic qualia realism does not hold this. To argue that empirical evidence 
presumes against classic qualia realism is just to state a fact of presumption, not to provide an 
argument against classic qualia realism based on this evidence. In agreement with 
Churchland, I admit that to define qualia classically is begging the question of qualia realism, 
but to redefine qualia on the basis of empirical presumption is begging the question the other 
way around. 
Furthermore, Churchland’s reduction of first-personal vantage points to third-personal 
vantage points does not do justice to the question of why mental states seem to be private. I 
can experience the seemingly phenomenal content, either reducible or nonreducible, of my 
own brain states, but you cannot. You can only experience the non-phenomenal, mechanistic 
 
18 Ibid., 25-26. 
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brain states themselves. But if we are both experiencing this same event third-personally, we 
should have similar experiences of the event. But we do not. I argue that this is because my 
experience of the color red for you and for me are experiences of two different things. 
Therefore, my seemingly phenomenal experience of the color red and my brain states cannot 
be identical to each other.19 If they were, then you should be able to have the seemingly 
phenomenally experience my brain states just as I can. But as it is, I experience what seems 
to be qualia of the color red, while you observe certain of my brain cells firing. In fact, you 
having a seemingly phenomenal experience of the color red as an awareness of my brain 
states seems absurd. Thus, the first-personal vantage point seems as if it cannot be identical to 
the third-personal vantage point. 
 In support of Churchland’s view, one may counter that, in the above scenario, my 
vantage point relative to my brain determines the nature of my third-personal experience of 
my own brain states. Someone else who is having an experience of my brain states is merely 
experiencing them from a different vantage point. Churchland seems to acknowledge this 
when he makes reference to “the modalities of outer sense” and “inner sense” in the quote 
above.20 I would agree with this, that these different vantage points equate to different 
experiences, but add that the vantage point one has in relation to their own brain is the 
subjective position, and that this position’s experience, as such, is first-personal. This is what 
gives the position the markedly different character that it has from the third-personal position. 
And as such, we should consider the first-personal vantage point differently than the third-
personal, and not presume that the knowledge that can be gained first-personally is identical 
to the knowledge that can be gained third-personally. 
 
19 See also Mark Crooks, “The Churchlands’ War on Qualia,” in The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond 
Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 207.  
 
20 Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective, 31. 
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 3.3.1.2 Negating the First-Person 
 Another other way of dealing with first-personal introspective evidence is to devalue 
it, thereby negating the need to consider it. Such is Daniel Dennett’s approach. Unlike 
Churchland, Dennett doesn’t assume that introspection results in valuable third-personal 
knowledge of brain states. Instead, introspection for Dennett seems an exercise that bears 
little epistemic fruit: 
[T]here is yet another possibility [concerning the nature of phenomenological 
theorizing], which I think is closer to the truth: what we are fooling ourselves 
about is the idea that the activity of “introspection” is ever a matter of just 
“looking and seeing.” I suspect that when we claim to be just using our 
powers of inner observation, we are always actually engaging in a sort of 
impromptu theorizing—and we are remarkably gullible theorizers, precisely 
because there is so little to “observe” and so much to pontificate about without 
fear of contradiction.21 
 
His argument hinges on our tendency to be wrong about the content of our perceptions, a fact 
which he hopes succeeds in undermining the value of taking any first-person account of 
experience gained via introspection as evidence for phenomenal realism.22 To support this, 
Dennett points to the fact that, although we are confident about it, we are often wrong about 
the content of our peripheral vision. Moreover, Dennett argues, the overconfidence we have 
concerning this content arises from a misconception about what our visual field is, i.e., we 
think it is “an inner picture composed of colored shapes.”23 Instead, we should lack 
confidence in our subjective states.  
 But what about the notion of privileged access? Dennett does not outright deny that 
we have some measure of privileged access. Nevertheless, he argues that the knowledge of 
one’s own subjective states lacks the epistemic authority we tend to think it possesses.24 
 
21 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1991), 68-69. 
 
22 Ibid., 68-70. 
 
23 Ibid., 68. 
 
24 Ibid., 68-69. 
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Since we are often wrong about the content of our subjective states, we should have little 
confidence in introspection revealing the true nature of those states. Thus, we cannot claim 
any knowledge concerning the true nature of those states based on introspection alone.25 
Therefore, in lieu of introspection, Dennett affirms the authority of the third-person 
perspective in giving an account of subjective experience. Thus, Dennett argues, 
phenomenological experience should be analyzed utilizing what he calls the 
“heterophenomenological method.”26 This method, which heavily relies on the third-person 
standpoint, is intended to be the scientific and “neutral” way of exploring the subjective 
experience of consciousness, and begins by making no assumptions concerning 
consciousness—including the assumption that human beings have consciousness full of 
content.27 Part of this method requires that we ascribe to the subject an intentional stance, that 
is, when receiving a first-personal account of a subject’s experience, all that we should 
assume about the subject is that she has intention behind her speech.28 With these parameters 
in mind, the question of human consciousness can be explored. 
 Under these parameters, Dennett then addresses evidence concerning the seeming 
phenomenal quality of consciousness—vision qualia specifically—as it seems to exist in the 
“Cartesian Theater” of the mind (i.e., the place where phenomenal experience is supposedly 
played out for a subject to witness, as Dennett himself characterizes mental and subjective 
realism).29 Dennett points to an instance of “prosthetic vision,” an experiment where a blind 
subject was given “sight” via a pixel mechanism which tactilely reproduced what would be in 
 
 
25 Ibid., 70-71.  
 
26 Ibid., 72. 
 
27 Ibid., 72-73. 
 
28 Ibid., 76. 
 
29 Ibid., 39. 
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the subject’s line of vision on his back or chest. With this mechanism, subjects could read 
signs and recognize objects and faces, much like a sighted person.30 Concerning the blind 
person’s ability to gain information of the environment around him via this form a “sight,” 
Dennett questions whether the phenomenal qualities of the subject’s experience was that of 
vision or merely touch sensation.31 Dennett concludes that, since the blind subject had much 
of the same experience as a sighted subject (including exhibiting the same behaviors a 
sighted person would exhibit if they were experiencing vision qualia), information gained of 
the outside world is all there is to experience. If tactile “vision” could transmit as much 
information of the exterior world as regular vision, then the notion of vision qualia can be 
completely dismissed.32 This conclusion concerning information negating the need for qualia 
is also evident in his treatment of knowledge gained by perception and its relation to any 
supposedly “phenomenal” content of consciousness. Take for example Dennett’s thought 
experiment of Marilyn Monroe wallpaper.33 Dennett argues that it makes sense if a visually 
functioning subject were to develop the belief that a wall covered in Marilyn Monroe 
wallpaper is indeed covered in Marilyn Monroe wallpaper, for the wall is covered in Marilyn 
Monroe wallpaper. This does not mean, however, that the image of Marilyn Monroe 
wallpaper was recreated in the subject’s mind.34 By this argument, Dennett is assuming that, 
since there is no need to postulate any phenomenal content of consciousness in order to 
explain the knowledge concerning the wallpaper gained via experience, there is no need to 
 
30 Ibid., 339-340. 
 
31 Ibid., 340. 
 
32 Ibid., 338-343. 
 
33 Ibid., 354. 
 
34 Ibid., 364. 
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postulate phenomenal content, along with qualia, at all. Our inner “seemings” in fact do not 
exist. 
 With his notions of heterophenomenology and the intentional stance, and his 
downplaying of introspection, Dennett concludes that qualia do not exist. This 
treatment of introspection, of course, begs the question at issue. That is, if Dennett 
has no independent reason to dismiss evidence from introspection, then he’s 
unjustified in doing so, since to dismiss this evidence requires evaluating the contents 
of introspection, and evaluating this content is what the whole argument is about. The 
question then becomes, has Dennett provided a good independent reason for treating 
introspection in the way that he does? As discussed above, Dennett seems to offer 
two: 1) subjective accounts of experience are prone to error and 2) there is no need to 
postulate qualia when information flow/knowledge is accounted for without it. 
However, even though Dennett makes a good case for propositional error, it does not 
follow from Dennett’s argument that a subject is not experiencing something and, 
further, that this something is not phenomenal.35 The subject may still be having a 
phenomenal experience, however incorrect they are about that experience. It doesn’t 
follow that just because we cannot be confident about the contents of our experience 
that we cannot be confident that we are undergoing an experience. 
Likewise, in the case of information flow/knowledge, it does not follow that 
knowledge gained of the outside world negates the existence of qualia. For instance, 
in the case of the “prosthetic vision,” it does not follow that change in qualitative 
kind—from visual to tactile—results in the negation of qualia altogether if “vision” is 
proven to be informative. In fact, this seems to demonstrate that information is lost if 
 
35 See also Galen Strawson, Mental Reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 52. 
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we ignore qualia, considering the experience of tactile vision and regular vision must 
be internally very different for the subject experiencing it. Moreover, even with 
perfect knowledge gained, Dennett cannot escape the problem of phenomenology. 
According to Dennett himself, it seems as if phenomenological experience exists, 
even though it doesn’t.36 The seemingly phenomenological nature of experience, 
however, is itself phenomenological and first-personal. Thus, the qualitative nature of 
experience itself cannot reduced with the reduction of the mere content of 
experience.37 It must also be accounted for. If this phenomenological seeming 
surrounding experience itself exists, we are still burdened by unreduced first-personal 
introspective evidence. 
3.3.1.3 Redefining the Content of First-Personal Experience 
 It seems as if a brand of eliminativism that attempts to collapse first-personal 
evidence into third-personal, or attempts to ignore first-personal evidence altogether, 
inadequately addresses the problem of first-personal introspective evidence. However, there 
is another approach: redefine the content of first-personal experience to begin with, and base 
the interpretation of first-personal observation and evidence on said definition. Such is the 
aim of representationalism, a view of consciousness which attempts to redefine phenomenal 
experience in terms of intentionality.38  
Broadly speaking, there are two types of representationalist approaches: one weak 
and one strong. The weak holds that mental states are universally intentional, although some 
 
36 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 366. 
 
37 See also Strawson, Mental Reality, 52, for a similar assessment of Dennett’s claim. 
 
38 John O’Dea, “Transparency and the Unity of Experience,” in The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond 
Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 299; Also note, in this chapter I focus the discussion of 
representationalism on the ontological status of mental content. In chapter 7, I discuss representationalism again, 
but in the context of a discussion on the possibility of non-conceptual perceptual knowledge. Hence, the topic of 
perceptual knowledge is addressed in this chapter since it has bearing on the ontological status of the content of 
mental states, but a more thorough theory of perceptual knowledge will be presented in Chapter 7. 
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content of those states can be non-intentional. On the other hand, the strong approach strictly 
affirms the universal intentionality of all mental content in all mental states.39 How is it that 
the representationalist can affirm this intentionality in light of phenomenal experience? As 
Howard Robinson puts it, representationalism rests on the notion that experience is 
transparent, that is, “there is nothing introspectable in experience other than the external.”40 
This characterization of experience makes representationalism at heart an eliminativist 
project, since the goal is to eliminate the need to postulate the existence of phenomenal 
intrinsic experience.41 
 One such theory is that of Fred Dretske. Dretske argues that the quality of a subject’s 
experience should be distinguished by its intentionality, that is, by the relation between 
subject and the intentional objects of that experience, in the same way a subject’s belief is 
distinguished by its intentional object. Under this assumption, Dretske rejects the idea that 
experiences are constituted by qualia in the mind of the subject.42 This rejection stems from 
an inability to situate the qualities that individuate one experience from another within the 
subject. Dretske reasons that these qualities therefore must be relational, and indeed 
intentional.43 Given this, Dretske rejects local supervenience (e.g., supervenience on brain 
states) and claims that what we would consider qualitative properties—such as red or hot and 
 
39 Barry Maund, “A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense,” in The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond 
Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 272. 
 
40 Howard Robinson, “Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary,” in The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond 
Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 227. 
 
41 Martine Nida-Rümelin, “Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience,” in The Case 
for Qualia, ed. Edmond Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 311. See also Amy Kind, “How to Believe 
in Qualia,” in The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 285. 
 
42 Fred Dretske, “Phenomenal Externalism or If Meanings Ain’t in the Head, Where Are Qualia?” 





the like—are outside the subject’s mental states and in a relation with the objects that mental 
states are experiences of.44 
In support of his theory, Dretske argues that people experience the objects of their 
experience through their beliefs about their experience. In other words, what I believe about 
the objects of my experience determines the quality of the experience that I have of those 
objects. To support his argument, he distinguishes between two different meanings of the 
term “look” (as in “look,” “seem,” and “appear”): the phenomenal sense, which picks out the 
phenomenal quality of how objects present themselves to a subject undergoing an 
experience, and the doxastic sense, which picks out the beliefs held by a subject that bears 
upon the experience in question.45 The point Dretske makes is that a way an object appears to 
a subject in the phenomenal sense is determined by the way it appears in the doxastic sense, 
since the subject’s beliefs about her experience determines the quality of experience.46 To 
demonstrate the truth of this thesis, Dretske utilizes Putnam’s thought experiment of Fred and 
Twin Earth Fred (i.e., “Twin Fred”) both encountering water (i.e., as opposed to Twin Earth 
“twater”) and the content of their individual experiences. For clarification, Dretske utilizes 
“LOOKS” in all capitals to indicate “look” in the phenomenal sense, and “k” is a puddle of 
water. Dretske argues: 
Fred will think—correctly as it turns out—that his experience of the puddle 
(the way the puddle LOOKS to him) is exactly like his experience of water (is 
exactly the way water normally LOOKS to him). So Fred will think—once 
again correctly—that k LOOKS like water to him. Twin Fred, on the other 
hand, will think that k LOOKS like twater to him. He will think—correctly—
that k LOOKS the way twater always looked to him in normal conditions. The 
twins’ phenomenal experience of the water will prompt in them, not only 




45 Ibid., 147-148. 
 
46 Ibid., 149-150. 
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experience of it. How their experience seems to them will therefore be 
different.47 
 
Dretske likens this difference in phenomenal experience based on doxastic considerations to 
the experience of a small child with a petunia and the way Dretske’s own experience of a 
petunia would be. Because the child has no knowledge of a petunia while Dretske has a 
developed concept of a petunia, Dretske’s experience of a petunia would seem to Dretske 
phenomenally different than a child’s experience of a petunia would seem to her.48 Because 
of this difference, doxastic considerations must bear on phenomenal experience.  
 Susanna Schellenberg, in espousing her own representationalist theory, makes a 
similar kind of argument:  
If I speak Urdu, then a sentence uttered in Urdu sounds different to me than if 
I do not speak Urdu. Similarly, if I possess the concept of a skyscraper, then a 
tall building arguably looks different than if I do not possess the concept. If 
experience is argued to have [representational] content, then these differences 
can easily be accounted for.49 
 
In addition to the above, Schellenberg offers the following positive argument in favor of 
conscious experience consisting in representational content: 
Premise 1: If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering  
      from blindsight etc.), then she is aware of the world. 
Premise 2: If a subject is aware of the world, then the world seems a certain  
      way to her. 
Premise 3: If the world seems a certain way to her, then she has an experience  
      with content C, where C corresponds to the way the world seems       
      to her. 
Conclusion: If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering  
        from blindsight etc.), then she has an experience with content C,    
        where C corresponds to the way the world seems to her.50 
 
 
47 Ibid., 150. 
 
48 Ibid., 148-149. 
 





In support of the third premise, Schellenberg proposes what she calls the “seems-content 
link,” that is, the natural connection between a subject’s perception and its contents.51 This 
link allows that any given object of perception can be perceived in a variety of ways, since 
more than one set of contents can correspond to any given object of perception. As 
Schellenberg argues: 
The way the world noncomparatively seems to the perceiver may change from 
moment to moment even as her gaze remains steady. Say she is looking at a 
pig. She can direct her attention at its shape, its color, the texture of its skin, or 
any combination of these features. As her attention shifts, her phenomenology 
will change. One or more propositions can be associated with every one of 
these phenomenal states and thus with every one of these ways that the world 
may noncomparatively seem to her.52 
 
In this way, utilizing Dretske’s example, the adult Dretske can have a phenomenally different 
experience of a flower than a small child. Such is also with the speaker and non-speaker 
listening to Urdu being spoken. The seems-content link explains why these differences in 
experiences exist. 
 Schellenberg also points to our ability to gain knowledge through perception as 
supportive of her conclusion. She presents the thought experiment of a subject perceiving a 
coffee cup; the object of the cup is what grounds the knowledge of the cup, not the 
qualitative features of perception. In order to clarify this point, Schellenberg offers up a 
contrasting case: a subject perceives a coffee cup and then, after closing her eyes a moment, 
perceives a qualitatively identical but numerically different coffee cup. The subject’s belief 
that the cup is the same, based on the quality of perception, is false. The truth or falsity of her 
belief is grounded in the cup—the object of her perception—not in the perception itself.53 
 
51 Ibid., 723. 
 
52 Ibid., 724. 
 
53 Ibid., 735. 
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Ergo qualia play no role in the generation and grounding of perceptual knowledge, and 
therefore qualia do not exist.  
 Does representationalism adequately dismiss the burden that first-personal 
introspective evidence puts on explicating a theory of consciousness? If we accept 
Schellenberg’s positive argument in favor of representationalism, then it seems as if it does. 
But, as seen with Dennett’s view, Schellenberg’s argument also begs the question of 
eliminativism. This can be clearly seen when analyzing the wording of her second premise. If 
we replace the representationalism favoring “then the world seems a certain way to her” with 
the qualia realism favoring “then the world appears a certain way to her,” then we do not 
walk away with a valid argument in favor of representationalism. From this, we can see that 
the word “seems,” as used in the second premise by Schellenberg, is in the doxastic sense.54 
Thus, through her choice of words, Schellenberg begs the question of eliminativism. This 
might seem like a fair move on Schellenberg’s part since to utilize “seems” in the 
phenomenal sense is to beg the question of qualia realism. We must be given more reason to 
believe that begging the question in favor of eliminativism is more reasonable than the 
alternative, which Dretske and Schellenberg attempt to do. 
 Dretske’s and Schellenberg’s views, outside the positive argument Schellenberg 
provides, rests on the notion that phenomenology is dependent on doxastic content. They 
base their argument on the evidence of our own experiences. However, a reasonable case can 
be made that phenomenology is independent of doxastic content, also based on our 
experiences. Take Schellenberg’s example of Urdu: we can make the case that the speaker 
and non-speaker of Urdu, the phenomenal experience of hearing someone speak Urdu sounds 
exactly the same. The only difference between the speaker and non-speaker is that the 
speaker is able to link socially established shared meaning to the auditory forms that he 
 
54 Dretske, “Phenomenal Externalism,” 148. 
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perceiving, while the non-speaker is not. The same is true of Dretske and the child. They are 
both having the same phenomenal experience, but Dretske is able to connect this current 
qualitative experience with certain kinds—that is, the petunia kind—that he’s had in the past. 
The phenomenal content has not changed at all, regardless of the doxastic content. It always 
presents itself the same; the difference is in the subject’s reaction to it. 
Moreover, the idea that phenomenology is independent of doxastic content has the 
potential to make better sense of human learning than the alternative. If we take a 
dependency relation between phenomenology and doxastic content seriously, then learning 
via experience seems to be an accidental exercise, since learning could only be cashed out in 
terms of doxastic content changing on its own and our subsequent experiencing the now new 
and different content. But what would cause this change of content in the first place? One 
may argue that a new stimulus has been introduced. But what about when children learn 
about different features of objects that have not physically changed? The phenomenology-
doxastic content dependency does not seem to make sense in these cases. If phenomenology 
is independent, however, then we can cash out learning as the process of changing how we 
attend to our phenomenology, and our being able to make connections between past and 
present phenomenological presentations. In reference to Dretske’s example, Dretske knows 
the phenomenal kind petunia because he has experienced the phenomenal kind petunia in the 
past. Dretske has attended to different features of this phenomenal kind petunia, and 
therefore he is able to recognize these features when they present themselves again. The 
small child has not come across this phenomenal kind in the past, however, and thus, unlike 
Dretske, lacks the skill to recognize the characteristic features of petunia; furthermore, the 
child is yet able to apply knowledge of past experiences of petunia kind to current ones. 
Moreover, in regards to the thought experiment of the coffee cup, Schellenberg is 
wrong to suggest that qualia realism, unlike representationalism, fails to provide a reliable 
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account of perceptual knowledge. Remember in the thought experiment, the subject perceives 
a coffee cup and then, after having closed her eyes a short while, perceives a qualitatively 
identical but numerically different coffee cup. The subject then forms the false belief, based 
on the quality of her experience, that the coffee cup is the same. Therefore, Schellenberg 
concludes, we should not ascribe to qualia realism if we want to ascribe to the notion that 
knowledge can be gained perceptually: dependence on qualia for perceptual knowledge 
would lead to the formation of false beliefs. 
I question, however, how a true belief could be arrived at under the circumstances of 
Schellenberg’s thought experiment, even given representationalism. Schellenberg is right that 
the truth or falsity of a belief about the coffee cup in grounded in the cup; a qualia realist does 
not have to deny this. However, under the circumstances of being in the presence of a 
qualitatively same but numerically different coffee cup, a false belief would be justifiably 
formed, even in a representationalist ontology. The subject would have no reason to believe it 
was a different cup, and therefore would lack justification for believing so. In any case, 
Schellenberg argues that a qualia realist would have to give an account of how a subject 
would know a coffee cup is the same as a coffee cup she saw at a different time, given that all 
she has to go by is the phenomenal perception.55 However, there is nothing according to my 
version of qualia realism that bars a subject from bringing in background knowledge into an 
instance of forming perceptual knowledge. In other words, it is compatible with the theory 
being developed here that background knowledge has a bearing on the contents of perceptual 
knowledge. What is being denied however is that background knowledge has a bearing on the 
contents of perception itself.56 
 
 
55 Schellenberg, “Perceptual Content Defended,” 736. 
 
56 These thoughts on perception, background knowledge, and perceptual knowledge formation are 
discussed much further in Chapter 7. 
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3.3.2 Assessment 
 If we had independent reason to maintain the reduction, elimination, or redefinition of 
first-personal introspective evidence, then we would have reason to dismiss first-personal 
evidence when it comes to the question of qualia. However, as I have attempted to 
demonstrate above, we do not have independent reason without first begging the question 
against qualia, since qualia, if they exist, are what would constitute first-personal 
introspective evidence. 
Churchland’s collapse of the first-personal vantage point to third-personal vantage 
point seems too hasty, and still leaves a characterizing feature—namely privacy—of the first-
personal vantage point left unaccounted for. Dennett, in his attempt to eliminate the need to 
take first-personal evidence into consideration, did not adequately give an account of why we 
should remove it from the equation. Although he independently demonstrated was that 
subjects tend to be in error concerning the content of their experience, this does not disprove 
the reality of subjective experience altogether. Even if the subject is wrong about every 
aspect of his experience, the subject is nevertheless undergoing an experience. Moreover, the 
seemingly phenomenological nature of experience is itself phenomenological, and is not 
eliminated by reducing the contents of experience. 
Representationalism attempts to redefine the content of introspection as the 
representational content of intentional objects, thereby removing the need to posit the 
existence of any intrinsic qualitative properties, and making all introspectable properties 
properties of external objects. This move, if justified, would dismiss first-personal 
introspective evidence as evidence of qualia realism. However, the only reason we might 
make this move is because it would give us a better account of our experiences than qualia 
realism. But in some ways, such as in the explanation of learning as discussed above, it seems 
to fail in this regard.  
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Amy Kind, in her assessment of representationalism, points out that the 
representationalist logically errs in holding that the existence of representational content 
translates into attending consisting in nothing but attending to representational content.57 
However, as Kind states, “there is a difference between saying that introspecting an 
experience of pain involves or even requires attending to a particular bodily location and 
saying that all that there is to introspecting an experience of pain is attending to a particular 
bodily location.”58 Kind is quick to point out that the representationalist case concerning 
representation becomes muddled in light of emotions: what external object exactly is the 
subject attending to when the subject attends to an emotion? There isn’t an easy 
representationalist answer.59 We could posit that in the case of emotions the subject is 
attending to a wide variety of objects at once. But although this seems to be a reasonable 
avenue of exploration, it does highlight some problems for the representationalist to address. 
Nida-Rümelin also makes a similar point as Kind, claiming that the representationalist 
assumes we cannot be aware of the intrinsic properties of our own experiences on the basis 
that we can be aware of the properties of external objects. Nida-Rümelin, however, points out 
one assertion does not follow from the other—it is feasible we can both be aware of the 
properties of external objects and the intrinsic properties of our own experience,60 as my 
answer to Schellenberg’s coffee cup problem indicates. Diana Raffman further suggests that 
it is unreasonable that we could be aware of any content of experience without being aware of 
intrinsic qualitative properties of experience to begin with.61 In any case, if we are aware of 
 
57 Amy Kind, “How to Believe in Qualia,” 294. 
 
58 Ibid., 292. 
 
59 Ibid., 293. 
 
60 Nida-Rümelin, “Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience,” 314-315. 
 
61 Diana Raffman, “From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism,” in 
The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 328. 
 
 94 
intrinsic content in any capacity, even if some form of representationalism is true, this would 
count as first-personal introspective evidence in favor of qualia realism, and we would still be 
left where we started, trying to evaluate the importance of first-personal introspective 
evidence. 
The point of section 3.3 is not to make a demonstrative case against eliminativism, 
but to defend first-personal introspective evidence as evidence for qualia realism. However, I 
recognize that maintaining first-personal introspective evidence is evidence for qualia realism 
begs the question of qualia realism. Thus, all that I hope to have accomplished in this section 
is a defense of the reasonableness of taking first-personal introspective evidence as evidence 
of the existence of qualia. What follows in section 3.4 is more of a positive independent 
argument for the existence of qualia within a naturalistic framework. However, the argument 
still relies on evidence gained from the first-personal point of view. My hope in section 3.4 
therefore is not to definitively demonstrate the existence of qualia, but to give some 
plausibility to the belief that qualia exist. And if qualia are plausible in a naturalistic 
ontology, then they can be considered plausible in any ontology. 
3.4 Positive Argument for The Existence of Qualia 
 Saul Kripke famously argued for the non-identity the mental and physical utilizing 
the example of the mental state of pain and the physical brain state of C-fibers firing. Pain 
cannot be identical to C-fibers firing, Kripke argues, because it is possible for someone to be 
in what we would call—that is, what we have rigidly designated—as pain without C-fibers 
firing. Since this is possible, an identity relation (i.e., a relation of necessity) cannot exist 
between the experience of pain and C-fibers firing.62 
 
62 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1981), 98-99. 
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 The notion of rigid designation is the notion of picking out a referent, as it essentially 
is, across all possible worlds. Along with this notion comes the notion of necessary 
properties; an individual person or object has a set of necessary properties without which that 
person or object fails to be itself and therefore does not exist. These are different than 
contingent properties, which a person or object can possess or fail to possess without impact 
on its being identical to itself and in a state of existence.63 
Kripke argues that picking out a person or object specifically is born out of people’s 
common reference to contingent properties. That is, attempts at de re reference forces us into 
making contingent predication. An example Kripke uses is an attempt to distinguish Richard 
Feynman, the famous 20th century physicist, from a random unassuming person named 
Feynman. In both cases, the rigid designator Feynman can be utilized to pick out both 
Feynmans, since they are both indeed, in a de re sense, identical to Feynman (that is, each 
Feynman is identical to itself). However, even though they are both necessarily identical to a 
Feynman they are not identical to the same Feynman. How do we make a distinction then 
between the two Feynmans? We’d have to go beyond the rigid designator in reference to 
Feynman. To pick out the famous physicist, we’d need to make reference to his being a 
famous physicist. His being a famous physicist, however, is not an essential property of the 
famous Feynman: it is a contingent one, since he could have failed to become a physicist.64 
With the above in mind, a challenge for us when we are exploring the issue of 
identity between the mental and the physical is to distinguish necessary from contingent 
properties. Taking seemingly qualitative properties as our paradigmatic example of a 
possibly intrinsic property, I will defend the claim that either the way a color appears is a 
necessary property of color while the physical properties of color are contingent properties, 
 
63 Ibid., 3-21, 46-58. 
 
64 Ibid., 80-81. 
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or the way a color appears is a contingent property of color while the physical properties of 
color are necessary properties. Therefore, the relation between appearance and any physical 
property is a contingent one, thereby undermining any eliminative identity thesis. This would 
be against those like Churchland and Dennett who would argue that the experiential 
components of color are in a necessity relation to physical processes found in the human 
body, or those like Dretske and Schellenberg who would argue that these experiential 
components are in a necessity relation with intentional objects.  
So let us discuss the necessary and contingent properties of color. Suppose there 
existed a possible world where the visible light spectrum wavelengths we in the actual world 
would associate with the color green instead appeared to us humans as what we in the actual 
world would call red, and vice versa (i.e., we evolved to see colors inverted).65 How would 
we be able to uniquely identify the color red across these worlds? In other words, given both 
the actual world and this possible inverted color world, what entity does the word red rigidly 
designate? What are its properties? In order to answer this question we must make a 
distinction between possible world red and actual world red in the same way we make a 
distinction between famous physicist Feynman and some other Feynman. That is, we must 
make reference to the color red’s contingent properties. 
What are red’s contingent properties? It depends on what you take red’s necessary 
properties to be, since whatever property of red is not necessary is contingent. If you take 
appearing actual world red to humans to be a necessary property of the color red, then any 
appearance of actual world red to humans, regardless of physical grounds, will itself be red. 
Thus, in the possible world in question, leafy plants and trees will be red since they appear to 
 
65 Let us say that in this possible world, this inversion is a product of evolution; human vision just 
evolved this way in this world in response to this world’s human beings’ unique environmental needs. Perhaps 
leafy plants were scarcer, of more nutritional value, and, as a consequence, were of more survival interest for 
humans on this world. Therefore, being able to spot them more easily was of utmost importance to our species’ 
success. On the other hand, berries and fruit were unimportant, and therefore humans had no need to spot them 
as easily.  
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humans as red appears in the actual world. Given this (that is, if we take the appearing actual 
world red to humans to be a necessary property of red), then the wavelength of light that 
produces the color red will be a contingent property of red. This is because, in the instance of 
the possible world, the light wavelength that we in the actual world associate with the color 
green appears to humans how red appears in the actual world. 
On the other hand, if you take a certain wavelength of the light spectrum to be a 
necessary property of red—or surface properties of an object’s ability to reflect a certain 
wavelength of light, or the human physical ability to pick up on and process a certain 
wavelength of light, etc.—then this physical property, regardless of how it appears to 
humans, will be red. Therefore, a contingent property of red would be appearing actual 
world red to humans. Thus, even though in our possible word red appears to humans like 
green appears in the actual world, this color would regardless be red given its physical 
properties. 
With this in mind, we see there is no identity relation between the physical properties 
of color and its appearance to humans: we can distinguish between possible inverted world 
red and actual world red using references to the contingent properties that red possesses on 
each world, depending on what we took for red’s necessary properties. If we took the 
physical properties of red to be necessary then we can discuss the differences in how red 
appears in each world, and if we took the appearances properties of red as necessary then we 
can discuss the differences in how red is physically grounded in each world. Thus—in the 
same fashion that Kripke argued that pain could not be C-fibers firing—how a color appears 
to humans cannot be a physical property, i.e., it cannot be a brain state or an intentional 
object. Therefore, qualia exist.  
This argument, if it has merit, also undercuts the notion that the content of experience 
is external and, by extension, that color must necessarily be a property of external objects. 
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Indeed, we can easily imagine color—as it is experienced by humans—as contingent to 
objects, considering that the human visual spectrum could have evolved to be somewhere 
else on the light spectrum. For example, imagine a possible world where human color sight 
developed to have similar capabilities to those of domestic canines. Now imagine how a red 
ball from the actual world would appear to humans in this canine color vision possible world. 
It would appear to us in this possible world as it appears to canines in the actual world, that 
is, it would appear grey. Now, the question becomes, does this ball possess the property of 
being colored red or grey? Externalists would have to affirm both, since both properties 
would have to simultaneously exist in the external object, regardless of the human experience 
of it, if externalism was true. An eliminativist may counter that the ball possesses the 
property of being colored red in the actual world but the property of being grey in the canine 
vision world. But this muddles the fact that this ball has not changed any of its objective, 
physical properties between worlds. It is still the same numerically identical ball, and 
therefore should not be able to possess different objective properties depending on what 
world it is in.  
I imagine some eliminativists will just flatly deny that what I called the property of 
appearing x to humans exists. All that exists, they will say, are objective, physical, 
quantifiable properties, and any seeming qualitative property is just an illusion. They may 
claim that “color properties” reside in the physical functions of the human eye and brain, and 
if human beings evolved to have different color experiences, then these physical functions 
would have all evolved differently as well.66 I think such a response is plausible on 
Churchland’s view, who holds that phenomenal experience really just is the experience of 
physical brain states.67 However, it would still need to be explained how seemingly 
 
66 See Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 389-398. 
 
67 Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective, 54-55. 
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phenomenal experience leads to true justified belief about the external world (which Dennett 
affirms we are able to gain on eliminativism)68 if the way the external world is perceived is 
based upon contingently developed physical functions.  
Someone may counter that, considering the argument developed in this section, true 
justified belief about the external world is impossible to gain, since sense properties are only 
contingently related to physical properties. There are several ways this objection can be 
answered. The first is to admit that, in the same vein as Edmond Wright, mental images do 
not match reality at all: objective reality lacks color and the kind of depth that we experience 
it as having.69 This, however, is an undesirable concession, since it is admitting that 
knowledge of the external world really can’t be gained. The second is to maintain that human 
beings evolved in such a way as to experience the external world as it actually is. However, 
this position, although plausible, would be difficult to prove since we could never get outside 
ourselves, so to speak, to check if our experiences were accurate to reality. The third is to 
give up on naturalism altogether.70  
In any case, given the contingent relation between the physical and experiential 
properties of color that naturalism entails, it seems plausible that qualia do exist. This, along 
with the demonstration of the reasonableness of qualia in section 3.3 of this chapter, should 
motivate us to adopt qualia realism without worry. The existence of such phenomenal 
properties will be key to the development of my theory of moral perception in part II, but 
before that, there is a more immediate concern that the existence of qualia presents for us, 
namely, the mind-body interaction problem. 
 
68 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 364. 
 
69 Edmond Wright, “Why Transparency is Unethical,” in The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond Wright 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 343. 
 
70 Since I am not defending naturalism, but only assuming it for the purposes of this argument, I do not 
have a particular answer for this objection. 
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4. Mind and Body Interaction 
4.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to develop a reasonable metaphysic of the human 
substance, that is, in terms of mind-body interaction. It begins with commitment to 
phenomenal, non-reducible consciousness, contrary to any eliminativist theories. In the 
previous chapter, I justified belief in a distinctly mental realm through a defense of 
phenomenal consciousness, arguing on the basis of taking seriously the first-personal 
experience of seemingly qualitative experiences. If qualia exist—or even seem to exist1—
then the mental is constituted, at least in part, by non-reducible, purely immaterial 
phenomenal content, counter to eliminativism. Therefore, I will not consider reductivist 
physicalist theories further. 
This chapter also begins by assuming causal closure, i.e., the notion that effects we 
observe in nature have causes—and cannot fail to have causes—constituted of the same kind 
of stuff2 as those effects we observe, e.g., physical effects must have physical causes. I have 
previously argued in chapter 1 that leaving room for indeterminacy between causes and 
effects is unreflective of how we understand causal events and develop causal explanations—
hence, effects have definite causes, even if those causes are unknown. Moreover, denial of 
causal closure leaves us with the infamous mind-body interaction problem—that is, the 
problem of how two different kinds of stuff (e.g., mental stuff and physical stuff) can be 
involved in the same causal chain. By affirming causal closure, this chapter begins with an 
 
1 The seeming nature of qualia is itself qualitative and phenomenological. See also Galen Strawson, 
Mental Reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 51-52. 
 
2 I am using stuff here in a technical sense, as referring to a way of fundamentally being, i.e., being 
physical, or mental, or what have you. For clarity’s sake, I am refraining to utilize the more popular word 
substance in this context as I will be using substance to refer to Aristotelian substances later in the chapter, 




extremely skeptical view of substance dualism. The prima facie available options we have as 
theories of mind-body interaction therefore are epiphenomenalism, non-reductive 
physicalism, and panpsychism. However, since epiphenomenalism is undesirable as a theory 
of mental causation (since the mental in this case fails ultimately to be efficacious), it will not 
be considered.  
It will be shown that those theories which allow for the intrinsic nature of causal 
powers (i.e., the existence of real powers) in the human substance are best suited to explain 
the causal efficacy of human beings while maintaining a commitment to irreducible mental 
properties, although causal closure remains a problem. I will begin from the physicalist’s 
position with a discussion of non-reductive physicalism. I will then move to the 
panpsychist’s argument in denial of a distinctly physical realm. Following this, I will provide 
reasons for rejecting the existence of a physical realm altogether, that is, for affirming 
idealism. This will include responding to objections to idealism at length, since idealism is 
prima facie an unattractive theory. Nevertheless, I conclude that any view which affirms 
irreducible mental properties and allows for the intrinsic nature of human causal powers—
panpsychism, idealism, and substance dualism—is a reasonable metaphysic of the human 
substance.  
4.2 Non-Reductive Physicalism 
 Needless to say, non-reductive physicalist theories are physicalist theories. However, 
there is some ambiguity as to the definition of physicalism and physical, and to what kind of 
physicalist ontology any given physicalist theory may be adhering to. I will be taking a 
general approach to the definition of physicalism, in order to capture the physicalist 
commitment at its broadest. Namely, I will be defining physicalism as a commitment to the 
thesis that all that exists is/are—or is instantiated by, grounded in, constituted by, or in some 
fashion dependent on—those fundamental entities as theorized by natural science. Thus, we 
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are now unencumbered in terms of finding a definition of physical while allowing for 
disagreement amongst physicalists to persist.3 
 Non-reductive physicalist theories, then, are those theories that affirm the reality of 
non-reducible mental properties and entities but nevertheless claim these properties and 
entities depend on physical properties (i.e., properties affirmed by natural science) for their 
instantiation. Hence, I am defining non-reductive physicalism in terms of Jaegwon Kim’s 
own definition of a minimal physicalist theory (i.e., a theory that exhibits the minimal 
commitments necessary to be considered a physicalist theory), with the relation between a 
physical property and its instantiated mental property as one of supervenience.4 According to 
Kim, supervenience is a relation between property kinds and not instances, thus allowing for 
multirealizability, i.e., the ability of mental properties to be realized by multiple physical 
properties.5 Moreover, Kim points out that non-reductive physicalist theories, in their quest 
to solve the mind-body problem, carry presumptive commitment the causal efficacy of non-
reducible mental content, and, second, to causal closure—commitments that are affirmed in 
the present analysis as well.6 
 However, as an undesirable consequence, these two commitments can lead to causal 
overdetermination in a physicalist ontology, as demonstrated by Kim.7 The reason why non-
reductive physicalism results in overdetermination is because, due to supervenience, the 
 
3 See also Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism (New York: Routledge, 2010), 69-95, for a discussion of the 
difficulties involved in defining physicalism in terms of scientific theorizing. As Stoljar points out, a concept of 
physicalism based on our notion of intuitively physical objects is too restrictive, while a concept of physicalism 
based on what science theorizes is too broad, allowing to the existence of objects that are intuitively 
nonphysical. With my definition here, I attempt to capture physicalist commitments to science and naturalism 
without restricting the nature of what can possibly exist if naturalism is true. 
  
4 Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental 
Causation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 6, 15. 
 
5 Ibid., 6, 9-10, 19-26. 
 
6 Ibid., 37-38. 
 
7 Ibid., 43-44. 
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instantiation of every mental property depends on the existence of some physical property. 
As Kim explains, the way to account for how a mental event has causal bearing on a physical 
event via the supervenience relation is to say that mental event m, occurring at time t, causes 
physical event p, and further that the causal relation that holds between m and p is a result of 
m being an event of mental kind M and p being an event of physical kind P (i.e., mental event 
m is of the kind M that causes physical kind P). However, this account would be a violation 
of causal closure, since p would not have a physical cause. And if we said that p did have a 
physical cause, p*, then m having causal bearing on the production of p would be case of 
overdetermination. Further, any mental event m* that caused m must itself have had a 
physical realizer, p*, due to the commitment to physicalism. p* would therefore be the cause 
of p, and m could have no causal role to play.8 Kim concludes that, if one is committed to 
both physical causal closure and to phenomenal realism, then the only available mind-body 
interaction option seems to be epiphenomenalism.9 
 There is also a problem with the notion of supervenience as an account of 
phenomenal consciousness, as is evident from Chalmers’ analysis of the supervenience 
relation. Chalmers begins his analysis by making a distinction between logical supervenience 
and natural supervenience, the former being a relation of logical entailment, and the latter 
being one of nomological correlation.10 He then argues that, since it is logically possible that 
phenomenal consciousness does not exist, it can only be naturally supervenient if it is 
supervenient at all.11 He demonstrates this logical possibility through his famous conception 
of a phenomenal zombie: a physical and functional silicon isomorph of himself with no 
 
8 Ibid., 41-46. 
 
9 Ibid., 118-120. 
 
10 David J. Chalmers, Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 34-36. 
 
11 Ibid., 37-38. 
 
 104 
experiential mental content.12 If it is conceivable that such a zombie can exist, then the 
supervenience relation cannot be one of logical entailment.13 Further, Chalmers argues that if 
consciousness was logically supervenient, it should be able to be reductively explained in 
terms of functional roles. The whole point of the non-reductive physicalist project however is 
that consciousness is not reducible in this manner, and therefore consciousness must be 
naturally supervenient if supervenient at all.14 
 Chalmers further makes the point that, given the natural laws of the actual world, 
there are more constraints on what can be considered naturally possible than there are on 
what can be considered logically possible.15 Through this observation, he highlights a 
connection between natural possibility and natural law-like correlations. Given Chalmers’ 
analysis here, what we observe of nomological relations should inform us as to what is 
naturally possible. However, what we consider naturally possible is supposed to inform us of 
what nomological relations exist. In other words, analyzing what is naturally possible should 
shed light on whether supervenience exists, but it is only by observing supervenience—and 
thus knowing that it exists—that we would know it is naturally possible. This epistemic 
circularity seems to point to the impossibility of definitively demonstrating that the 
supervenience relation is possible. In fact, given this circularity, nothing can be demonstrated 
as possible unless it is demonstrated as actual. This problem calls into question the use of 
supervenience as an explanation for the existence of phenomenal consciousness. Something 
more needs to be said than merely claiming a nomological connection; this law-like 
 
12 Ibid., 94-95. 
 
13 Ibid., 97. 
 
14 Ibid., 44-50. 
 
15 Ibid., 36-37. 
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connection itself is in need of explanation. Without said explanation, non-reductive 
physicalism seems untenable as an account of non-reducible phenomenal consciousness. 
 Fundamentally, the problems that non-reductive physicalism faces aren’t due to its 
commitment to causal closure or the non-reducibility of the mental, but to its commitment to 
a certain understanding of what constitutes the physical. Importantly, non-reductive 
physicalists hold that the physical is best understood as an ontologically distinct kind of stuff 
from the mental. Our next theory of mind, panpsychism, rejects this understanding of what 
constitutes the physical. 
4.3 Panpsychism 
 Like substance dualists and non-reductive physicalists, panpsychists take our first-
personal phenomenal experiences of our conscious states as epistemologically authoritative: 
because we have these phenomenal experiences, we know these phenomena exist.16 
However, unlike substance dualists and non-reductive physicalists, panpsychists attempt to 
give an account of mental phenomena that is embedded in the fundamental nature of physical 
reality in a way that renders these phenomena neither wholly distinct nor emergent,17 thereby 
allowing for them to interact in a causal chain with physical entities. Hence, panpsychism is 
the view that mental content is real and non-reducible because it pervasively occurs in nature 
(as opposed to merely arising when matter reaches a certain complexity or obtains a certain 
structure) even at the most fundamental level. Chalmers himself defines panpsychism as “the 
thesis that everything is conscious, or at least that fundamental physical entities are 
conscious.”18 Strawson himself claims that “[b]eing [i.e., existence] is essentially experience-
 
16 Galen Strawson, “Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism,” in Panpsychism: Contemporary 
Perspectives, ed. Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 84. See 
also Chalmers, Conscious Mind, xii-xiii. 
 
17 Strawson, “Mind and Being,” 82. 
 




involving—where ‘experience’ denotes any sort of conscious experience whatever, including 
the most primitive forms of ‘mere’ sensation.”19 It is important to emphasize this 
metaphysical fundamentality of phenomenal experience since holding to this is what sets 
panpsychists apart from non-reductive physicalists.  
Thus, like non-reductive physicalists, panpsychists retain a commitment to 
physicalism. However, unlike non-reductive physicalists, panpsychists redefine the physical 
to include mental phenomena. As Strawson argues, this redefinition is justified since we lack 
a full concept of the physical (or physical stuff, what Strawson calls “matter”); our lacking a 
complete concept is why mind-body interaction is such a problem.20 He claims: 
Many take this to be the problem of how mental phenomena can be physical 
phenomena given what we already know about the nature of the physical. But those 
who think this are already lost. For the fact is that we have no good reason to think 
that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any 
problem in the idea that mental phenomena are physical phenomena [emphasis 
Strawson’s].21 
 
Moreover, Strawson argues that physicalists “must grant that experiential phenomena are 
real, concrete phenomena, for nothing in this life is more certain.”22 Therefore, physicalists 
should take the position that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena.23 Hence, for 
panpsychists, the commitment to the existence of phenomenal consciousness is merely part 
of the commitment to physicalism in general, since there is no real metaphysical distinction 
between the mental and the physical to begin with.  
 
19 Strawson, “Mind and Being,” 80. 
 
20 Strawson, Mental Reality, 98-99. 
 
21 Galen Strawson, “Real Materialism,” in Real Materialism: and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 20. 
 
22 Ibid., 21. The term that Strawson uses here is materialists, not physicalists. However, unlike many 
others, Strawson utilizes the terms physicalist and materialist interchangeably. See Strawson, “Mind and 
Being,” 83, where Strawson explicitly states as such. 
 
23 Strawson, “Real Materialism,” 21. 
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Also important to recognize is that panpsychism possesses a built-in framework for 
the existence of intrinsic properties, which for panpsychists would be experiential properties. 
For example, Strawson holds to what he calls “a form of pure panpsychism,” i.e., what he 
takes “to be the view that experientiality is all there is to the intrinsic nature of concrete 
reality.”24 Regarding intrinsic properties, Chalmers speculates the following: 
[I]t is often noted that physics characterizes its basic entities only extrinsically, in 
terms of their relations to other entities, which are themselves characterized 
extrinsically, and so on. The intrinsic nature of physical entities is left aside. Some 
argue that no such intrinsic properties exist, but then one is left with a world that is 
pure causal flux (a pure flow of information) with no properties for the causation to 
relate. If one allows that intrinsic properties exist, a natural speculation given the 
above is that the intrinsic properties of the physical—the properties that causation 
ultimately relates—are themselves phenomenal properties.25 
 
As Chalmers points out above, the existence of these phenomenal intrinsic properties helps 
explain the ordered nature of causation and provides a place for real causal powers to exist. 
Without this, a metaphysic is at a disadvantage since it would have difficulty making room 
for anything except Humean causation, which was shown to be inadequate in chapter 1. 
Therefore, panpsychism seems like a good option to adopt as a metaphysic in that it 
maintains irreducible mental properties and causal closure. Moreover, because panpsychism 
makes room for intrinsic properties, it makes room for the substance theory of causation: 
mental properties, as intrinsic properties, could play the role of powers given their ability to 
affect the behavior of objects. 
4.4 Problems with Panpsychism 
 Panpsychism is not without its problems, however. One such problem is known as the 
combination problem. Basically, the combination problem arises when questioning how it 
may be that the macrolevel phenomenal consciousness of human beings can arise from the 
 
24 Strawson, “Mind and Being,” 81. 
 
25 David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 
2 (1995): 217. 
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microlevel consciousnesses of individual fundamental particles26 (or whatever one’s 
panpsychist theory considers the basic individual instances of phenomenal content).27 Or as 
Strawson puts it, how do the many experiences of many subjects come together to make one 
unified experience of a single subject?28 Combinatory problems of this type plague all 
physicalist theories that attempt to account for phenomenal consciousness by an appeal to the 
unity, coordination, or complexity of constituent units—i.e, any theory that denies the 
mereological simplicity of conscious beings.29 Whereas all other physicalist theories have 
trouble providing an account of how consciousness itself emerges, panpsychism has set itself 
up for the unique problem of providing an account of how macrolevel consciousness 
emerges. In that sense, panpsychism seems to not have made much progress over 
emergentism. 
 Another problem with panpsychism is one related to the mind-body problem, that is, 
the problem of explaining how internal phenomena interact with an external world. This 
problem is much different for panpsychists than it is for non-reductive physicalists or 
substance dualists, however. For the latter theories, this problem results from taking the 
mental and the physical to be wholly distinct kinds of stuffs, which results in the difficulty of 
trying to fit them in the same causal chain. For the panpsychists, on the other hand, this 
problem arises from maintaining universal internal phenomenology through a commitment to 
the consciousness of fundamental particles as well as universal external physicality through a 
commitment to physicalism, thereby creating a natural tension. This tension comes to the fore 
 
26 David J. Chalmers, “The Combination Problem for Panpsychism,” in Panpsychism: Contemporary 
Perspectives, ed. Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 179-180.  
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in explaining how experiential aspects of objects and properties interact with non-experiential 
aspects, in much the same fashion that non-reductive physicalists and substance dualists have 
trouble in explaining how mental properties can interact with physical properties. This 
problem is most pronounced when one type of causal explanation—for example, a non-
experiential molecular explanation of chemical changes—exhaustively explains a particular 
causal occurrence while the other type—the experiential aspects of said same chemical 
changes—seems to play no causal role. As such, similarly to non-reductive physicalists, 
panpsychist accounts of causation run the risk of overdetermination if we take both 
experiential and non-experiential explanations seriously. What is doing the causing in agent 
causation? Is it the external excitement of neurons or the internal will of a subject? The 
panpsychist affirms that these are just external and internal aspects of the same thing, but 
there seems to be a risk of advocating for a form of epiphenomenalism if non-experiential 
causal accounts are given primacy. 
We can see this problem more clearly if we consider a thought experiment. Let’s say 
that I pick up a rock. In this scenario, given panpsychism, there’s me, a sophisticated 
macrolevel conscious being, and a rock, a probably not-as-sophisticated conscious being. I 
internally perceive the rock, internally decide to pick it up, and internally exert my will: these 
are the experiential aspects of this causal occurrence. Externally, my body moves and the 
rock gets picked up: this is the non-experiential, third-personal aspects. What is the 
relationship between the experiential and the non-experiential? If we explain this relationship 
by claiming that there is no metaphysical difference—the relationship is one of identity—
then we run the risk of saying everything is experiential and nothing is non-experiential. 
Thus, with a commitment to the experiential and without an account of the experiential’s 
relationship to the non-experiential, we risk idealism. Perhaps this isn’t really a big problem 
for the panpsychist—Strawson himself acknowledges the movement towards idealism his 
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theory suggests.30 But there is a sense, even for Strawson, that panpsychism is not idealism, 
at least a form of idealism that holds the internality of all existents.31 
 Since panpsychism still succumbs to the problems inherent in attempting to bridge the 
gap between an external and internal world, it falters in the face of the mind-body problem. 
Perhaps where panpsychism fails is where physicalism in general fails—not with positing 
universally pervasive consciousness so much as trying to retain the notion of external, mind-
independent, material stuff. The solution to the problems of panpsychism therefore might be 
to collapse the external to the internal and assume the mentality of all existents. 
 What if we were to assume the mentality of all existents? That is, why should we not 
posit idealism? We would still be able to hold to the two commitments that began this 
discussion—the reality of irreducible phenomenal consciousness and causal closure (that is, 
mental activity having mental causes and mental effects as opposed to physical causes and 
effects)—as well as avoid the problems inherent in accepting a distinctly physical, external 
reality. The idea of idealism is objectionable to many, however, and further it does not seem 
to cohere with our natural intuitions concerning what we perceive as the mind-independent 
world around us. Much more needs to be said if we are going to take idealism as a serious 
option.  
4.5 Idealism 
 Berkeley, in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, argues 
against the existence of the physical, as it is traditionally understood (what Berkeley calls 
“matter”), on the basis that, even if the physical did exist, we could not know it exists. 
Berkeley argues that since matter is “passive and inert,” it “cannot be an agent or efficient 
 
30 Strawson, “Real Materialism,” 23, 49. 
 
31 Strawson, “Mind and Being,” 93-94. 
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cause.”32 Moreover, since what is perceivable are qualitative properties, matter itself is 
“unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our 
perceptions…as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends 
it.”33 Therefore, in order to avoid the skepticism that arises out of taking matter to be distinct 
from mind, Berkeley adopts idealism. Or, in his own words: 
So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being 
perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any 
real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers 
distrust their sense, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they 
see or feel, even of their own bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of 
thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative 
knowledge of the existence of sensible things…I can as well doubt of my own being 
as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest 
contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or 
touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an 
unthinking being consists in being perceived.34 
 
In this way, Berkeley turns to idealism in order to maintain the metaphysical reality of what 
we perceive and, moreover, our ability to gain knowledge of “sensible things,” i.e., the 
objects of perception. 
 Robert Adams argues for idealism along similar lines, stating that the difficulty of 
discovering what objects are like within themselves naturally leads one to believe that 
perhaps there is nothing to what objects are like within themselves.35 To understand this 
reasoning, recall the argument in chapter 3 that humans could have evolved to see leafy green 
plants phenomenally as a different color. This is the case with any sensible thing: it could 
 
32 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, §69. Note I am using 
section numbers, found in the text of the A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in order to 
reference A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, while I will be using the page numbers 
from the Roger Woolhouse edited volume of Berkeley’s works in order to reference Three Dialogues Between 
Hylas and Philonous (see footnote 49).  
 
33 Ibid.  
 
34 Ibid., §88. 
 
35 Robert M. Adams, “Idealism Vindicated,” in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter van Inwagen 
and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 36. 
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have appeared differently to human perception. This relation between perception and the 
objects of perception calls into question our ability to understand what things are like in 
themselves: perhaps we have little to no understanding of mind-independent reality.36 
Moreover, if we allow that at least some properties that we perceive do not belong to mind-
independent objects (such as color properties, or taste and smell properties), then it is perhaps 
possible (or at least, conceivable) that no properties do.37 All properties (or at least a vast 
majority of properties) exist internally in the mind of subjects.38 
Adams sees this idealistic thinking as a reaction to modern philosophers’ mechanistic 
model of the universe, which, according to Adams, is understood “in terms of geometrical 
properties and motions of bodies which interact only by touching and pushing each other.”39 
Given this modern conception of interaction, it is natural to assume that all causes and effects 
have mechanistic explanations, and the properties and behavior of objects are 
“geometrical.”40 According to Adams, however, this model leaves something lacking. In 
response to Descartes’ assertion that corporeality is merely extension, Adam argues that “a 
system of spatiotemporal relationships constituted by sizes, shapes, positions, and changes 
thereof is too incomplete, too hollow, as it were, to constitute an ultimately real thing or 
substance.” 41 Contending that this conception of corporeality is inadequate, he advocates for 
 
36 See also Edmond Wright, “Why Transparency is Unethical,” in The Case for Qualia, ed. Edmond 
Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 342-345, where Wright talks about the lack of resemblance 
between qualia and the objects that gave rise to said qualia. 
 
37 Todd Buras and Trent Dougherty, “Parrying Parity: A Reply to a Reidian Critique of Idealism,” in 
Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, ed. Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 2-3.  
 
38 See Adams, “Idealism Vindicated,” 47. Adams specifically defends a version of idealism where 
some causal relations are external. This is his way of avoiding solipsism.  
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a richer conception to fill into the formal and structural ontology he considers the modern 
mechanistic ontology to be.42 Adams then goes on to question whether or not it is secondary 
qualities that fill in this gap: 
Within the visual field the colors literally fill in the shapes; and it is because shapes 
need a filling that we can hardly imagine, visually, a shape without some chromatic 
property. And it is because of the qualitativeness of colors that they bring to the 
context something that is not merely formal and structural. In a more general way, 
then, we may conjecture that the reality of a substance must include something 
intrinsic and qualitative over and above any formal or structural features it may 
possess.43 
 
Adams then affirms “first, that substances must have intrinsic non-formal qualities, and 
second, that qualities of consciousness, or qualities very like them, are the only intrinsic non-
formal qualities of substances.”44 Therefore, it seems, conscious properties must belong to all 
substances. 
One may recognize that this conclusion—that all intrinsic properties are conscious 
properties, and that conscious properties are universally possessed by all entities—is both 
compatible with idealism and panpsychism. Adams admits as much.45 In order to distinguish 
his position, Adams maintains that, under idealism, spatiotemporal relations reduce to 
internal mental content, which Adams believes is idealism’s differentiating feature.46 We can 
see now how my above objection to panpsychism—that it fails under something like the 
mind-body problem—does not work against idealism. In the above objection, I called into 
question how the internal exercise of my will was able to cause effects to my external 













relations that give corporeality to my body and the rock’s body—were reduced to mental 
content, then nothing external (or nothing much external) is happening when I move the rock. 
4.6 Objections to Idealism 
 In The Nature of Perception, John Foster—similarly to Berkeley and Adams—
defends the claim that, in order for humans to have perceptual access to the world, the world 
must be both logically dependent on the human mind and fundamentally consist in human 
mental facts.47 According to Foster, these two claims are what constitute idealism.48 
However, if the world is dependent on and consists in the facts of immediate mental states, 
what it seems we are left with is solipsism: for indeed, if I collapse the perceived world to my 
perceptions of the world itself, and deny the existence of anything beyond those perceptions, 
then other minds except my own do not exist. Shouldn’t we reject idealism based on this bent 
towards solipsism? 
One solution to this problem is to embrace the conclusion that there is only one mind 
while giving an account of a quasi-mind-independence. This is what Bernardo Kastrup does 
when he argues that there exists only one universal consciousness that each individual 
consciousness derives its being from through a process of mental dissociation, i.e., the 
psychiatric concept that describes the discontinuity of some mental content with other mental 
content in a single mind. For Kastrup, each human being is a bit of universal consciousness 
that is logically disconnected (as opposed to metaphysically disconnected) from the universal 
consciousness as a whole. In this fashion, Kastrup is able to maintain some semblance of 
mental privacy.49 
 
47 John Foster, The Nature of Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 249. 
 
48 Ibid., 255. 
 




The other, and, in my opinion, more attractive solution to the problem of solipsism is 
to reject Foster’s denial of mind-independence as inherent to idealism. For one, we are 
naturally inclined to believe that, even if idealism is true (and solipsism is false), there is at 
least some mind-independence: if more than one mind exists, each mind is independent of all 
others. Foster himself even admits that idealism, if it is to be non-solipsistic, requires an 
external basis.50 This external basis would both assume and allow for mind-independence. 
What would the character of this external basis be? The most straightforward 
answer—especially for a theist—would be Berkeley’s view or something similar to it.51 
Berkeley held that the existence of a perceived object did not subsist in the perceptions of a 
human observer but in the perceptions of a divine observer. Thus, objects of our perceptions 
have mind-independent existence from our minds since they exist in God’s mind. In fact, for 
Berkeley, existence seems to consist solely of being perceived by God and nothing can exist 
unless it is so perceived.52 However, as Daniel Flage also clarifies, this doesn’t mean that 
Berkeley holds that God has sensations as humans have sensations: God having sensations 
would assume God’s passibility53 and Berkeley explicitly denies God is passible.54 
Nevertheless, that God would have perception of his creation is without controversy, as 
Berkeley points out.55 The postulation of a transcendent observer undergirding the existence 
of objects of human perception allows for the existence of a reality independent from human 
 
50 Foster, The Nature of Perception, 281-282. 
 
51 See also Foster, The Nature of Perception, 283, where Foster mentions Berkeley’s theory as a 
solution to this problem. 
 
52 George Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, 160-162. Page numbers taken 
from combined volume A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues 
Between Hylas and Philonous, ed. Roger Woolhouse (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1988). 
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minds.56 In this way, idealism avoids solipsism. Unfortunately, this solution is unattractive to 
non-theists. 
  Another objection to idealism is that, if truth conditions are given by phenomenal 
content, then there can be no such thing as objective truth. Indeed, if reality consists in 
perceptions, then illusions, dreams, and hallucinations are no less real and true than any other 
perception. We need physical reality in order to ground truth. As an answer, Kastrup argues 
that the reason why we come to know that we are wrong about misperceptions, such as with 
illusions, is because of subsequent perceptions that inform our judgments.57 Moreover, 
holding to physicalism presents a bigger epistemological problem: 
Lucid contemplation of [idealism and physicalism] shows that idealism attempts to 
reduce an explanatory abstraction (physically objective matter) to that which 
articulates and hosts the abstraction in the first place (mind). This is prima facie 
eminently reasonable. Mainstream physicalism, in turn, attempts to reduce mind to 
mind’s own explanatory abstractions, an obvious paradox that constitutes the crux of 
the “hard problem.”58 
 
As previously discussed, and as Berkeley argued,59 holding the physical as ontologically 
distinct from the mental makes it impossible to get out into the world—to know that what we 
perceive of the external world is what the world is like in and of itself. If we take the mental 
to be distinct from the physical, it is hard to make sense of the physical, considering all we 
know about it is what we perceive in the mental. It seems as if any worldview is a barrier to 
truth, it’s one that admits material objects. 
 Berkeley acknowledged that the perceptions of a single object as had by different 
subjects can all be different, but the true reality of an object is grounded in object’s 
 
56 Ibid., 182. 
 
57 Bernardo Kastrup, “Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter 
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archetype, which exists in the mind of God.60 As Flage points out, these archetypes ground 
identity claims in Berkeley’s ontology.61 Therefore, there is a truth of the matter for each 
claim about an object of perception. Furthermore, for Berkeley, all qualitative properties of 
an object really exist in the object—as opposed merely existing in internal qualia separate 
from the external object itself—and thus our perceptions of an object gives us real immediate 
knowledge of that object. The example Berkeley uses is that of a tulip: because the tulip 
consists in its idea with all its qualitative properties, the color property of the tulip truly exists 
in the tulip itself.62 Moreover, objects consisting of being perceived does not make them any 
less real for Berkeley. For Berkeley, to be an idea in this fashion is to have real existence.63  
 But what about dreams and hallucinations? How does Berkeley distinguish what is 
“real” perceptions from these false ones, if everything is in the mind? Berkeley contends that 
false perceptions are “faint and indistinct,” have the character of being “dim, irregular, and 
confused,” and are wholly dependent on the human will. On the other hand, perceptions of 
the real “are more vivid and clear” and are outside one’s control.64 Counter to Berkeley’s 
assumption, I am uncertain that a good case can be made in support of the notion that real 
perceptions are wholly outside one’s control (or that false perceptions are totally within one’s 
control, for that matter). Nevertheless, it seems pretty evident that the experience of dreams 
and hallucinations is less orderly and coherent, especially in terms of each instance of a 
dream or hallucinatory experience logically connecting to other experiences, both real and 
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64 Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, 182. 
 
 118 
false.65 Because of this, we as perceptual beings are generally able to distinguish between 
reality and fantasy. Since we have this ability, it cannot be said that an idealist ontology 
hinders knowledge of objective reality. 
 Another objection to idealism is that idea that, if idealism is true, then there’s no such 
thing as real causal interaction between objects or substances. For indeed, if idealism is 
adopted, then one primary reason for adopting it—that it maintains causal closure—becomes 
moot. Moreover, idealism can’t allow for an ontology of substances with causal power and 
thus would not work with the theory of causation advocated in chapter 1. 
 In fact, with idealism the existence of the human substance itself is called into 
question. Berkeley infers the existence of the self, the human substance, from his own inner 
reflection of himself; however, for Berkeley, the human substance seems to be a spiritual 
substance, which he considers distinct from thoughts and perceptions.66 It seems as if 
Berkeley missteps to say he can infer the existence of his own spiritual substance without 
direct perception given he doesn’t allow this kind of inference to the knowledge of material 
substances.67 Berkeley, however, addresses such an objection, stating that he refutes the 
existence of material substances because of the inconsistency involved in the idea of the 
material, not just on the basis of the material being imperceptible. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to see how postulating that a spirit has thoughts and perceptions is anything over and above 
postulating a mind inhabiting a body, for how do thoughts relate to a spirit? It seems as if we 
must either say that a spirit just is a being of pure mental states—and nothing over and above 
those mental states—or we arrive back at the mind-body problem again. In either case, how 
idealism can account for the existence of the human substance is unforthcoming. 
 
65 See also Adams, “Idealism Vindicated,” 48, where Adams discusses this point. 
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Furthermore, Berkeley contends that God gives order to nature, which exhibits 
lawlikeness.68 But it is difficult to see how this is anything above occasionalism given that 
God’s mind is fully in charge of the causal order. As Adams demonstrates, idealism prima 
facie doesn’t seem to support the idea that substances have any real causal interaction with 
each other; it seems to be solely an occasionalist theory due to God’s causal sustaining role. 
Adams explains that this is the case because, under a truly interactionist version of idealism, 
substances would lack the perceptual ability needed to constitute physical reality as we 
observe it: 
[I]ntuitions regarding the reality of physical causation seem better respected in 
postulating an interactionist causal structure, in which many perceiving substances, 
corresponding in some way to physical objects, exercise metaphysically real causal 
influence on each other…And the obvious reason not to prefer such an interactionist 
version of idealism to the occasionalist version is that it seems doubtful that the 
rudimentary perceptions of those many substances contain enough information for the 
construction of a causal order as rich and well articulated as that of physics. 
Specifically we may wonder whether the feelings of substances that do not have fairly 
advanced geometrical perception can contain enough information for the construction 
of space and time from intramental resources which is required for an idealist as 
distinct from a merely panpsychist theory. 69 
 
Adams states that what could be postulated to support real causation by the substances 
themselves is “that spatiotemporal relational properties are indirectly tied to qualities of 
consciousness (or quasi-consciousness) by belonging to the same substance;”70 but this fix 
results in panpsychism since now spatiotemporal relations are not reductive—they exist 
externally and physically (or in other words, all existents are not completely phenomenal as 
idealism would hold, but bear some physicality).71 Adams concludes that a “either a broadly 
occasionalist idealism or an interactionist panpsychism can account for the causal structure of 
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physics as well as a typical physicalist view can.”72 What is left in doubt, however, is the 
possibility of a truly interactionist version of idealism that is compatible with the affirmation 
of substance causation. 
 This is a real problem for idealists if they cannot come up with an answer. For truly, 
we want to say that there are real properties belonging to a substance that allow it to act and 
be acted upon (indeed, this chapter concerns providing an account of mental causation in a 
substance causation ontology). Perhaps the way forward is to think of these causal properties 
as belonging to the object (or substance) of perception as any perceived properties would, 
such as color properties. Moreover, the perceptions of the objects involved in causal 
interaction are not the grounding perceptions of these powers, counter to Adams’ postulation. 
It could be argued that the existence of these properties, as well as their interactions, are 
grounded in God’s mind, just as individual substances themselves are grounded in God’s 
mind. Arguably, how objects exist in God’s mind may be much finer and more detailed than 
humans can perceive and therefore complex causal powers that we don’t have direct 
perceptual access to may exist. The question becomes, is this just occasionalism in disguise? 
In one sense, yes, because without God thinking it nothing would come to be, including the 
exercise of causal powers. And in another sense, no, because if we affirm Berkeley’s 
assessment that to be perceived is to be real in a metaphysically serious sense, then causal 
powers and the causal interactions between substances are very real. 
 What does this do to our developing a theory of mental causation—where human 
beings are said to possess real causal powers originating in the exercise of their wills—if we 
have to admit that human powers, and the exercise thereof, are grounded in the mind of God? 
If we accept idealism, shouldn’t we have to say that humans lack the capacity for free will? 
For a possible answer, we can look at philosophical work surrounding divine providence that 
 
72 Ibid., 54. 
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deals with exactly this kind of problem, given that the existence of a God, as classically 
conceived, poses an inherent problem concerning human freedom regardless of what 
ontology one adopts.73 It should be concluded that this is not a problem unique to idealism 
and thus shouldn’t be treated as such. 
Another objection to idealism goes like this: if the world is exactly as humans 
perceive it, then how can different species have different perceptual experiences of the same 
object? For example, a human may see a ball as red that a dog sees as grey. If the ball merely 
is the perception of it, then how can it consist in multiple perceptions? I’ve discussed a 
problem similar to this in the last chapter concerning how externalists about experience might 
situate color properties that appear to two different species two different ways. I concluded 
that, because we cannot externally situate such contradictory properties, we had to reject 
externalism. Now we are considering an internalist theory of experience; however, the 
properties in question are still externally grounded in a divine mind as opposed to in an outer 
physical world. Therefore, the problem is still similar. What property belongs to the ball, now 
internally conceived? Red or grey? 
This problem can be met similarly to how we met the previous objection concerning 
the grounding of objective reality. Since the world that human beings find themselves in is 
not constituted by human perceptual content, but by divine mental content, the world is not 
exactly as human beings perceive it anyway since human beings have perceptual limitations. 
Moreover, just as human beings can have different perceptions of the same object, so it can 
be inferred that different species can also have different perceptions of the same object. What 
possesses the properties of the ball in question aren’t any species’ ideas or perceptions of that 
 
73 See David S. Oderberg, “Divine Premotion,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 
(2016): 207-222, and Robert C. Koons, “Dual Agency: A Thomistic Account of Providence and Human 
Freedom,” Philosophia Christi 4 (2002): 397-411, where Oderberg and Koons attempt to develop a coherent 
account of humans exercising causal powers and God causing the exercise of those same powers while human 
freedom is maintained. 
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object, but the archetype of the ball in the mind of God.74 According to Flage’s analysis, an 
archetype is that to which a perception of an object is held in reference, which grounds all 
identity claims;75 moreover, an archetype contains within it all possible perspectives of the 
object it is the archetype of.76 Perhaps the archetype of the ball in question contains both dog 
perspectives and human perspectives (as well as an unknown number of other species-based 
perspectives). Further, from the dog perspective the property grey is perceptible and from the 
human perspective the property red is perceptible. Both red and grey, however, belong to the 
archetype. 
4.7 Substance Dualism Revisited 
The downfall of idealism as presented here is that it would only be appealing to 
theists—non-theists could do nothing with it since it requires the positing of a divine observer 
in order to ground objectivity. Thus, anyone without a commitment to the existence of God 
would find cause to dismiss it outright. Perhaps the best option for the non-theist would be a 
single universal consciousness, such as argued for by Kastrup. Or, considering the deistic 
connotations of Kastrup’s theory, perhaps panpsychism would be better fitting for a non-
theist committed to naturalism. However, with panpsychism, the problem of bridging the gap 
between the internal and external has yet to be solved, and problems concerning giving an 
account of mental causation still remain. 
What if we turned back and considered substance dualism? We initially rejected 
dualism on the basis of its closure violations. Yet now we have cast doubt on panpsychism 
and idealism because of problems inherent in those theories, ones that do not seem to give 
them an advantage over substance dualism. What if we could explain mental efficacy under a 
 
74 Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, 193-194. 
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dualist ontology that doesn’t violate closure, one that gives an account of mind-body 
interaction? There have been recent attempts by dualists to do just this via appeals to mutual 
manifestation. 
 Recall from chapter 1 that mutual manifestation is the thesis that a given 
manifestation event is the product of two or more powers or dispositions manifesting 
themselves simultaneously. As Christopher Austin points out, according to this thesis, “there 
is no such thing as a manifestation of a single dispositional property,”77 which “is in stark 
contrast to our usual stimulus-response model” of how substance causation works.78 In 
chapter 1, I criticized the mutual manifestation thesis for being fundamentally an anti-powers 
view of causation since according to mutual manifestation, the manifestation of power 
consists not in the activity of essential monadic properties but in the extrinsic contingent 
relations between properties. In this chapter, however, I will revisit it in order to explore 
whether it helps substance dualism solve the mind-body interaction problem. Ultimately, I 
argue, it does not. 
 One dualist theory that takes advantage of the mutual manifestation thesis in order to 
solve the interaction problem is that of Sophie Gibb. On her theory, Gibb tries to make sense 
of mental events as double preventers.79 A double preventer prevents a certain manifestation 
event which, if manifested, would prevent a targeted manifestation event from occurring.80 In 
other words, a double preventer allows for the occurrence of a targeted or desired 
manifestation event which would otherwise not manifest. Gibb illustrates the function of a 
 
77 Christopher J. Austin, “Is Dispositional Causation Just Mutual Manifestation?,” Ratio 29 (2016): 
235-236.  
 
78 Ibid., 236. 
 
79 S.C. Gibb, “Mental Causation and Double Prevention,” in Mental Causation and Ontology, ed. S.C. 
Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R.D. Ingthorsson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 194. 
 
80 Ibid., 199-200. 
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double preventer through the example of a game at a fair. In this game, the targeted 
manifestation is the breaking of a glass bottle by way of a ball thrown by a player. Unknown 
to the player, however, an invisible barrier would prevent the ball from reaching the bottle if 
the ball was thrown. Nonetheless, just as a player throws the ball, a fair worker removes the 
barrier by pressing a button—a double preventer—resulting in the targeted effect occurring—
the breaking of the glass bottle.81 
Gibb maintains that “double preventer events are not causes of the event that they 
have prevented from being prevented.”82 Thus, a mental event that acts as a double preventer 
does not violate causal closure. However, this doesn’t mitigate the double preventer’s 
necessity for the effect’s occurrence, since without the double preventer permitting the event, 
the event would not have occurred. Therefore, as Gibb claims, “the role of an event that 
permits a cause to bring about an effect is no less important than the role of the cause.”83 
Moreover, she argues that the double preventer’s role in a causal event is “an objective one, 
not merely an explanatory one.”84 Thus, by way of this causal importance of a double 
preventer, Gibb attempts to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. 
In order for Gibb’s theory to work, a base neurological event corresponding to the 
targeted event must already be set to occur before the execution of any mental double 
preventer (think of the fair game scenario: the player must already be winding up to hit the 
bottle before the barrier is removed). But this seems counter to the notion of free agency, or 
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that will result in my messaging my leg to alleviate some muscle pain—these physical 
processes will be neurological event n1, my accompanying desire to alleviate my pain is 
mental event m2, labelled 2 because it is ontologically subsequent of the neurological event, 
thereby acting as a double preventer of any counterfactual manifestation that would put a stop 
to n1. But before I start body movement b2, the muscle pain goes away and I experience an 
intense itch in my arm that I want (m3) to scratch (b3). Unless there is a primed and ready 
neurological event, n0, that m3 can act as a double preventer of n1 for, I must rub my leg with 
the desire to scratch my arm. On the other hand, if n0 is indeed present, it would have to be 
set in motion prior to my forming a desire to rub my leg, and even more troubling, prior to 
my forming the desire to scratch my arm.  
Too much of Gibb’s theory rests on the manifestation of powers permitting or 
excluding counterfactual events. Accepting this would create an ontological quagmire of 
objective, causally relevant, non-existent events—which may or may not be 
epistemologically accessible—that must be invoked when formulating a causal explanation 
that could attribute certain effects to particular agents. This seems ad hoc and, if taken 
seriously, impossible. 
More recently, Matthew Owen has proposed mutual manifestation to specifically 
account for the physical manifestation of neurological activity that occurs with mental 
content. His goal is to refute neurological correlates as exclusive evidence for physicalism.86 
According to Owen, the physical body possesses passive powers that mental powers are 
active power partners with. For example, a runner chooses to run, and therefore she manifests 
a passive body power, or B-Power, along with an active mental power, i.e., an M-Power. 
These two powers, the B-Power and the M-Power, are in a relation of ontological 
 
86 Matthew Owen, “Aristotelian Causation and Neural Correlates of Consciousness,” Topoi (2018): §1 
and §3, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9606-9. 
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dependence. Neither could manifest without the other—specifically, the manifestation of B-
Power is a constituent of the manifestation of M-Power.87 
 I consider Owen’s theory to be heading in the right direction when it comes to solving 
the mind-body problem for substance dualists. Of note is the constituent relation he proposes 
between mental and physical activities (i.e., that physical manifestations are a constitutive 
part of mental manifestations) since this potentially accounts for both physical causal closure 
and mind-body interaction. Given that physical manifestations are constitutive parts of 
mental manifestations, we have a built-in explanation for why physical manifestations 
accompany mental manifestations and, further, why mental manifestations have the ability to 
produce physical effects. However, Owen’s view still leaves unexplained how a physically 
grounded power can have a mentally grounded power as a power partner for a single 
manifestation, regardless of whether that manifestation is consistent with the mutual 
manifestation thesis or not. This would be an important explanation to have to save substance 
dualism from the interaction problem, for the active power is just how a substance acts upon 
another substance with a passive power. Therefore, invoking a mentally grounded active and 
a physically grounded passive power still leaves a mental substance having causal power over 
a physical substance in need of explaining. That is, we are still left with a closure violation 
and the existing interaction problem, just at a deeper mereological level. 
Moreover, Owen admits that the B-Power and M-Power are in a dependence relation. 
However, why should we consider the M-Power more ontologically primary in this 
dependence relation? Without a positive argument towards this end, we’re left with an 
ontology compatible with physicalism, particularly one that is reflective of 
epiphenomenalism. We still have not been given reason to accept the ontological order of 
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dependency necessary for free will agency in a substance dualist ontology, other than that we 
should accept such an ordering to maintain free will (which is Owen’s approach).88 Even 
though I think Owen gets far with his theory, I believe there is still a long way to go. 
4.8 Conclusion 
 What can we conclude after considering all these interaction theories? For one, the 
interaction problem is a difficult problem to get around: non-reductive physicalism, substance 
dualism, and, as shown above, even panpsychism seem on par in terms of faltering in the face 
of it. Idealism would be at an advantage at this point, except that it has its own problems in 
terms of accounting for truth and objectivity without having to invoke a divine observer.  
Secondly, in light of the all the above theories (i.e., non-reductive physicalism, 
panpsychism, idealism, and substance dualism), it must be affirmed that those theories which 
allow for intrinsic properties are at a significant advantage. We know from chapter 1 that 
substance causation—involving real intrinsic causal powers—is more suitable than 
Humeanism at explaining what we causally observe. Moreover, from chapter 2, we have a 
reason to be committed to incompatibilist human freedom. Further, from chapter 3, we can 
make a case for the non-reducibility of experiential properties. Therefore, in order to preserve 
the idea that human beings have first-personal qualitative experiences—and, moreover, that 
they can rationally originate causal chains free from the determining effects of external 
forces—we have a strong reason to be committed to the existence of intrinsic properties.  
Thus, physicalism must be rejected, including non-reductive physicalism, which does 
not allow for intrinsic properties, but merely breaks down to epiphenomenalism. This leaves 
us with the options of substance dualism, panpsychism, and idealism, all of which can allow 
for the existence of intrinsic properties in various forms. Some may have issue with the lack 




existence of a distinctly physical realm is not integral to this thesis—only intrinsic properties 
are. Moreover, as Daniel Stoljar points out, defining physical as a distinct way of being is 
more difficult than one would think at first glance (see footnote 3 above).89 We have ample 
reason to reject the modern conception of the physical, and, as Strawson argues, reason to 
admit what is historically considered nonphysical into the physical.90 Instead of worrying 
about making difficult distinctions, our commitment should be to intrinsic properties, not to 
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5. The Question of Moral Perception 
5.1 Introduction 
What follows in the next three chapters is a defense of a strong moral realism that 
allows for non-inferential perceptual moral knowledge. In particular, the thesis I will be 
defending is that moral knowledge can be gained via ordinary perception (such as the 
knowledge of the presence of any ordinary object or properties, e.g., the green-leaved tree 
outside my window, can be gained via perception) and, moreover, that moral properties exist 
non-reductively and mind-independently as relations.1 
The ideas developed in previous chapters are integral to the development of what 
follows. In chapter 1, I made the case that the relata of events are substances—as opposed to 
mere objects—and that these substances have real intrinsic features, including powers. This 
account of causation will be important to the account that I develop in chapter 6 of how moral 
relations are a type of causal relations between substances. It is important to this account that 
the substance theory of causation holds because, as I will argue in chapter 6, the associated 
powers and final causes of substances in a causal relation determine the moral quality—if 
any—of said relation. Without substance theory, there is no account of morality. 
In chapter 3, I defended the idea that the experiential content of consciousness is 
phenomenal and non-reducible or eliminable (i.e., qualia realism is true). This will be 
important to the development of the idea that moral relations have their own phenomenology 
that is irreducible to descriptive properties or psychological states—a topic introduced in this 
chapter but dealt with more thoroughly in the next. Moreover, the experience of phenomenal 
moral relations is important to how moral concepts are learned and moral knowledge is 
gained, a topic of this chapter and chapter 7.  
 
1 More specifically, moral properties exist as features of relations between substances. What this means 
will be thoroughly explained in chapter 6. For the purposes of this present discussion, it is expedient just to say 
that moral properties are relations. 
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In chapters 2 and 4, I developed an account of the human being such that they are 
non-reducible to any material parts and possess intrinsic features and powers (i.e., exhibits 
incompatibilist causal freedom). Thus, I provided an account of the human substance which 
can enter into causal relations and, consequently, into moral relations. This will be important 
to the chapter 6 discussion of how and why human beings are morally culpable and are able 
to exercise moral agency, and thus why a substance ontology with human beings cannot help 
but be a moral one.  
This chapter will serve as an introduction to my theory of moral perception as 
ordinary perception and moral properties as relational—as opposed to monadic—properties, 
with the focus of this chapter being on answering the question of whether or not moral 
knowledge can be gained via perception. In the next chapter, I will provide a metaphysical 
account of relations that is compatible with relations having their own irreducible 
phenomenology, and address the issue of how we can consider some relations moral. In the 
final chapter, I shall address the epistemological problems that arise from my view of 
perceptual knowledge, namely making sense of non-conceptual or concept-limited 
knowledge and how such knowledge is justified. It is the intention of these last three chapters 
to provide a viable metaphysical foundation for the moral realist while giving a plausible 
account of moral perception.  
5.2 Harman’s Cat 
 Gilbert Harman, in the attempt to motivate a discussion on whether moral principles 
can be empirically analyzed, poses the following questions and thought experiment: 
Can moral principles be tested in the same way [as scientific hypotheses], out 
in the world? You can observe someone do something, but can you ever perceive the 
rightness or wrongness of what he does? If you round a corner and see a group of 
young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that 
what they are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you can see that 
it is wrong. But is your reaction due to the actual wrongness of what you see or is it 
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simply a reflection of your moral “sense,” a “sense” that you have acquired perhaps as 
a result of your moral upbringing?2 
 
Ultimately Harman concludes that your reaction is from your moral “sense,” and not due 
what is objectively located in the world: people’s moral sensibilities determine what moral 
judgements they make, i.e., what they “see” in a given moral situation.3 However, Harman 
does not arrive at the conclusion without first making some interesting observations about the 
nature of perception: 
You see some children pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it. To really see that, you 
have to possess a great deal of knowledge, know about a considerable number of 
objects, know about people: that people pass through the life stages infant, baby, 
child, adolescent, adult. You must know what flesh and blood animals are, and in 
particular, cats. You must have some idea of life. You must know what gasoline is, 
what burning is, and much more. In one sense, what you “see” is a pattern of light on 
your retina, a shifting array of splotches, although even that is theory, and you could 
never adequately describe what you see in that sense. In another sense, you see what 
you do because of the theories you hold. Change those theories and you would see 
something else, given the same pattern of light…Observation depends on theory 
because perception involves forming a belief as a fairly direct result of observing 
something; you can form a belief only if you understand the relevant concepts and a 
concept is what it is by virtue of its role in some theory of system of belief.4 
 
According to Harman, one’s theory of morality determines what moral judgements one 
makes in the same manner that one’s scientific theory determines how one may make sense 
of scientific observation.5 However, unlike in the scientific case, moral judgements don’t 
necessarily involve assumptions about supposed moral facts in order to explain supposed 
moral observations, whereas with science, assumptions need to be made about physical facts 
in order to explain observations.6 To support this claim, Harman argues that, since moral 
 
2 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 4.  
 
3 Ibid., 6-7. 
 
4 Ibid., 4-5. 
 
5 Ibid., 5-6 
 
6 Ibid., 6. 
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facts do not play a role in how a subject arrives at a moral judgement (given that moral 
judgements have psychological explanations), then their existence can be doubted.7 
 Despite Harman’s skepticism, there seems to be great intuitive appeal in the idea that 
a moral agent is just able to witness a moral situation unfold and “see” the morality of it, as 
Harman’s cat thought experiment suggests—therefore, we have reason not to give up so 
easily on it. Moreover, Harman himself states that in order for us to see a cat being lit on fire 
by children, we need the concepts of cat and children, amongst other things. What if in order 
to see moral objects or properties, all we need to have is the correct moral concepts in the 
same fashion? Harman seems to argue that we do, but it seems that he would hold that these 
concepts do not denote anything beyond an agent’s own psychology and thus do not project 
onto any moral facts in the external world.8 The problem for the perceptual moral realist 
becomes locating the objects or properties that moral concepts latch onto—that is, moral 
referents—in objective reality. If we were able to accomplish this, it would provide us with 
an account of moral facts, and moral judgements would no longer be thought of as a mere 
product of an agent’s psychology, but the product of perception.  
5.3 Robert Audi’s Theory of Moral Perception 
 Robert Audi has done much to advance the claim that non-inferential moral 
knowledge can be gained through perception. Since he holds the widely accepted realist view 
that moral properties are constitutively grounded in more basic (e.g., physical or descriptive) 
properties, he argues that moral perception is the phenomenal experience of moral properties 
as perceived through the direct sensory phenomenal experience of ordinary properties 
 
7 Ibid., 7-8.  
 
8 Ibid., 4-7. 
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exhibiting certain patterns. Because it is indirect like this, moral perception isn’t the same as 
ordinary perception for Audi, but something (imperfectly) analogous to it.9  
To clarify his position, Audi makes an important distinction between a phenomenal 
perceptual kind of moral seeing from an intellective kind of moral seeing. Intellective seeing 
connotes more of an apprehension or understanding as opposed to just a mere perception. 
Audi uses the example of seeing an American flag displayed every day in front of a 
residential home. Such a display could be “seen as” a political statement, and as such, seen in 
this instance conveys a type of apprehension or understanding—an intellective kind of 
seeing. As an example of the perceptual kind of seeing, on the other hand, Audi offers the 
common illusion of a stick in water being “seen as” bent. In this instance, seen isn’t 
conveying apprehension or understanding, but instead a purely perceptual phenomenon.10 
With this distinction in mind, Audi makes clear he is interested in the perceptual kind of 
seeing and thinks moral knowledge can be gained through this kind of seeing.11 In terms of 
Harman’s concern over “seeing” moral properties and their grounding in reality, Audi’s view 
allows for moral perception to be the perception of something that finds its ground in 
objective reality. His concern, along with my concern, is not merely with the internal 
psychological states of moral agents. 
 Audi further makes a distinction between what he calls “moral perception” and 
“perception of a moral phenomenon.”12 The distinction is between an agent seeing a moral 
situation as moral versus her seeing the ordinary constitutive properties of a moral situation 
 
9 Robert Audi, Moral Perception (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013, 52-53, 57, 106-108; 
Robert Audi, “Moral Knowledge and Moral Perception,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes 84 (2010): 87-88, 94-95. 
 
10 Audi, Moral Perception, 9. 
 
11 Audi, “Moral Knowledge and Moral Perception,” 85, 87, 94. 
 
12 Audi, Moral Perception, 31.  
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but failing to see the situation as moral. For example, we could witness someone robbing a 
store, and all the nonmoral properties—e.g., prying open a door or shattering a window to get 
inside, the taking of mercantile goods, etc.—that such an action is constituted by. But even 
so, we could fail to see the wrongness of the act, i.e., the moral properties involved in 
robbery.13  
This distinction between moral perception and perception of the moral finds its basis 
in Audi’s metaphysical commitment to moral properties being grounded in base properties, 
with Audi calling the relationship that holds between moral and base properties both 
supervenient and consequential.14 It is supervenient because “no two actions or persons can 
be alike in all their non-moral properties and differ in their moral ones,”15 and consequential 
because the morality of a moral act is determined by descriptive or physical properties, i.e., 
the properties that make up the supervenient base.16 Audi argues that supervenient or 
consequential moral properties themselves are not directly observable in the same way as 
base properties are directly observable.17  Additionally, the phenomenal perception of moral 
properties does not map onto objects in the same way as ordinary properties seem to. In other 
words, moral perception is not pictorial or cartographical like visual perception. Audi argues 
this isn’t sui generis—smell and taste do not seem cartographical either. And even though 
phenomenal sensory properties of experience may map onto the constitutive base properties 
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argues that moral perception involves “phenomenal representation constituted by a (richer) 
perceptual response to” moral properties than ordinary perception would have to ordinary 
properties.19 It’s unclear what the phenomenal representation of moral perception itself 
exactly consists in, although Audi does mention that the constituents of moral perception may 
include psychological elements, such as attitudes and emotions, along with ordinary visual 
representations.20 What is clear is that moral perception isn’t like ordinary perception, and, 
more important, moral perception operates, at least partially, through ordinary perception. 
 Importantly for our overall discussion, Audi affirms that moral concept possession 
plays an important role in what knowledge is gained via moral perception, and moreover, that 
moral perception aids in concept formation. The unexperienced subject can see the ordinary 
constitutive properties of a moral action without seeing the action as a moral action, and the 
reason that they may do this is because they lack the relative concept. However, acquaintance 
with the perception will help the subject in forming the appropriate concepts, and ultimately 
aid in forming moral knowledge. As Audi explains: 
A child who has yet to develop the concept of injustice can see an act that constitutes 
an injustice. A decade later, of course, the same perception might immediately yield a 
moral conceptualization of the act or indeed moral knowledge thereof. Between these 
two points, the child may be disturbed at seeing an injustice in the kind of act in 
question, say giving a visibly much nicer pair of shoes to a twin sibling of the same 
sex taken to the same store just before the beginning of the school year. Prior to 
conceptualization, the child may have a sense of unfittingness in such action: the 
disparity in treatment disturbs the child who sees the sibling treated better. That 
perception of disparity, together with the sense of its unfittingness, reflects a 
discriminative sensitivity to differential treatment and puts the child in a good 
position to develop the concept of injustice. If this picture is correct, moral perception 
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This seems right and is along the same lines as Harman’s own ideas on the subject, as 
discussed above. However, there is still the question of whether Audi has succeeded in giving 
an account of the properties moral concepts attach onto in the actual world. Here I think he 
has failed. 
 The issue concerns the constituents of moral perception. For Audi, these are not 
exclusively sensory phenomena, nor can they be. The reason being Audi’s commitment to 
moral properties being supervenient and consequential—what is perceived by the subject is 
not moral properties per se, but their grounding. This supervenience theory is a very natural 
one for a moral realist to accept in the face of the extreme context sensitivity of moral 
properties. For example, a certain action (e.g., a killing) may in one context be morally 
impermissible (i.e., a murder) while in another be wholly permissible (e.g., in self-defense). 
Those theorists who hold to moral supervenience have a ready answer to why this is so: any 
change in grounding descriptive or physical properties leads to a change in moral properties. 
Moreover, it also seems obvious that moral properties cannot be the same as ordinary 
properties, like color or shape properties, since they cannot be “seen” in the same way as 
these properties. But it also seems obvious that moral properties must be possessed by objects 
(that is, in objects) in the same fashion as ordinary properties are, as Audi himself holds.22 
Yet, we don’t see moral properties in objects. Therefore, the constituents of moral perception 
therefore cannot be purely sensory.  
 This leaves us with a theory of moral realism still liable to fail in light of Harman’s 
objections. Given Audi’s commitment to the supervenience theory of moral properties and 
perception (i.e., that moral properties themselves aren’t sensed by the perceiving subject, but 
what is sensed is their nonmoral supervenient base) and subsequently his theory of perception 
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involving psychological states such as the “attitudinal, and even emotional aspects of moral 
perception,”23 Audi’s theory is compatible with Harman’s own argument that moral 
judgments consist entirely in psychological states. There is nothing per se out in the world 
that moral concepts latch onto—the nonmoral base of moral properties may exist externally, 
but what one may consider to be supervenient moral properties may only be only a product of 
agential psychology, that is, his or her internal judgments. But what if we could meet 
Harman’s challenge by making the contents of moral perception purely sensory phenomena 
that directly reflect the way that external objects and/or properties exist mind-independently? 
Is this even possible? I argue that it is, if we reject supervenience theory as the basis for 
moral realism and instead view moral properties as relational properties. Before I get into the 
metaphysics of moral relations, however, I want to lay out a new theory of moral perception 
in light of this discussion of Audi’s theory. 
5.4 A New Theory of Moral Perception 
Along with Audi, I will also affirm the distinction between the intellective and 
perceptual senses of “seeing.” The notion that propositions of moral perceptual judgments 
can be thought of as an intellective kind of seeing is easy to accept and is difficult to deny. 
Consider an agent who says, “I see that this action is wrong.” In my view, we can understand 
this statement as akin to, “I see that two plus two equals four.” The agent is expressing a sort 
of intellectual understanding, that is, she is grasping that whatever action she is witness to is 
wrong. I do not deny that intellective grasping of moral truths is commonplace, or that 
perception can play a part in it. In accordance with Audi’s view, I will even admit it may be 
difficult to distinguish the two senses of seeing in some cases.24 However, accounting for 
intellective moral grasping is not my concern here. My concern is whether moral knowledge 
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can be gained exactly like perceptual knowledge of ordinary objects. Therefore, my sole 
concern is with the perception in the sense of the pure qualitative perception of external 
mind-independent objects prior to any kinds of agential judgments. Hence, this is what I will 
be referring to in this discussion of perception and moral perception. Any kind of intellective 
grasping is secondary to this kind of perception anyhow, as will become apparent throughout 
the discussion. 
 As I argued for in chapter 3, I also hold that perception—and now here, for the 
purposes of this discussion, moral perception—is phenomenal, i.e., it is subjectively 
experiential and there is a qualitative what-it-is-like to undergo it.25 I also take perceptions of 
the same scene across different subjects—regardless of background knowledge, and barring 
any misapprehensions or sensory deficiencies—to have the same qualitative content. For 
example, one sees a red ball on a white table and might say, “I see a red ball on a white 
table,” or even, “I see that there is a red ball on a white table” (that being indicative of 
intellectual understanding).26 However, neither being able to propositionally express one’s 
experience or have an intellective grasp of undergoing said experience is necessary for 
awareness. An infant may see a red ball on a white table without having the concepts for red, 
ball, white, table, or on at all. Nevertheless, the infant would have the same visual 
experience—with the same qualitative content—an adult would have.27 Moreover, both the 
infant and the adult could gain perceptual knowledge based on their perceptions. 
 
25 Audi would also agree with this. See Audi, Moral Perception, 12-13 and Audi, “Moral Knowledge 
and Moral Perception,” 81-82. 
 
26 See also Audi, Moral Perception, 10, for a discussion on how “seeing that” expresses one’s 
propositional knowledge. 
 
27 Although vision continues to develop throughout childhood and even adulthood, there is evidence 
that children’s vision is largely matured by age one. See Ruxandra Sireteanu, “Development of the Visual Field: 
Results from Human and Animal Studies,” in Infant Vision, ed. François Vital-Durand, Janette Atkinson, and 
Oliver J. Braddick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 20; Anne Fulton, et al., “Development of Primate 
Rod Structure and Function,” in Infant Vision, ed. François Vital-Durand, Janette Atkinson, and Oliver J. 
Braddick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 38-44; Russell J. Adams, “An Evaluation of Color 
Preference in Early Infancy,” Infant Behavior and Development 10 (1987): 149. 
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Many philosophers argue that propositional belief is necessary for any kind of 
knowledge and therefore an infant without the relevant concepts could gain no knowledge. 
This is especially true for those representationalists who take doxastic states to be contents of 
perception.28 They would argue that an infant without the right concepts in fact fails to even 
see the objects said concepts are indicative of. Even Audi himself, who rejects the claim that 
representationalism entails this view about doxastic states,29 would maintain that beliefs can 
only be held propositionally, including those beliefs that are held as perceptual knowledge.30 
Along with denying doxasticism (and representationalism in general), I deny that 
propositional beliefs are a necessary constituent of perceptual knowledge. The infant who 
sees a red ball doesn’t need to hold the propositional belief there is a red ball in order to 
know there is a red ball. She has a kind of primitive non-propositional or extremely limited 
propositional knowledge—perhaps based on other imagery, primitive concepts, or gained 
wholly non-conceptually—of the object before her. She knows the ball is red, although she 
doesn’t know it in terms of the ball being red, as an adult would. And even though the 
content of this knowledge isn’t as detailed as an adult’s, the infant can still act on it—that is, 
she can play with the ball.31 
 
28 Representationalism in general holds that perceptual content is comprised of intentional objects. By 
extension, representationalists tend to hold that what one believes about an object of experience determines the 
quality of said experience. See Chapter 3 section 3.3.1.3 for my previous discussion of representationalism. 
 
29 Audi, Moral Perception, 17-20. 
 
30 Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd Edition 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 17-19. Audi argues that there is no particular proposition that needs to be 
believed by the subject in order for the subject to have knowledge of an object of perception. Therefore, the 
subject does not need to possess the correct corresponding concept of the object in order to have knowledge of 
said object. An example he gives is that of knowing that a field is green without knowing that it is particularly a 
field—perhaps one believes it is a rectangular plot of artificial turf. Thus, for Audi, propositions are always 
involved in beliefs. 
 
31 This will be more fully argued for in chapter 7. Audi has a similar view in that he distinguishes 
between propositional belief and objectual belief. The first is a belief in a particular proposition while the 
second is belief of or about an object of perception. The second requires no particular proposition to be held in 
order to be believed (see Audi, Epistemology, 18 and note 30 above). In both cases, however, some proposition 
needs to be held in order for belief to be possessed. I question this requirement. 
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Recall that Audi made a distinction between “moral perception” and “perception of a 
moral phenomenon,” i.e., between an agent seeing a moral situation as moral versus her 
seeing the ordinary constitutive properties of a moral situation but failing to see the situation 
as moral.32 I make a similar distinction, but since I reject Audi’s metaphysics of 
supervenience,33 the terms I use are recognition and perception, which better capture what I 
am distinguishing. In the instance where the agent sees the moral situation as moral, it can be 
said that she recognizes the situation for what it is—a situation exhibiting a moral quality. On 
the other hand, where the agent fails to see the situation as moral, it may be that she perceives 
the situation, even the moral quality of it, yet she fails to recognize the moral quality for the 
kind of thing that it is—a moral kind. Audi himself seems to also utilize the term 
“recognition” in the same manner; however, for Audi, recognition is dependent on the seeing 
of constitutive properties in a supervenience relation,34 while for my view—since there is no 
supervenience relation—recognition just is knowing a property for what it is on sight. Thus, 
someone could fail to recognize, in my sense, a simple monadic property, such as the color 
red. 
Thus, unlike the distinction Audi makes, my distinction between recognition and 
perception also applies in the nonmoral perceptual case.35 The agent who perceives but fails 
to recognize a moral instance may do so in the same way an infant perceives a red ball but 
fails to recognize it as a red ball. The infant in this case fails because she lacks the concepts 
 
32 Audi, Moral Perception, 31. 
 
33 Ibid., 107-108. 
 
34 Ibid., 52-55. 
 
35 See Audi, “Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge,” 93, where Audi makes a distinction between 
basic and non-basic perception. According to Audi, basic perception is of basic properties, like colors and 
shapes, while non-basic perception is of things constituted by basic properties. One may object that my 
distinction between recognition and perception just is this distinction of his. However, I reject that basic 
perception, as Audi defines it, can be performed without what he would consider non-basic concept application, 
and so I reject his distinction. 
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red and ball. In the moral case, the agent may fail because she lacks the relevant moral 
concepts.36 Note because the perceptual knowledge of concept-possessors is a result of 
recognition and not mere perception, the content of their knowledge will be more detailed 
and most likely propositional. For example, whereas the infant, with her limited or absent 
concepts, can gain perceptual knowledge of a certain colored object with a certain shape, the 
adult will have knowledge of a red ball, with all the accompanying knowledge of what balls 
are and what the color red is. Nevertheless, the quality of perception is the same for the adult 
and the infant. Also note that recognition requires (logically) prior perception, but perception 
does not necessarily entail subsequent recognition—thus, recognition can be thought of as a 
type of perception.  
Some may object to the above by arguing that recognition—because it can result in 
complex propositional knowledge—is always a product of inference. Thus, there can be no 
such thing as non-inferential recognition, as I’ve defined recognition here. I reply that if we 
do not allow for non-inferential perceptual knowledge to obtain in complex—including 
moral—cases, then there is a question as to whether anything could be considered perceptual 
knowledge. This is because it can be argued that even the most basic qualitative properties, if 
propositionally believed, are inferred. For example, if I am to have a propositional belief that 
there is a red ball before me, then both the color red and shape ball37 must be inferred on the 
basis of my qualitative experience. Thus, the condition that perceptual knowledge must be 
non-inferential if it is to be considered perceptual is impossible to fulfill. If we want to allow 
for non-inferential, perceptual knowledge in the basic case, there should be nothing barring 
 
36 Audi perhaps would agree with this assertion concerning concepts in the moral case, as mentioned 
above. However, it is important to keep in mind our moral metaphysics are drastically different. See Audi, 
“Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge,” 90. 
 
37 I am borrowing Audi’s notion of basic properties here. See Audi, “Moral Perception and Moral 
Knowledge,” 93.  
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the complex case. Audi himself argues similarly, claiming if our standard for perceptual 
knowledge includes only those things that cannot possibly be inferred, then, “[w]e could not 
be properly said to see that someone is angry or even that water is coming from a tap.”38 
Since we of course want to allow that we can know such things perceptually, we must reject 
the inferential standard that holds we can only perceptually know things that cannot possibly 
be inferred.39 
There is also the subtly different concern of whether what I am calling recognition is 
really just an intellective kind of “seeing”—i.e., merely a cognitive grasping—and not 
perceptual at all. This concern stems from the fact that recognition employs the use of 
concepts and, moreover, that concepts don’t seem perceptual in nature, but propositional and 
thus doxastic. Along with Audi, I do admit that the intellective involves the phenomenal,40 
and therefore the demarcation between perceptual recognition and intellective understanding 
is prima facie unclear (as already mentioned above). However, this demarcation problem 
between the purely perceptual and the purely propositional is not just a problem for me but 
for anyone who affirms the existence of perceptual knowledge and yet denies doxastic views 
of perception. If those who deny doxasticism want to allow for the existence of perceptual 
knowledge, then we cannot allow the deployment of propositionally expressible concepts 
during an instance of perception (thus, making the instance an instance of recognition) to bar 
us from claiming that a resulting belief is an instance of perceptual knowledge.41 
Phenomenally and non-intellectively seeing a red ball as a red ball on sight should, at the 
 
38 Audi, Moral Perception, 52. 
 
39 See also Audi, “Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge,” 91-92. 
 
40 Audi, Moral Perception, 25; Audi, “Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge,” 85. 
 
41 Indeed, all theories of perceptual knowledge have this problem and the problem of inference above 
to contend with as possible objections, not just the one being developed here. 
 144 
very least, be possible. Otherwise, we must either deny perceptual knowledge or affirm 
doxasticism. 
As already mentioned, many philosophers assume that since we cannot see moral 
properties as we see ordinary properties, moral perception must not operate in the same 
manner as ordinary perception—Audi included.42 I contend this view of moral perception is 
misguided on the basis that it assumes moral properties and their non-moral grounds are 
properties possessed by objects, a view that Audi himself is explicit about.43 If moral 
properties were in objects like this, then necessarily they couldn’t be the same as shape and 
color properties, since we don’t see them in objects like these ordinary monadic properties. 
This view is reinforced given the context sensitivity of moral properties. A change in moral 
properties correlates with a change in physical or descriptive properties, and thus moral 
properties must, one might think, be supervenient. Given the different nature of moral 
properties, it is understandable that some might think moral properties cannot be perceived 
like ordinary properties. 
In response, I maintain that moral properties are different from ordinary properties not 
because they are supervenient, but because they are not monadic: they are exclusively 
relational properties between substances. This relational account of moral properties also 
explains their context-sensitivity: a change in relata or in the nature of the relatum changes 
the moral quality of a moral relation (this idea will be further developed in the next chapter). 
Moreover, I contend these relations are sense-perceptible in the same manner as ordinary 
properties. 
 There is precedent for holding this view, namely from the world of music. 
Additionally, the examples that we can glean from music affirm that normative relational 
 
42 Audi, Moral Perception, 33-34; Audi, “Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge,” 87-88. 
 
43 Audi, Moral Perception, 38-39, 48-49; Audi, “Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge,” 88-90. 
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properties are sense-perceptible across all normal functioning subjects but take skill and 
experience to recognize (a notion that will become important over the next two chapters). 
Take tuning a violin for example: when a novice learns to play a violin, tuning may be a 
laborious exercise of playing each string individually, listening to each string’s pitch and 
comparing it against the same note being played on a piano or some electronic device, and 
tightening or loosening the string many times over to match. However, when an expert 
violinist tunes a violin, all he needs to hear, if anything at all, is the pitch of an A4. Once he 
tunes his A string to this pitch, he is able to harmonize all the other strings around it, 
producing perfect fifths between them. He doesn’t need to go up and down the scale to find a 
fifth up from A or a fifth below; he is able to hear the perfect fifth itself in the sounding of a 
chord between two adjacent strings because of the quality of sound that a perfect fifth is. This 
quality is dissimilar to two pitches played at random; it also seems to be something over and 
above than just the two individual pitches combined. It has its own what-it-is-likeness. 
Moreover, it is recognizable to the musical expert as a perfect fifth; indeed, even non-musical 
people can tell there is something qualitatively unique about it. What is being recognized as 
musically valuable or unique is a certain fittingness between two pitches—a relational 
property. 
 Some may balk at the above claim that there is something over and above the two 
pitches in a perfect fifth—how can I support this claim that there is this other relational 
quality? In response, consider the C major scale and E Phrygian mode: both C major and E 
Phrygian are comprised of A, B, C, D, E, F, and G natural. A melody in C major, however, 
will be qualitatively and drastically different than a melody in E Phrygian—yet, in each 
instance the individual pitches that constitute both melodies are exactly the same. The only 
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difference is how the pitches relate to each other in each melody. Changes in relation alter 
the perceptual quality.44  
 This, then, is my view of moral perception and moral perceptual knowledge, which 
will be defended over the next two chapters. During an instance of perceptual moral seeing, 
there is a perceptual recognition by the morally experienced of a relational property, due to 
the morally experienced being able to deploy the relevant moral concept or concepts involved 
on sight in the same manner she would deploy the concepts red and ball on sight if she saw a 
red ball. The reason the agent is able to recognize the moral relational property—as shared 
between a substance and itself, or between one or more substances—is because this relation 
has its own what-it-is-like quality to it. Like a perfect fifth, this quality derives from the 
relation being fit or unfit (as determined by the nature of the relata). Further, the recognition 
of this quality is sufficient for moral perceptual knowledge of what is perceived.  
As such, when we are witness to a moral depravity, such as in the case of Harman’s 
cat, the recognition of the depravity—the kind of thing it is and why in this instance it is 
present—may come to us immediately, non-inferentially, and non-intellectively.45 The less 
morally experienced may even be able to recognize that what she witnesses is unfitting, 
although she might not be able to put the quality into words or why there is a lack of fit. Audi 
himself even admits that the “unfittingness” of a moral wrong may be phenomenally “felt” by 
an agent. However, for Audi, this feeling is not always within the content of moral 
perception. For him, what essentially constitutes the content of moral perception is the non-
 
44 This argument concerning relational phenomenology in both the visual and auditory case will be 
picked up again in chapter 6. 
 
45 That is, non-intellectively in the sense that a subject may not know why a situation has the moral 
quality that it does, or which features of the scene contribute to this moral quality. The subject will possess an 




moral base properties that ground moral properties.46  On my view, however, the phenomenal 
unfittingness itself is, in this instance, the essential content of moral perception.  
This is not to say perceptual recognition is the only avenue to moral knowledge. The 
perceptually deficient—i.e., the morally inexperienced—could infer her way to moral 
knowledge based on features of the moral circumstance. However, what is being maintained 
is that it is possible for moral knowledge to be gained in the same fashion as knowledge of a 
red ball on a white table—through ordinary perception. The way that this is possible is 
because 1) moral properties are relations, and 2) relations are perceptible. With this, we are 
































46 Audi, Moral Perception, 40. 
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6. The Metaphysics of Relations and Moral Relations 
6.1 Introduction 
 In the last chapter I introduced a theory of moral perception that relied on the notion 
of moral properties as relations. In this chapter, I will modify this claim and develop a theory 
of moral properties as features of relations. Relations themselves, I argue, are the total 
complex state of affairs between substances, while their features are properties of that state of 
affairs. Moreover, relational propositions merely reflect features of relations as opposed to 
relations themselves. These distinctions are important, because—as it will be shown—it is 
only by making sense of relations in this fashion can relations be said to be sense-perceptible. 
In order to clarify and defend this claim, I will provide a metaphysical account of 
relations in general and moral relations in particular. I will begin with a discussion of internal 
versus external relations. This is a natural starting point, for if both moral realism and 
substance realism are true, then prima facie the internal features of moral relata should 
strongly factor into moral relations (i.e., the natures of substances should determine what 
relations those substances stand in). As we shall see, determining whether or not relations are 
internal or external may help in determining how intrinsic properties of substances do factor 
into moral relations. 
Moreover, if the phenomenology of moral features is above and beyond the monadic 
properties of relata (i.e., if moral properties have their own what-it-is-like quality) as I argue 
is the case, then at least some relations (particularly, moral relations) need to be demonstrated 
as non-reducible. Otherwise, moral relations cannot be considered sense-perceptible, and the 
theory being developed here lacks metaphysical support. This question is inextricably tied to 
that of the external or internality of relations, as shall be demonstrated below. I conclude that 
the assumption of non-reducibility being exclusively associated with the externality of 
relations creates a false dilemma: either relations relate intrinsic natures or they are non-
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reducible, but never both. I argue that what philosophers typically consider to be internal 
relations are in fact non-reducible, and I thereby reject this dilemma. The reason that this can 
be so is because relations do not relate properties, but substances, which possess definite 
intrinsic natures. This allows for the non-reducibility and sense-perceptibility of moral 
relations. 
Next I will move on to the specific question of moral relational features. What makes 
some features of a relation moral while others are not? I argue that moral features are a 
special kind of causal feature of relations. Moreover, I adopt the scholastic notion of final 
causes in order to account for the moral normativity of these special causal features. Thus, 
both the perceptibility and morality of moral properties are accounted for.  
6.2 Internal Versus External Relations 
 According to David Yates, internal relations are “those [relations] whose holding is in 
some sense in the nature of their relata.”1 The way most philosophers make sense of this 
concerns the location of truthmakers. If a relation is internal, then the truthmaker consists in 
the relevant monadic properties located in each of the relata.2 In this way, the relation does 
not have a truthmaker external to the relata, and the relation itself can be reduced to monadic 
properties possessed by the relata—i.e., the relation is reducible.3 For example, most 
philosophers hold that the monadic height properties of relata in a taller than relation is what 
makes the relation true, and thus the relation itself can be reduced to heights of the relata. An 
external relation’s truthmaker, on the other hand, is external to the relata, thus making the 
relation non-reducible.4 Spatial relations—i.e., next to, above, etc.—are considered to be 
 
1 Anna Marmadoro and David Yates, “Introduction,” in The Metaphysics of Relations, ed. Anna 
Marmadoro and David Yates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7. 
 
2 Ibid., 3, 7-8. 
 




classic examples of external relations. Truthmakers for these relations are not found in 
monadic properties, but in relative spatial orientations of relata.  
This way of thinking of internal versus external relations presents us with a dilemma. 
Given the commitment to a substance ontology with intrinsic properties being brought into 
this chapter, the notion that moral relations are internal relations seems intuitive—we want to 
say that the natures of substances, as expressed through intrinsic properties, factor into the 
moral relations they enter into. However, the reducibility of internal relations to monadic 
properties implies that moral relations, if they are internal, do not possess their own 
phenomenology—what we perceive in a moral instance is the monadic properties possessed 
by relata and nothing more. Therefore, if we are committed to the view that moral relations 
have their own phenomenology, we need to make a case for their non-reducibility and thus 
externality. However, if we do so, would not the natures of the substances involved in moral 
relations thus be left out of moral relations? 
Perhaps the solution to resolving this dilemma lies in how we view the ontological 
relationship between what is generally considered to be internal relations and the associated 
monadic properties that they seem to arise from. Robert Knowles, in arguing for a view that 
allows physical objects to be related to platonic universals, suggests the following:  
[A]ssociated with each relation are relational properties that hold of each relatum. 
For instance, the relation holding between x and y just in case x is taller than y has the 
associated relational properties being taller than y, which holds of x alone, and being 
shorter than x, which holds of y alone. The relation is not identical with these 
properties, but it is intimately related: the properties are instantiated just in case the 
relation obtains. Intuitively, the relational properties hold in virtue of the relation's 
obtaining, rather than the other way round. The relation is more fundamental.5 
 
Even though I will not be defending Knowles’ theory of universals as relata, I think there is 
something to be said for his ontological ordering of relations and relational properties. If the 
 
 
5 Robert Knowles, “Heavy Duty Platonism,” Erkenntnis 80 (2015): 1258. 
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property of being 6 feet tall possessed by John gives John the additional property of being 
taller than Jenn, the property of being taller than Jenn is not prior to John’s height relation to 
Jenn, but subsequent to it. The relation itself is more fundamental. 
The fundamentality of a relation prior to relational predication seems to accord with 
Kit Fine’s own analysis of the positional relations on top of and beneath: 
Suppose that a given block a is on top of another block b. Then there is a certain state 
of affairs s1 that we may describe as the state of a’s being on top of b. There is also a 
certain state of affairs s2 that may be described as the state of b’s being beneath a. Yet 
surely the states s1 and s2 are the same. There is a single state of affairs s “out there” 
in reality, consisting of the blocks a and b having the relative positions that they do; 
and the different descriptions associated with s1 and s2 would merely appear to 
provide two different ways at getting at this single state of affairs.6 
 
Thus, a single positional state of affairs exists between the blocks prior to predication, with 
any predication merely reflecting one of at least two relational descriptions. 
Fine goes on to address the problem of how we can metaphysically and linguistically 
make sense of the single relation reflected by the single state of affairs.7 Difficulty in doing 
this stems from the view that our relational predications, if true, must be made true by a 
truthmaker. If a is on top of b and b is beneath a, then it seems there must be two 
metaphysical entities fulfilling the truth conditions of these propositions. But how is this 
reconciled with only one relation? 
In reply, Fine rejects what he calls “the standard view,” i.e., the view that takes 
relations to hold on the basis of a certain ordering of relata.8 The problem with this view is 
that it ontologically commits us to any relation under review (a is on top of b) and also its 
 
6 Kit Fine, “Neutral Relations,” The Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 3. 
 
7 Ibid., 4. 
 
8 Ibid., 1-2. To clarify this ordering view, Fine provides the example of loves. If a loves b, then the 
relation loves holds between a and b, but not b and a, since b could fail to love a.  
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converse (b is beneath a).9 Fraser MacBride explains how, with the standard view, the 
compounding of entities gets out of hand: 
If we restrict ourselves to binary relations, converses might seem familiar enough 
because we have names for many of them and the grammatical device of 
passivization—‘after’ as well as ‘before’, ‘less’ as well as ‘greater’, ‘loves’ as well as 
‘is loved by’. But we shouldn’t think that converse relations are familiar old friends. 
Each ternary non-symmetric relation has five mutual converses, and we don’t have 
names for any of them. Things only get worse when we consider that each quaternary 
non-symmetric relation has 23 converses, etc.10 
 
Fine, however, rejects the idea that we have to accept the standard view. Because relations 
are mind-independent entities, he argues, it is difficult to make sense of them depending on 
any kind of ordering.11 Instead, it seems more reasonable “to suppose that there is a single 
underlying relation connecting the things together and that any difference in the order of 
connection is to be attributed to the way we represent the relation as holding rather than to the 
relation itself.”12  
Even though Fine understands the risk of multiplying entities unnecessarily, he still 
ends up with a theory of relations that does just that. It seems as if Fine thinks there is one 
underlying state of affairs that is exhaustively described by both a is on top of b and b is 
beneath a; any other relational description that can be applied to a and b requires another 
state of affairs.13 Indeed, Fine is only concerned with addressing the problem of multiplying 
relations through their converses, not with how many relational propositions describe the 
same objects in relation.14 This is why his theory is only neutral about the ordering of relata: 
 
9 Ibid., 2-3. 
 
10 Fraser MacBride, “How Involved Do You Want to Be in a Non-Symmetric Relationship?,” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2014): 4. 
 
11 Fine, “Neutral Relations,” 5. 
 
12 Ibid., 5-6. 
 
13 Ibid., 14. 
 
14 Ibid., 2-3. 
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he would consider a is on top of b and b is beneath a to be a single relation between a and b 
that is “neutral between on top of and beneath.”15 But what if, in addition to the positional 
situation, a is dark in color and b is bright, let’s say, blue and yellow respectively? What 
underlies a is darker than b and b is brighter than a? A single state of affairs seems to make 
both a is on top of b/b is beneath a and a is darker than b/b is brighter than a true. Some may 
object that it is only the single positional state of affairs, which has nothing to do with color. 
But considering a relation like the blue block a is on top of the yellow block b, color and 
position seems descriptively inextricably linked. If we argue that they are distinct, then we 
lose the fact that, according to the state of affairs, both darkness and blueness is positioned on 
top of the brightness and yellowness.  
Things only get more complicated if we add another relational feature, such as in the 
small blue block is on top of the large yellow block. In this case, there would be a multitude 
of relations: block a is on top of block b, blue is on top of yellow, block a is smaller than 
block b, the dark block is on top of the bright block, and etcetera. It seems clear that the blue 
block is on top of the yellow block and the dark block is on top of the bright block are 
predications that cannot reflect the existence of two different truthmakers. What I am further 
arguing is that the small block is on top of the large block and the blue block is on top of the 
yellow block cannot reflect the existence of two different truthmakers either. For indeed, if 
there were two different truthmakers, what then acts as the truthmaker for there is more 
yellow than there is blue given this state of affairs? Size then is also inextricably linked to 
color and position. 
The problem with philosophers’ usual way of thinking about relations stems from 
thinking relations relate properties instead of substances. Indeed, a relation like wider than 
 
15 Ibid., 14. 
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seems to relate properties of width, while taller than seems to relate properties of height. But 
thinking of relations like this multiplies them needlessly. Instead, just as we think of width 
and height as properties of the same object, wider than and taller than should be considered 
properties—or features—of the same relation. 
Some may object that this metaphysical picture of relations makes no sense of causal 
relations, an important metaphysical category of relations, given that causal relations are said 
to hold only when causal activity is occurring. This is especially pertinent for those 
philosophers who hold that causal relations hold due to the manifestation of corresponding 
powers intrinsic to individual substances (or objects, etc.) engaged in causal activity—it is 
prima facie unquestionable that the manifestation of causal powers is what does the relating 
when two substances are engaged in causal activity and not anything else. However, I answer 
that, when it comes to causal relations, any potential causal activity between two substances 
exists prior to the manifestation of any powers between them; the manifestation of powers is 
subsequent to, and a feature of, a prior relation that exists between two substances. In other 
words, what brings two substances into a causally relevant relationship is not the 
manifestation of powers per se: the manifestation of powers is evidence of a prior existent 
relation and is an instantiation of potential causal activity attributed to said relation. (Of 
course, this doesn’t preclude that what determines the quantitative and qualitative causal 
features of a relation is determined by internal powers and capacities possessed by individual 
substances. However, these don’t comprise the relation, since it is substances that enter into 
relations, not powers.) For example, a state of affairs that consists in a tablespoon of salt two 
feet away from a cup of unsaturated water possesses all the relational features relevant to 
causation: the salt is dissolvable by the water and the water is able to be made saline by the 
salt, even if no causal activity is happening. When activity is happening, this is merely a new 
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feature—one of many—brought about by a change in the state of affairs: perhaps now the salt 
has been dropped into the water.  
Some may counter that I am overcomplicating the issue: isn’t the manifestation and 
triggering of power between substances just what it means for them to be in a causal relation? 
In one sense, yes: when it comes to causation and causal explanation, the triggering of 
powers by other powers is what is relevant. Thus, when we typically talk of causal relations, 
we speak of two substances related by their causal activity. But in another sense, to require 
that the manifestation of powers be present in order for two substances to be considered in a 
causally salient relation would be to ignore a prior relation—with causally salient features—
that exists between the substances already (e.g., the causally salient relationship that exists 
between salt and water even when water is not manifesting the dissolution of salt). There 
seems to exist a real causally relevant relation between substances that are not actively 
engaged in causal activity, a relation that can be expressed via predications concerning 
powers and liabilities possessed by said substances. As far as substances that are engaged in 
occurrent causal activity, the actual manifestation of powers is a product of this relation, not a 
precursor to it, ontologically speaking. 
Now that we have a picture of what mind-independent relations really are, let us 
return to the discussion of internal versus external relations and the dilemma we faced. Recall 
that on one horn of the dilemma, we figured that our moral relations must involve the 
intrinsic properties—and thus the internal natures—of the substances involved in moral 
relations. Hence, we were compelled to think of moral relations as internal relations. On the 
other hand, we wanted to make the case that moral relations had their own phenomenology 
above and beyond the monadic properties involved in relations. Therefore, we were inclined 
to think that moral relations were non-reducible and, thus, external. The way in which this 
dilemma is resolved then is to disavow the false equivalence between a relation relating 
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natures and a relation being reducible to intrinsic properties: a relation can relate natures, not 
because it relates intrinsic properties, but because it relates substances that possess natures. 
Further, relations are not reducible because relations exist as the total complex state of affairs 
that substances stand in with respect to each other. This total complex state of affairs is not 
reducible to any one or more relata. 
 Consider for example the typical internal relation taller than. What grounds the taller 
than relation for most philosophers is the individual heights of the relata. Therefore, 
according to these philosophers, what makes the statement Joe is taller than Mary true is the 
fact that Joe is 72 inches tall and Mary is 62 inches tall. The relation is reducible to intrinsic 
properties and hence an internal relation. However, on the metaphysical picture being 
sketched here, this reduction would not be possible. Remember, it is not properties that enter 
into relations, but substances—a relation consists in the total complex state of affairs 
involving two (or more) substances (or between a substance and itself),16 and relational 
predication merely distinguishes features of this relation. Thus, what makes Joe is taller than 
Mary true is the single total complex state of affairs that Joe and Mary find themselves in. 
This mind-independent relation exists in virtue of it being the case that Joe and Mary exist in 
the same universe—indeed, Joe would not be taller than Mary if Joe didn’t exist. Therefore, 
what we consider to be the taller than relation is not reducible to the heights of either Joe or 
Mary; it is merely a feature of the non-reducible relation that exists between Joe and Mary. 
It is not the case that monadic properties of relata have no role to play, however. If 
their heights were reversed, it would not be the case that Joe was taller than Mary. It must be 
the case that intrinsic properties determine the quantitative and qualitative features of a 
relation. Nevertheless, they do so not prior but subsequent to the existence of a relation.  
 
16 It is clear to me that a substance can be in relation with itself given a substance’s ability to causally 
act upon itself. For example, I can willfully injure myself. This relation to oneself also accounts for why one is 
morally obligated to oneself, as we shall later see. 
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6.3 The Phenomenal Experience of Relations 
Accepting the notion of non-reducible relations between substances still leaves us 
with the question of how such relations factor into our perceptions, especially since we don’t 
seem to “see” these relations: what we seem to see is monadic properties. I question the 
denial that we do see these relations, however. If I am looking at two parallelly positioned 
inch-wide red rectangles drawn on a white sheet of paper, and I notice that one rectangle is 
longer than the other, that seems to me something that I can perceive directly. I would not be 
conjoining the perceptions I had of each rectangle’s length; I could just see that one is longer 
than the other in a very brute and immediate fashion that suggests the irreducibility (to the 
phenomenal experience of monadic properties) of what I am seeing. 
Arguably, the intuitive counter to the above assertion is simple: what I am seeing is 
the monadic phenomenal properties of each rectangle, especially since these properties factor 
so strongly into what is perceived. I do not deny that these properties do color the quality of 
my perception of the rectangles, so to speak. I just deny that those properties are all that I am 
seeing. What I am seeing is those properties contributing to the quality of a relation between 
the two rectangles, a quality that is distinct from the quality of each individual rectangle 
combined. 
Some may object by pointing to an example of, say, two evergreen trees a thousand 
miles apart. Perhaps one is in California and the other is in British Columbia and, moreover, 
the one in California is 50 feet taller than the one in British Columbia. Can we indeed say that 
there’s a real and irreducible relation between the two trees that has its own phenomenology, 
especially since we would never be able to feasibly see such a relation given the trees 
immense distance from one another? Even if we could fix cameras on both trees and compare 
the images of them side by side on a television screen, and if somehow this visual 
comparison could create an accurate visual representation of the size relation between the 
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two, this visual representation would only be momentary, and thus illusory—there is no real, 
enduring perceptible relation that exists between the two trees. At most, we should think of 
the relation that does exist as merely a logical or cognitive construct. So, since we can call 
into question the existence of a perceptible relation between these two trees, doesn’t that call 
into question the existence of a perceptible relation between any two objects? 
Whether or not a real, irreducible, perceptible relation exists between two objects at 
great distances seems to be the same kind of question as whether or not a tree that has fallen 
in the woods makes a sound. In both cases, there exists something perceptible that is 
nevertheless not perceived due to the limits of human perception. And, based on this fact, it is 
not reasonable to call into question the existence of the thing that would be perceived if 
circumstances, or human capacities, were different. I cannot hear a tree fall in my local wood 
because the wood is too far away for my human hearing. If I had the capacity for hearing at 
greater distances, such as an elephant does, I would hear the tree falling because there is 
indeed something to hear. In the case of the relation between the evergreens, if I had the 
capacity to somehow get two objects that are a thousand miles apart in my visual field at the 
same time, I would be able to see the relation that exists between them. There is also 
something to be perceived in that case as well. 
Some may still be unsatisfied with the claim that a perceived relation is above and 
beyond the mere perception of each individual relata concurrently perceived. Perhaps another 
visual example can be used to demonstrate the notion that perceiving a relation is more than 
just the perception of each relatum’s monadic phenomenal properties. Consider colored 
squares A, B, and C: in figure 6.1, we are able to see a relation of all three squares, while in 
figure 6.2 we can see a relation of just A and C.  
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The relation exhibited in figure 6.2 is able to manifest the contrasting nature of the colors 
comprising A and C—a contrast which produces a phenomenal experience that is exploited 
by artists—better than figure 6.1. This, even though in both figures, A and C are each plainly 
visible concurrently. The change in relation between A and C via either the absence or 
presence of B results in a perceptible qualitative difference between the two figures.  
One may object that the qualitative difference comes merely via the presence or absence of B. 
Consider therefore colored squares D, E, F, G, H, I, and J: 
 
In figure 6.3, the squares are arranged in chromatic order, while in 6.4, two squares—E and 
I—are switched. Yet, even though each and every colored square is concurrently perceived in 
both figure 6.3 and 6.4, and even though the change in relation is slight—only two squares 
switch places—the phenomenal difference between figure 6.3 and 6.4 is very apparent. The 
relation consisting of the colors in chromatic order is phenomenally above and beyond the 
colors merely being perceived concurrently. 
An auditory example similar to the one presented in chapter 5 may well prove this 
point better than the above visual example. Consider the C major scale and the A minor scale. 
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Both C major and A minor are comprised of the pitches A, B, C, D, E, F, and G natural. 
However, a melody in C major will favor C as the tonic (i.e., “homebase,” or the pitch the 
melody finds its natural end on) while a melody in A minor will favor A as its tonic. A 
melody in C major will also sound more lighthearted while a melody in A minor will sound 
more serious. Why the difference between an C major melody and A minor melody? It is not 
merely because they are two different melodies—it is because of how the pitches relate to 
each other in each melody. The relation between pitches in one melody determines that C is 
favored as the melody’s end while the other determines that A is favored. The relation 
between pitches also determines that one melody has a lighthearted quality to it while the 
other melody has a more somber quality. Pitches play different roles—i.e., have different 
relations with each other—in a tune depending on whether it is in C major or A minor. For 
example, an E relates to an A in A minor as a dominant to a tonic, meaning that E has a 
naturally strong pull towards A. The relation between E and A in a C major melody, 
however, is of a mediant and submediant respectively. The pull going from E to A is not as 
strong in C major as it is in A minor. Changes in relation between pitches alter the perceptual 
quality of the tune above and beyond the mere phenomenal perception of the pitches that 
constitute the tune. To deny this is to deny large swathes of music theory and the common 
perceptual experience of listening subjects. 
Some may have issue with the use of a musical example, considering the metaphysics 
of relations being developed in this chapter. Remember, according to the view being 
developed here, a relation is the total complex state of affairs that exists between two or more 
substances, or between a substance and itself. This state of affairs consists in a myriad of 
features, and relational predication (e.g., taller than, on top of, etc.) distinguishes individual 
features. So how do we metaphysically make sense of music, when music prima facie does 
not seem like a feature of a complex state of affairs between one or more substances? 
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It is important to recognize that, in the case of music, more than one feature of a 
relation is between presented to the listener. Not only pitch, but temporal distances and 
degrees of loudness or softness, and—in the case of live multi-instrument musical 
presentations—source of sound. This is indicative of the entities in relation being musical 
instruments (either taken to be objects in relation themselves or constitutional substances—
such as wood or brass, etc.—in relation) or electronic pulses (such as those produced by a 
speaker). The relation between these entities has many features, not just ones having to do 
with sound. Indeed, a violin is smaller than a cello, and thus smaller than is another possible 
relational feature between musical instruments. 
6.4 The Metaphysics of Moral Relations 
 I now want to move onto the question of morality and relations. How can we classify 
some relations as moral? In other words, how can some features of a relation be considered 
moral features and how do we distinguish these features from non-moral ones? What 
properties of relata contribute to the moral quality of a relation? Answering these questions is 
critical to motivating the claim that moral properties are relational as opposed to monadic 
properties. 
Consider the proposition Joseph is taller than Jane. Everyone would agree there is no 
moral truth (or falsity) being communicated here. Thus, Joseph being related to Jane by being 
taller than her does not seem on the face of it to be moral, and it would be difficult if not 
impossible to make the case that it is. On the other hand, consider the proposition Joseph 
loves Jane. Can we make the case that a moral truth could be communicated here? The 
answer is prima facie less obvious. Joseph’s intentional attitude17 could have moral 
consequences for his interpersonal relationship (or lack thereof) with Jane, but on its own, 
 
17 See E. J. Lowe, “There Are (Probably) No Relations,” The Metaphysics of Relations, ed. Anna 
Marmadoro and David Yates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 106-107, where Lowe makes sense of 
relational predicates like loves by appeal to monadic intentional states.  
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this proposition does not seem to qualify as morally evaluable. Thus, Joseph loves Jane does 
not reflect a moral feature of a relation. 
Lastly, consider the proposition Joseph murders Jane: could this communicate a 
moral truth? Not prima facie in the same manner as the proposition murder is wrong could: 
murder is wrong blatantly expresses a moral judgment. But what about Joseph murders 
Jane? If indeed murder itself is morally neutral, then nothing moral is communicated with 
this proposition. But let us assume that murder is morally wrong, then Joseph murders Jane 
is morally communicative, and further, it seems to reflect a moral evaluation. Thus, Joseph 
murders Jane is reflective of a moral relational feature.  
What features of the relation between Joseph and Jane does Joseph murders Jane 
capture that Joseph loves Jane and Joseph is taller than Jane fails to? I.e., what makes this 
feature of the relation moral as opposed to other features? On the face of it, Joseph murder 
Jane captures causal features. It expresses causal activity—the manifestation of powers—
between Joseph and Jane. Joseph is exercising his powers to willfully and unlawfully cause 
the death of Jane, while Jane is manifesting potentialities to fatally respond to the powers 
Joseph is exercising. For indeed, if Jane was a granite statue, she would not possess said 
powers to be murdered. Thus, part of the quality of the relation Joseph murders Jane is 
dependent on the internal properties—the powers—of both Joseph and Jane. 
 It is apparent then that the moral features of relations are causal features of a special 
kind. Perhaps to see this more clearly, take for example again Harman’s cat. In this example, 
we have a group of youths causally acting on a cat in a fashion so as to cause the cat pain and 
possible death. The cat is such a creature that it can be affected by the youths’ actions. 
Involved in this moral situation are the causal agents of gasoline and a source of ignition, 
which the youths use to cause damage to the cat. Arguably, without causation, these entities 
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would lack the ability to enter into moral relations, and thus enter into any kind of meaningful 
moral relationships that would entail anything like obligations or possibility for harms.  
The question then becomes, must causal activity always be present in order to say that 
a situation is moral? Indeed, we can think of situations where moral obligations may exist 
even when no causal activity is happening. Arguably, I have an obligation to be attentive to 
my infant child as she plays on the floor. I have an obligation to feed her when it comes time 
for her scheduled feeding. I have an obligation not to be abusive towards her. These 
obligations exist, if they exist, even though she’s quietly playing on the floor and I watch her 
from the couch, and even though no causal activity is, at this instance, happening. If I fail at 
these obligations, by neglecting her or purposefully harming her, arguably this is a moral 
failure on my part. Therefore, the relation between my daughter and myself in this moment 
has moral features, even though no causal activity is occurring. But how can this be so? 
Remember I argued above that causal features of relations exist, even though no 
causal activity is happening. Both my daughter and I possess powers and capacities to act on 
each other and to be acted on. These exist even when no power is being manifested. The 
existence of these powers, along with my knowledge of the harms and goods that can come 
about through their exercise, means that the relation I stand in with my daughter is a moral 
one. Therefore, moral obligations, if they occur, occur by default, arising merely by the 
existence of causally efficacious and intelligent creatures in a causal universe. 
  But do moral obligations occur? In the above example, it was assumed that I had a 
moral obligation to be attentive to my daughter, to feed her, and not to be abusive. But in 
order to motivate a robust theory of moral realism, an account must be given as to why I have 
these obligations. Or take for example again Joseph murders Jane. What makes this 
proposition indicative of a wrong moral relational feature? The wrongness—or rightness, for 
that matter—of a relational feature must somehow be metaphysically grounded. In other 
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words, accepting that moral features are causal in nature, there still is a question of what 
determines the moral quality of any causal relational feature and what distinguishes them 
from a non-moral causal feature. Otherwise, moral realism itself has not been demonstrated; 
just a causal realism that moral judgements can, real or unreal, be mapped onto. In my 
chapter 5 response to Audi’s theory, I stated that, qualitatively speaking, the fittingness or 
unfittingness of a moral scene tells of its moral valuation. What, metaphysically speaking, 
can ground this fittingness or unfittingness? How can moral realism be grounded in a theory 
of moral relational features as causal features?  
 At the end of chapter 1, my chapter on general causation, I introduced the notion of 
final causes. The role that final causes plays in causation is that of “ordering” efficient 
causes, to borrow the wording of David Oderberg.18 Final causes determine what causal 
effects are possible when a substance exercises its powers. Arguably, final causes play an 
essential and integral role in efficient causal activity,19 determining the quality of the effects 
that take place.  
 I now want to make the case that final causes, particular to the natures of each and 
every substance, play an essential and integral role in determining the moral quality of moral 
relational features. For if moral features are causal in nature, then their quality—their 
fittingness or unfittingness—is determined by final causes. It is not my goal here to give a 
thoroughgoing account and defense of Scholastic metaphysics; my purpose here is merely to 
formulate a plausible account of how moral realism is grounded in causal activity between 
substances. Namely, I argue, along the lines of Oderberg, that (in scholastic terms) the 
actualization of potentialities towards perfection (being determined by a substance’s nature) 
 
18 David S. Oderberg, “Finality Revived: Powers and Intentionality,” Synthese 194 (2017): 2396; David 
S. Oderberg, The Metaphysics of Good and Evil (New York: Routledge, 2020), 28. 
 
19 Oderberg, “Finality Revived,” 2396-2397. 
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is what constitutes a fitting moral action.20 Unfitting action on the other hand hinders this 
process. In more analytic terms, an agent’s actions are morally positive if the action is 
question is conducive to a substance or multiple substances trending21 towards final states 
determined by their internal constitution, whereas wrong action has the opposing effect. This 
is the ground for moral realism I will defend. First, I will give an account of final causality. 
Afterwards, I will end the chapter by elaborating on what makes some causation moral. 
6.4.1 Final Causality 
 In Scholastic theory, a final cause is an end state towards which the exercise of power 
drives a substance, giving structure or order to causal activity, as well as determining its 
quality. Oderberg himself characterizes final causality as follows: 
The Scholastics adhered to what is called the principle of finality: every agent 
acts for an end. The end, whatever it may be, is that which is perfective of the nature 
of the thing. Finality is another way of talking about final causes…Variations of the 
principle of finality include the proposition that every nature is ordered to an end; that 
nature does not act in vain; that the end is the first principle of activity; and that the 
end is the reason for all movement.22 
 
What directs a substance towards this end is intrinsic to the substance itself, i.e., it is in the 
inherent nature of the substance—and the powers that it internally possesses—to naturally 
arrive at this end.23 According to Oderberg, it is specifically higher-order causal properties 
that drive a substance to a teleological end, these higher-order properties being part of what 
 
20 David S. Oderberg, The Metaphysics of Good and Evil (New York: Routledge, 2020), 2. 
 
21 Oderberg uses the term tending to describe the same kind of causal movement by a substance, but I 
favor the term trending since it places emphasis on the final state as the goal of causal activity. It the movement 
towards or away from the final state that is important to the determination of whether a given situation is 
morally fit or unfit. See Oderberg, The Metaphysics of Good and Evil, 23. 
 
22 Oderberg, The Metaphysics of Good and Evil, 28. 
 
23 Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction 
Books, 2014), 88-89. Feser also distinguishes here between intrinsic and extrinsic final causality in that an 
artifact will have its final causality imposed upon it from without, via an intentional agent giving purpose to the 
artifact, as opposed to from within an internal nature. Since I am only dealing in natural substances, which have 
only internal natures, I shall not be addressing extrinsic final causality.  
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Aristotelians and Scholastics call the formal cause of substance. Using the example of salt, 
Oderberg explains: 
The reason for salt’s dissolution in water is the final cause of its behaviour: salt is 
governed by a higher-order property in virtue of which it behaves in water in a certain 
way. That higher-order property is part of the essence of salt, what scholastics—
following Aristotle’s fourfold theory of causation—called the ‘formal cause’ of salt. 
In other words, it just is part of the essence of salt to be soluble in water: when we 
isolate any power or cluster of powers in virtue of which a substance behaves in a 
certain way, we are thereby isolating one or more final causes of the substance’s 
behaviour.24 
 
I will not utilize the Scholastic terminology of formal cause. Instead, I will borrow the notion 
of final cause capture the teleological nature of all causal activity along with the 
characteristic end states that substances seem to naturally arrive at through said activity. As 
Edward Feser points out, it is natural to an acorn to arrive at the end state of an oak tree: there 
is an internal, natural “directedness” of an acorn to arrive at this goal.25 This is the reality I 
am wanting to capture via an appeal to final causes, since this reality will be important to the 
discussion of moral relational features as causal features. While in Scholastic theory (as Feser 
points out) the term final cause refers to only the external goal of this directness as opposed 
to the directedness itself,26 for simplicity sake, I will use the term to capture all teleological 
aspects of causation that bear on substances, including their end states towards which their 
causal activity trends. 
 Many modern analytic philosophers, as well as scientists, are repelled by the notion of 
final causes. They assume teleology requires the existence of “spooky” properties that can 
only exist via supernatural means, thus running counter to any naturalistic explanation of 
universe. The main objectors along these lines would be those who hold to physicalism and 
 
24 Oderberg, “Finality Revived,” 2397-2398. 
 
25 Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 88-89. 
 
26 Ibid., 88. 
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the Humean view of causation, since they would reject the notion of intrinsic power 
properties altogether. I have already expressed a rejection of both reductive and non-
reductive forms of physicalism, as well as Humean causation, in chapters 1 and 4. Along with 
not finding these theories plausible, I also take them to be incompatible with the moral 
realism being developed here. As such, I will not be addressing the physicalists’ or Humeans’ 
worries. 
 Panpsychists with commitments to naturalism, on the other hand, may also be hesitant 
to accept the strong teleological view being expressed here, but I don’t think this needs to be 
much of a worry. Because panpsychism is compatible with intrinsic powers, there is nothing 
barring panpsychism from allowing this kind of teleology. As David Chalmers maintains: 
The world…consists in a vast causal network of phenomenal properties underlying 
the physical laws that science postulates…The basic properties of the world are 
neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are 
constructed out of them. From their intrinsic natures in combination, the phenomenal 
is constructed; and from their extrinsic relations, the physical is constructed. 
On this view, the most basic laws will be those that connect the basic intrinsic 
properties.27 
 
This view of Chalmers seems to be consistent with the idea that substances have internal 
powers that contribute to the directed nature of causation, however mentalistically the 
panpsychist wants to cash out these powers. Chalmers himself seems to want to cash out 
these internal properties in a strong mentalistic sense, as follows: 
[I]t is often noted that physics characterizes its basic entities only extrinsically, in 
terms of their relations to other entities, which are themselves characterized 
extrinsically, and so on. The intrinsic nature of physical entities is left aside. Some 
argue that no such intrinsic properties exist, but then one is left with a world that is 
pure causal flux (a pure flow of information) with no properties for the causation to 
relate. If one allows that intrinsic properties exist, a natural speculation given the 
above is that the intrinsic properties of the physical—the properties that causation 
ultimately relates—are themselves phenomenal properties.28 
 
27 David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 155. 
 
28 David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 




Nevertheless, even this strong phenomenal view of intrinsic properties is consistent with the 
existence of power properties if we take these powers to be products of intrinsic mental 
activity. Though this is a stark departure from most substance and powers theories, it is 
compatible with the notion of intrinsic properties of substances determining the quality of 
causal activity as well as the teleological nature of causal activity giving way to certain end 
states of substances. Therefore, panpsychism, even a panpsychism with a commitment to 
naturalism, is compatible with the notion of substantial natures and final causes—and thereby 
compatible with the moral ontology being developed here. 
 6.4.2 Moral Causation 
 The task now becomes one of making sense of the causal picture when it comes to the 
discussion of moral relational features as causal relational features. As already mentioned at 
the end of section 6.4, an agent’s actions can be considered morally positive if the action is 
question is conducive to a substance or substances trending towards certain final states, the 
quality of which are determined by the internal constitution of substances, i.e., their natures. 
It is not my intention to demarcate the line between obligatory and supererogatory moral 
action, or even to identify any specific moral maxims. My sole concern is to develop a 
metaphysic in which the answer such questions can be ontologically rooted. As such, what 
follows, I believe, is compatible with multiple systems of ethics, although it seems better 
suited to some systems as opposed to others. 
Also already mentioned is my borrowing from Oderberg’s Scholastic theory, namely, 
his definition of goodness as the actualization of potentialities towards perfection,29 which I 
am describing as the causal trending towards certain internally (i.e., via a substance’s nature) 
prescribed (as opposed to causally determined) end states of substances. The natural causal 
 
29 Oderberg, The Metaphysics of Good and Evil, 2. 
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tendency towards perfection, i.e, the prescribed end state, is what constitutes goodness, i.e., a 
morally positive state of affairs. In Oderberg’s words: 
The older usage [of the term perfection]…sees perfection as what used to be called an 
increase in the fullness of being, a bringing to fulfilment or completion of some 
disposition, power, or tendency of an object—in Aristotelian-Scholastic terminology, 
the actualisation of some potentiality (or potency) of a thing. And this, at least 
according to the Scholastics, albeit less clearly in Aristotle himself, is precisely what 
they called good in the broadest, fundamental sense.30 
 
Oderberg’s definition of goodness—because it consists in the actualization of potency, and 
because for Oderberg all substances are a mixture of act and potency—even applies to non-
organic materials.31 However, I am uninterested in the case of non-organic materials, per se. 
Oderberg himself makes the distinction between a good state of affairs and a moral state of 
affairs, the latter requiring the presence and action (or lack thereof) of a moral agent.32 What I 
am interested in is this latter case of a state of affairs involving a moral agent, i.e., a sentient 
being capable of moral knowledge and agency, although I am willing to allow that natural 
goodness that does not involve a moral agent, and perhaps goodness only involving inorganic 
entities. Because my main concern is with moral knowledge and agency, I will bypass the 
question of inorganic goodness and even organic goodness not involving a moral agent and 
focus on cases involving a moral agent. What is important for present purposes, however, is 
that the causal trending towards an end state—as determined by the nature of a substance—is 
what constitutes goodness. 
 When it comes to goodness which concerns a moral agent—specifically, in situations 
that involves other moral agents and other organic life, both sentient and non-sentient—the 
measure of what good action consists in can be described as action that fulfills the needs of 
 
30 Ibid., 15. 
 
31 Ibid., 57-58.  
 
32 Personal conversation with Oderberg. 
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the substances in relation with the moral agent (including the moral agent him or herself). 
What these needs are depend on the essential natures of organic entities involved. According 
to Oderberg: 
On the Scholastic view, a need is whatever is necessary for the proper 
functioning of some entity according to its nature. The nature is presupposed. Cows 
don’t need to be mammals: anything that is not a mammal just is not a cow. Humans 
don’t need to be rational, since anything non-rational is not human. But cows do need 
to lactate, to eat, to nurture their young; and humans need to exercise their rationality 
just as they need to exercise their bodies.33 
 
Fulfilling these needs is what ensures causal trending towards the final states of substances. 
Thus, good action consists in the fulfillment of these needs, and goodness itself consists in 
these needs being fulfilled. 
Additionally, these morally pertinent needs arise via natures, which themselves are 
part of mind-independent reality. Oderberg makes this point as follows: 
Now the kind of necessity appealed to here is broadly metaphysical in the following 
sense: all real needs must in some way emanate from an underlying proper function, 
that is, the functioning of an entity according to its nature. If there is no way of 
explaining how a putative need derives from an underlying proper function, it is not a 
need at all. It might be many things—a mere desire, a whim, a fancy, a requirement 
for this or that to happen—but it will not be a real need.34 
 
For example, it is the proper functioning of a human child to grow into a healthy adult, and 
thus growing into a healthy adult fulfills the nature of a human child and can therefore be 
considered a good. This doesn’t mean all needs are physical needs and that there are no felt 
needs or purely psychological needs. The example of human beings needing to exercise 
rationality, as Oderberg mentions, is a purely cognitive need. It also seems obvious that 
human beings have a need emanating from their nature for felt emotional connections to 
other human beings. I imagine there are other nonphysical needs that can be variously 
defined, and so we shouldn’t limit what we consider to be real, metaphysical needs as those 
 





things that are merely necessary for basic physical growth and survival. But what should be 
clear is that goodness, as it is being defined here, is situated in metaphysically real, mind-
independent reality. 
 If goodness comes by way of fulfillment, then moral badness—or evil—must come 
by way of privation,35 or so it seems. A problem that immediately arises with this idea 
regards absences as causal entities since, when looking for a causal explanation for some evil, 
our first resort is to say that something necessary for a need fulfillment is lacking, such as a 
lack of water necessary for a plant to continue on living.36 Some may be prepared to accept 
that absences have causal power. However, better metaphysical sense can be made of what 
seem to be causally potent “lacks.” Take for example respiration. We could say that a lack of 
oxygen causes death by suffocation, but what immediately kills a suffocating person is an 
accumulation of carbon dioxide waste in the blood. As for a lack of oxygen, oxygen is 
necessary for the renewal of metabolic energy and without it the body is subject to normal 
physical entropy. What causes death therefore isn’t a lack of anything: death is caused by 
waste accumulation and/or entropy, both of which are positive states of being (the waste 
build up itself having been caused by normal metabolic functioning).37 Hence, if we define 
goodness as trending towards a designated final state, then we can define badness as trending 
away from that state. And even though we can make sense of goodness as fulfillment of 
natures, which causes final states to be trended towards, we don’t necessarily need to make 
 
35 Ibid., 3. 
 
36 Ibid., 175-176. 
 
37 See Ibid., 182-188. Oderberg would agree with this idea concerning real positive metaphysical 
causes in the face of seeming absences as causal entities (that is, he would deny that absences are real causal 




sense of badness as lacks in the metaphysically real sense, although it is explanatorily 
useful.38 
 Given the theory as now explained, we can make sense of the morality of a given 
situation as the causal relational features that either are conducive to or hindering to the 
trending of subjects towards their final causes. Let us consider an example, that of child 
drowning in a pool while in the presence of an adult who is capable of saving the child 
without any risk of harm to himself. For simplicity’s sake, let’s pretend these are the only two 
agents in this scenario, and no other relevant agents are present. Causally speaking, the water 
is interfering with the ability of the child’s body to perform life sustaining functions (recall 
the analysis of suffocation above). Because there is such a risk of death, the child is not 
trending towards her final state—this comprises a badness or evil. The adult has—in 
accordance with his rational nature—knowledge, either through direct perception or practical 
reasoning, of the perilous state of the child. The adult also has—in accordance with his 
rational nature—knowledge of how to set the child trending towards her final state by 
removing her from the water. Additionally, the adult has the causal capabilities—and knows 
he has the capabilities—to set the child more trending towards her final state than she is at the 
moment: this comprises the causal relational features between the adult and the child. 
Because the adult (1) has the causal power to save the child, (2) the knowledge of the 
causal circumstance the child finds herself in (i.e., her trending away from her final state), 
and (3) the knowledge of how he can cause her to trend towards her final state again, the 
adult is morally responsible in this situation. (1) is reflective of the causal relational 
features—moral relational features—of the relation that exists between the adult and the 
child. (2) and (3) are reflective of the nature of the adult as the kind of substance he is—a 
rational kind. Part of what makes him rational is his knowledge of the kind of substance the 
 
38 Ibid., 151. 
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child is, as reflected in (2). Thus, the causal relational features of (1) reflects a relation 
between substances as the kinds of things they are: a rational human adult with knowledge 
and capabilities and a human child that is, due to her nature, deserves saving in this situation. 
If the adult fails to act, he has committed a morally bad action. On the other hand, if he acts 
by taking the child out of the water, he has committed a morally good action. He is, because 
of (1)-(3), morally responsible and thus a moral agent. 
A lot more can be said about the adult as a rational agent, such as what kind of 
knowledge we should really expect him to possess in the above scenario, and whether or not I 
am really holding him to too high a standard here (or perhaps too low) in terms of how much 
knowledge I think he possesses and should possess to be considered a moral agent. In other 
words, is it reasonable to expect a morally responsible agent to hold some particular 
knowledge given a certain scenario or should we say a rational agent is morally responsible 
regardless of what knowledge he or she possesses?  
This is an interesting and important metaethical question, one that will not be fully 
fleshed out here. It seems apparent to me that a moral agent needs at least some working 
knowledge of the essential natures of the substances involved in a moral scenario, regarding 
how they causally interact. To put it differently, the moral agent needs knowledge of how his 
agency can affect change in his moral environment. Or, perhaps it is arguably the case that 
the moral agent should have such knowledge, and any lack of knowledge is a moral failure on 
his part. It may be the case that fully fleshing out an answer to this question will yield 
different answers according to which metaethical theory of agency is applied to the 
metaphysic described in this chapter. As such, this work will not be done here. The goal here 
is merely to lay out the basic necessary conditions for an agent to be considered a moral 
agent. 
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What is also important to emphasize is how these conditions are fulfilled by agents in 
the moral metaphysic developed in this chapter. Moral relational features—consisting of 
causal relational features of a special kind—are facets of relations that exist between 
substances. Moreover, what gives these relations the quality they have—moral or 
otherwise—is the monadic properties that exist in the relata. In the moral case, monadic 
essential properties comprise the natures of each of the relata, and thus determine the final 
causes that each relatum possesses. Trending towards, or away, from final causes determine 
whether or not a relatum is in a good state or a bad state. Further, how a moral agent relates 
himself—under his own causal control—to other relata determines whether or not he is 































7. Non-Conceptual Content and Perceptual Knowledge 
7.1 Introduction 
 While discussing perceptual moral knowledge in chapter 5, I presented the case for a 
distinction to be made between perception and recognition. I had claimed that perceptual 
knowledge (of any kind, moral or otherwise) gained via mere perception was limited in 
scope, due to the lack of relevant concepts possessed by the perceiver, while perceptual 
knowledge gained via recognition was fuller, since it benefitted from the deployment of 
relevant concepts. In the cases of both perception and recognition, I argued that the 
qualitative content of perception was exactly the same. The only difference between the two 
cases was the deployment of relevant concepts on sight by the subject (or, in other words, the 
perceiver knows what the object or properties of perception are non-inferentially upon 
perception.)   
In order to develop the distinction between perception and recognition, I had to make 
two prima facie problematic assumptions which I will now be dealing with in this chapter. 
The first is my assuming that the qualitative content of perception is wholly detached from 
concepts and can itself comprise knowledge. The idea that non-conceptual content exists is 
by itself a controversial position in perceptual theory. Can a plausible case be made for the 
qualitative contents of perception being experienced without the deployment of concepts? If 
the distinction between recognition and perception is to hold, the non-conceptual contents of 
perception must be coherently defined, and its connection to conceptual content explained. 
Thus, in this chapter, I will be defining non-conceptual content and bridging the gap between 
non-conceptual content and conceptual content. More controversial, however, is the idea that 
knowledge can be non-conceptual (i.e., non-propositional). (It is important to note that 
concepts and propositions are closely linked, for as Benjamin Bayer points out, “[o]ne does 
not use concepts except in the context of propositions, and one does not form a concept 
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except in the process of forming—and asserting—a proposition.”)1 I will demonstrate the 
existence of non-conceptual knowledge by making a distinction between the knowledge 
possessed by pre-linguistic subjects—such as infants—and post-linguistic subjects, arguing 
that pre-linguistic subjects possess non-conceptual knowledge while post-linguistic subjects, 
for most things, do not (but are likely to for moral properties they do not possess concepts 
for). Key to this argument will be understanding how recognitional learning may occur given 
that perceptual content for pre-linguistic subjects is purely non-conceptual and thus non-
discriminable via propositions. Features of perceptual content therefore must be 
discriminable perceptually—indicative of some kind of non-conceptual knowledge—if 
conceptual learning is to happen. This perceptual discrimination allows for concepts to be 
formed and attached onto discriminated properties. Otherwise, conceptual learning has no 
basis.  
The second assumption is that a non-conceptual belief (a belief resulting from mere 
perception) is justified via immediate awareness of perceptual content alone, while a 
conceptual perceptual belief (one that involves some degree of recognition) is justified via a 
combination of immediate awareness and background knowledge concerning the deployed 
concept. How immediate awareness can confer justification demands explanation, especially 
given that the position that it can is also controversial in epistemology.2 In order to tackle this 
problem, I begin with an exploration of Steven L. Reynolds’ work and entertain the notion 
that recognition, practiced as a skill, confers justification. Ultimately, however, after an 
exploration of the work of Carl Ginet and William Alston, I argue that immediate awareness 
of the content of perception itself directly confers justification when it comes to mere 
 
1 Benjamin Bayer, “A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realism Foundationalism,” Synthese 180 
(2011): 370. 
 
2 Laurence Bonjour, “The Regress Problem and Foundationalism,” in Epistemic Justification: 
Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, by Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 17-19. 
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perception, while the combination of immediate awareness and background conceptual 
knowledge confers justification when it comes to recognition.3 
Dealing with these assumptions will demonstrate that in both the cases of perception 
and recognition, knowledge is justified non-inferentially, and even though this seems like a 
jarring departure from the moral discussion we been having up to this point, dealing with the 
justification issue is integral to my theory of moral perceptual knowledge. This is because an 
intuitive objection to my view that moral relational features have their own irreducible 
phenomenology (i.e., a phenomenology over and above the monadic properties possessed by 
substances involved in a moral situation) would be that, because moral subjects don’t always 
come to the same moral evaluations when presented with a moral scene, irreducible moral 
phenomenology must not exist; therefore, moral evaluations in response to perceptual scenes 
must always come by way of inference when they do come. My answer to this objection is 
that, like pre-linguistic subjects, those who lack the relevant moral concept (or concepts) for a 
moral scene can still be said to perceive the moral phenomenology of the scene but fail to 
recognize it (thereby accounting for some vary in evaluations). On the other hand, those who 
possess the relevant moral concept and are able to deploy it on sight (i.e., those who are able 
to recognize the moral scene for what it is) are justified in their moral evaluations. This 
chapter explains how perceivers but especially recognizers can be justified in their perceptual 
moral beliefs without the need to be justified via inference, thereby allowing me to defend 
my view against this objection. 
Of importance to keep in mind in this chapter is a commitment to a robust view of 
qualia realism, which was defended against eliminativist and representationalist views of 
phenomenal experience in Chapter 3. I will here touch on representationalist arguments once 
 




again, but this time in the context of an epistemological discussion concerning the content of 
perceptual awareness and perceptual knowledge, and thus much will be assumed against 
representationalism. For arguments concerning representationalism as a theory of 
phenomenal experience, see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.3. 
7.2 Conceptual and Non-Conceptual Content 
 Concerning the relationship between concepts and experience, Matthew Burstein 
asks, “Do our experiences yield direct knowledge of the world, or do they do so only when 
the experiences are mediated by concepts?”4 This question concerns the contents of 
perception—whether it is conceptual, non-conceptual, or a mixture of both. Answering this 
question is of particular epistemological importance since the answer can shed light on how 
our perceptions and perceptual knowledge relate, especially in regard to the question of how 
one—our perceptions—confers justification to other—our perceptual beliefs.5 The question 
of justification will be dealt with in section 7.3. My first concern is with defining non-
conceptual content and how it relates to conceptual content, demonstrating that non-
conceptual content exists as distinct from conceptual content, and making the case for non-
conceptual knowledge. 
 Non-conceptual awareness can be thought of as the unmediated (i.e., immediate) 
awareness of mind-independent entities, i.e., an awareness of external objects that is given 
directly to one’s conscious awareness.6 In other words, non-conceptual content, if real, would 
lack mediation through concepts or propositions, and thus would involve a conscious 
awareness consisting purely of the qualities that constitute the perception of an external 
 
4 Matthew Burstein, “Situating Experience: Agency, Perception, and the Given,” The Southern Journal 




6 William P. Alston, “Back to the Theory of Appearing,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 182. 
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object.7 However, considering the question of how non-conceptual content could hold in the 
subject’s mind (i.e., how the subject could be consciously aware of the content), there are 
many who deny its existence and/or its significance. Tim Crane, who maintains that concepts 
are required for intentional states, argues that there is no such thing as thoughts without 
concepts; thus, without possessing concepts, a subject couldn’t grasp anything.8 Fodor, on his 
part, argues that non-conceptual content, if it existed, couldn’t carry any ontological 
commitments.9 This is at least partially due to the fact that non-conceptual representation 
lacks the power to individuate objects due to the absence of quantifiers.10 Ernest Sosa 
 goes as far as to deny that there can be subjective awareness of properties without concepts; 
for him, there is a tight connection between perception and concept possession.11 
Moreover, it is a widely held view that, even if non-conceptual awareness exists, it 
cannot, without attaching to a proposition, comprise a belief. In other words, there is no such 
thing as a non-conceptual belief and, consequently, no such thing as non-conceptual 
knowledge. Even Alston, himself a major advocate for the non-conceptual awareness of the 
subject, makes the explicit claim that non-conceptual awareness does not necessarily result in 
the awareness of any facts.12 Thus, he detaches the notions of non-conceptual content and 
belief, and affirms there is no such thing as non-conceptual knowledge.13 Along the same 
 
7 William P. Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 65 (2002): 71-72. 
 
8 Tim Crane, “The Nonconceptual Content of Experience,” in The Contents of Experience: Essays on 
Perception, ed. Tim Crane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 144-148. 
 
9 Jerry Fodor, “The Revenge of the Given,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian 
P. McLaughlin and Johnathan Cohen (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), 109 
 
10 Ibid., 109-111. 
 
11 Ernest Sosa, “Does Knowledge Have Foundations?” in Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. 
Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, by Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003), 124-125. 
 
12 Alston, “Back to the Theory of Appearing,” 183. 
 
13 Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 70. 
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vein, Audi argues that, while perception doesn’t depend on conceptual content, belief does. 
The example he gives is that of a rectangular field: a subject that lacks the concept field 
would perceive a green field and its shape, but would not be able to form a belief about a 
field.14  
This stance is due to an assumption that non-conceptual content is not the kind of 
thing that can be true or false.15 Additionally, it is assumed that it is propositional content, not 
non-conceptual content, that requires justification.16 Without this requirement to be justified, 
non-conceptual content cannot obtain the status of knowledge, i.e., true justified belief. As 
John Beversluis argues in critique of John Baillie, committing oneself to non-propositional 
knowledge commits one “to the awkward position of maintaining that one’s knowledge of 
any object is not only logically, but also epistemologically, prior to any affirmations” one 
could make.17 Again, the assumption is being made that affirmations, in the form of 
propositions, are necessary for knowledge. 
Setting aside for a moment the question of non-conceptual knowledge, can a case be 
made for the existence of non-conceptual content? It can be when considering how it is that 
concepts are applied. As Alston contends, the non-conceptual content of perception is 
fundamental to perception in that “the deployment of concepts is based on it and presupposes 
it.”18 Likewise, Bayer maintains that the non-conceptual (the word he uses is 
“preconceptual”) ability to see resemblance, i.e., that two objects resemble each other in 
 
 
14 Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd Edition 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 19.  
 
15 Bayer, “A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realism Foundationalism,” 358-359. 
 
16 Ibid., 359.  
 
17 John Beversluis, “Some Remarks Concerning a Non-propositional Knowledge of God,” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 43 (1965): 378 
 
18 Alston, “Back to the Theory of Appearing,” 186. 
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some capacity, is required in order to form a concept.19 The necessity of non-conceptual 
content in learning concepts seems right, for indeed how would concepts latch onto the 
external world if there was nothing perceived to be latched onto? In the instance of a child’s 
perception, there would be nothing about occurrent experience onto which to place a concept 
she is in the process of learning—she would be unable to recognize the concept visually 
presented or represented in the content of her perception.20 
As Alston points out, a commitment to the notion that perceptual experience is 
essentially non-conceptual is not necessary in order to admit non-conceptual content.21 In 
fact, Alston holds the view that adult perception relies heavily on the deployment of 
concepts.22 The notion that adult perception is largely conceptual seems correct considering 
that, given adult background knowledge, adult perception would be largely recognition in 
comparison to a child’s.23 Even so, a case can be made for the existence of non-conceptual 
content even in adult recognition. Non-conceptual content is what would make adult 
perception of external objects markedly different from mere thoughts about external 
objects.24 As Alston points out, visually experiencing a tree drastically differs qualitatively 
from merely possessing or forming a belief about a tree.25 Likewise, thinking about all the 
entailing propositions concerning an object differs from visually experiencing said object.26 
 
19 Bayer, “A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realism Foundationalism,” 369. 
 
20 Crane, “The Nonconceptual Content of Experience,” 137. 
 
21 William P. Alston, “Perceptual Knowledge,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. John 
Greco and Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 232. 
 
22 Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 73. 
 
23 See also Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 73. 
 
24 Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 72-73. See also Laurence Bonjour, “Back to 
Foundationalism,” in Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, by Laurence 
Bonjour and Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 71-72. 
 
25 Alston, “Back to the Theory of Appearing,” 194. 
 
26 Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 72. 
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The difference between visually experiencing an object versus merely thinking about it 
propositionally is due to the non-conceptual content involved in the experience, which gives 
it a distinctive quality.27 
 Furthermore, as Alston argues, the fact that the distinctive quality of an experience 
can vary in specificity in comparison to propositional content is due to non-conceptual 
content and propositional content being distinct.28 The example Alston uses is shades of red. 
An object can look red without looking any kind of specific shade to the observer. Although 
every case of looking red involves some specific shade, the observer may fail to notice the 
specific shade or lack the appropriate concept.29 Bonjour likewise points out that the 
variances in shading, lighting, and coloring—although perceptually present to the conscious 
awareness of an observer—cannot be conceptualized, and therefore what is perceived can be 
more refined than what can be expressed.30 The opposite can also true:31 we can come up 
with an infinite amount of propositions about a visual scene, given all the objects, properties, 
and relations involved. However, the non-conceptual qualitative content isn’t infinite, but 
limited.  
Even given the existence of non-conceptual content, can a case be made for non-
conceptual belief? It can when we consider subjects’ varying linguistic skills and the content 
of intentional states. While arguing for the position that concepts are necessary for belief, 
Crane utilizes the example of a subject who believes she is 70 years old. In order for the 
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28 Ibid., 77. 
 
29 Ibid., 77-78. 
 
30 Bonjour, “Back to Foundationalism,” 71-72. 
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subject to possess this belief, Crane maintains, she must also possess the concept year.32 
However, maintaining this tight relationship between concept and belief isn’t as 
straightforward as this case seems to suggest. Take for example a small child’s concept of a 
year versus the same concept possessed by an adult. It is commonly known that children 
experience time more slowly than adults (and young adults more slowly than older adults) 
and thus a child’s concept of year would be that of an exceedingly long time. Moreover, a 
small child’s concept of a year would lack robust background knowledge and fully fleshed 
out ideas related to how a year is calculated and societally experienced (e.g., the earth 
revolving around the sun, seasonal changes, cultural work and holiday rhythms, fiscal 
calendars, the collective cultural experience of the current zeitgeist in comparison past 
histories, etc.). Thus, a child’s belief that grandma’s 70 years old versus an adult’s belief that 
grandma’s 70 years old may have wildly differing content. Still, this fails to demonstrate that 
beliefs can be conceptless. In order to demonstrate this, we must look at what role concepts 
and propositions play in belief formation. 
 Alex Grzankowski, who is strongly against the non-conceptual view of perceptual 
content, defines propositions as “abstract truth-evaluable entities that are the objects of the 
propositional attitudes such as belief and desire and that are expressed by declarative 
sentences.”33 With this in mind, Grzankowski attempts to argue that representational 
content—such as the content of perception given representationalism—must be propositional 
(and thus, conceptual) since the content is linguistically expressible.34 However, the question 
remains whether the contents of perception must be expressible by the subject that is 
 
32 Crane, “The Nonconceptual Content of Experience,” 141. 
 
33 Alex Grzankowski, “Pictures Have Propositional Content,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 
(2015): 152. 
 
34 Ibid., 151-152. 
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undergoing a perceptual experience, i.e., whether the attitude of said subject must be 
propositional, or if it is enough that the attitude would be if it was possessed by a subject that 
had the appropriate linguistic skills.  
Even so, Grzankowski goes on to argue that those subjects who lack certain language 
skills nevertheless possess the ability to express some content, and therefore it cannot be said 
perceptual content is not propositional. The example he uses is of Piraha speakers who 
possess limited numerical terms and therefore cannot express that there are fifteen coins lying 
on a table. Grzankowski concludes that, even though there is this expressive deficit, this 
doesn’t entail that Piraha speakers can’t propositionally express some things about the coins 
on the table, and we can therefore conclude that perception is wholly propositional.35 
Grzankowski draws the wrong conclusion from this example, however. It is plain that Piraha 
speakers see the fifteen coins on the table just the same as English speakers would—what 
would qualitatively be presented or represented to them does not differ. Nevertheless, since 
the Piraha speakers lack the appropriate numerical concepts, they are unable to express what 
they perceive in the same fashion as English speakers. If that same perception was had by an 
English speaker, it would be propositionally expressible by the subject whose perception it 
was. The Piraha’s perceptual belief about the coins does not merely consist in the limited 
propositional content that they can express, as Grzankowski would argue. It also consists in 
the phenomenal content that they cannot express, that would be expressible by them if they 
possessed the appropriate concept of fifteen.36 
 
35 Ibid., 157. 
 
36 Carl Ginet argues that beliefs that are inexpressible by a subject who lacks linguistic ability are 
nonetheless propositional. This position, however, seems to muddle the issue since it doesn’t account for the 
difference in content between an expressible and inexpressible belief. See Carl Ginet, Knowledge, Perception, 
and Memory (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing Company, 1975), 5-6. 
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This seems to put into question the role that concepts or propositions play in beliefs. 
What is the role of concepts in forming and maintaining beliefs? Crane holds that concepts 
are constituents of intentional states, intentional states being the objects of inference.37 If this 
is the role concepts play, we can ask if something else can play this role. Indeed, we can ask 
whether intentional states must be propositional, and whether the role that concepts play in 
intentional states can be played by a non-propositional entity other than concepts. 
Arguably, there is such an entity: the unmediated experience of objects themselves.38 
My experience of seeing a book on the coffee table is about the book on the coffee table, 
given that I give appropriate focus to the book on the coffee table, regardless whether I know 
what books or coffee tables are. And even though this intentional state lacks the concept 
book, I am not arguing that it results in the sophisticated and expressible knowledge that we 
find in propositional knowledge. At the very least, it is hard to deny that unmediated 
experiences would result in at least one belief: the belief that an object is, i.e., that it is in the 
presence of the subject of experience. If such a conceptless belief exists, perhaps there can be 
others. 
Even if we want to deny that purely conceptless beliefs exist, it is difficult to deny 
that possession of concepts involved in propositional belief, and the subsequent knowledge, 
comes in degrees. Utilizing an example from Audi, a little girl may not know what the object 
on the table is (a tachistoscope), but she knows that whatever it is, it is noisy.39 This is not 
indicative of the child failing to see the object on the table and thus failing to gain knowledge 
of it. What she fails at is deploying the relevant concepts, which she lacks. Furthermore, even 
 
37 Crane, “The Nonconceptual Content of Experience,” 147. 
 
38 See also Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 72, where Alston admits that direct 
awareness is intentional in the intuitive sense of being about something, but seems to deny—although it is left 
unexplained why—that it can fully be considered intentional. 
 
39 Audi, Epistemology, 19-20. 
 
 186 
though her non-conceptual knowledge may be crude, it isn’t qualitatively limited. She has the 
same qualitative experience as a concept-possessor. Otherwise, she would fail to apply the 
appropriate concept to the object on the table once she possesses it.  
Regardless of the above arguments, it is impossible to deny outright that pre-linguistic 
children and some animals gain perceptual knowledge of their surroundings.40 This is 
because their behavior tells us as much.41 Ginet argues that beliefs are dispositional states, 
and as such, their presence can be tested by observing a subject’s physical or cognitive 
behavior.42 Even though we may not want to so bluntly equate beliefs with dispositional 
states as Ginet does, we can acknowledge a dispositional component to some beliefs that can 
manifest itself in behavior. Since we know that animals and infants can successfully navigate 
their environment,43 we can conclude animals and infants possess knowledge. 
Given this, then perceptual content and perceptual knowledge could consist in 
conceptless content exclusively in the pre-linguistic.44 We can accept this while also 
accepting that knowledge in the post-linguistic is largely conceptual. It is not unprecedented 
to think that perceptual knowledge differs between subjects in this fashion. John McDowell 
argues that the perceptual knowledge of rational subjects and the perceptual knowledge of 
non-rational and pre-linguistic subjects (i.e., animals and small children), although 
fundamentally the same, differ in that the warrant for belief possessed by each is distinctive.45 
 
40 William P. Alston, “What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?” Synthese 55 (1986): 90. 
 
41 Ginet, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 25. See also William P. Alston, “Level Confusions in 
Epistemology,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 164. Alston takes this kind of knowledge to be mediated whereas I take it to be immediate. 
 
42 Ginet, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 19. 
 
43 See also Burstein, “Situating Experience: Agency, Perception, and the Given,” 11, where Burstein 
analyzes Alston’s view that an animals’ direct access to particulars allows for successful navigation. 
 
44 See also Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 73. 
 
45 John McDowell, Perception as the Capacity for Knowledge (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University 
Press, 2011), 19-21. The language McDowell uses is that the knowledge of the rational and non-rational are two 
“species” of the same “genus.” 
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I maintain that in the pre-linguistic, the immediate awareness itself provides sufficient 
warrant for belief, while in the post-linguistic, concepts and background knowledge are 
required due to how sophisticated the knowledge is. 
This view of conceptless belief also accords well with what we know to be the 
subject’s ability to find similarity and discriminate between qualities before propositional 
knowledge has a chance to be formed. For example, Bayer argues that non-conceptual 
awareness of similarity between objects is what allows for learning concepts.46 It is difficult 
to see how this awareness can be anything but a certain kind of non-conceptual knowledge, 
for indeed a subject must know there is a similarity before she is able to apply a concept to 
the similarity. Likewise, J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard point out the importance of 
discrimination to the gaining the perceptual knowledge: to know that one is in the presence of 
a zebra, one must discriminate a zebra from non-zebras.47 The ability to discriminate seems 
to imply a crude non-conceptual knowledge prior to the formation of conceptual knowledge, 
for the subject would need to know there are differences in qualities, and what those 
differences are, in order for there to be a discrimination and a concept to be learned or 
applied. 
7.3 Justification 
It is commonly held by those who deny that non-conceptual content exists that non-
conceptual content, because it lacks any propositional content, fails to provide any 
justificatory power to beliefs. Thus, non-conceptual content cannot serve as a foundation for 
knowledge.48 This section will be a discussion of how non-conceptual content may confer 
justification, particularly for propositional beliefs. 
 
 
46 Bayer, “A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism,” 369. 
 
47 J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard, “Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives,” 
Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 969-970. See also Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 71-72. 
 
 188 
7.3.1 Recognitional Skill Theory 
One theory of non-conceptual content conferring epistemic justification is that of 
Stephen L. Reynolds. Reynolds maintains that perceptual beliefs are at least partially justified 
via a relation with perceptual experiences—experiences being, for Reynolds, non-
propositional and non-intentional.49 This relationship between perception and belief is not 
one of inference, and cannot be since Reynolds holds that perceptual experiences cannot be 
true or false.50 Instead, Reynolds advocates for another kind of justification-conferring 
normative connection between perception and belief, one that is akin to mastering a practical 
skill.51 
Reynolds argues that, when it comes to the practice of a skill, such as playing the 
piano or speaking a language, we can and do regularly evaluate which performances are good 
and which performances are unsatisfactory.52 Moreover, there seem to be rules which people 
follow in practicing these skills, although belief about following the rules and/or being 
conscious of the rules during performance doesn’t seem necessary for adequate performance, 
especially at a proficient level.53 Hence, Reynolds maintains, performing a practical skill is a 
matter of knowing-how, as opposed to knowing-that.54 In the same manner, perceptual 
knowers have learned how to form certain kinds of appropriate beliefs in response to certain 
kinds of experiences, that is, they have “recognitional skills.”55  
 
48 Laurence Bonjour, “Back to Foundationalism,” 70-71. 
 
49 Steven L. Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe with Justification,” Philosophical Studies 64 (1991): 
273. 
 
50 Ibid., 278-279. 
 
51 Ibid., 280. 
 
52 Ibid., 280-281. 
 
53 Ibid., 281-282. 
 
54 Ibid., 281. 
 
55 Ibid., 282. 
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This comports with our colloquial understanding of some facets of expertise and 
perception, an understanding which can be extended to perception in general. As Reynolds 
argues: 
Ordinary language admits the existence of skilled judges of music or horses or wines 
or paintings. Part of what makes them skilled judges is that they are more capable of 
arriving at justified perceptual beliefs about their subject matter than are others who 
lack their talent and training. They are more sensitive to the relevant perceptual 
differences than are people who haven’t had similar instruction and practice. But the 
differences to which they are sensitive are relevantly similar to the features that we 
become sensitive to in learning to recognize people and objects.56 
 
Reynolds argues that if a perceiver’s recognitional skills are adequate, the beliefs she forms 
on the basis of their exercise are justified, that is, barring any undermining beliefs.57 
Reynolds addresses three objections to his theory, based on how the analogy between 
practical skills and recognitional skills seems to break down. The first objection is that 
practical skills can be viewed normatively as rule following—however, there don’t seem to 
conceivably be any rules in the perceptual case. Reynolds counters this by maintaining that 
recognitional rules are written for robots (what would be better construed today as artificial 
intelligence or smart devices), and, further, that these rules would reflect how humans 
exercise recognitional skills in response to stimuli.58 Moreover, the fact human beings are 
able to form an infinite number of beliefs means that “arriving at beliefs must be composed 
of re-combinable sub-skills, which, apparently, roughly correspond to some of the nouns and 
predicates of our language.”59 Since acquiring a language is a skill based on rules, so must 





57 Ibid., 273, 282. 
 
58 Ibid., 283-284. 
 
59 Ibid., 285. 
 
60 Reynolds speculates that there even may exist “a tenuous connection between truth [i.e., of 
sentences] and justification by recognitional skills.” However, since he doesn’t believe this is important to 
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The second objection has to do with the performance aspect of practical skills. The 
objection goes that, since performing a skill is an action that a person does, whereas 
perception seems like something that just happens automatically (like digestion), then 
perception is not something that can be normatively evaluated like practical skills. Without 
this ability to be evaluated, perception is useless for justification purposes.61 In response, 
Reynolds points out the performance of practical skills also tends to happen automatically 
(i.e., reflexively, or without deliberate conscious action), and, in fact, is required to happen 
automatically when mastered.62 Automatic performance therefore does not bar a performance 
from being normatively evaluable. An experienced fencer’s responses to his opponent would 
be automatic and reflexive compared to a novice fencer who must slowly and deliberately 
arrive at the correct responses.63  
The last objection Reynolds addresses states that there is no real tie between 
justification and truth on his view since the correctness or incorrectness of exercising any 
skill is the product of “arbitrary cultural history.”64 In response, Reynolds entertains the idea 
that the goal of exercising recognitional skill is arriving at the truth in the same manner as the 
goal of exercising practical skill is arriving at aesthetic beauty.65 He admits that this seems 
implausible, however; subjects do not seem to have the goal of truth in mind when they 
perceive.66 Instead, he arrives at an interpretation of recognitional normativity as a 
 
answering the above objection, he fails to describe what this might be. See Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe 
with Justification,” 286. 
 
61 Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe with Justification,” 286-287. 
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“conformity to epistemic norms.”67 Even so, there is still a question of objectivity, i.e., how 
justification via recognitional skill relates to truth. In answer, Reynolds argues that the 
practice of recognitional skill arrives at true beliefs when properly performed because proper 
performance is affirmed and reinforced by actions having success and public third-party 
approval.68 Moreover, experience itself is related to truth in that “experience conveys 
information of the truth.”69 However, experiences themselves contain much more information 
than subjects can perform recognitional skills on, hence different perceptual beliefs about an 
experiential scene are formed when component information about said experience is 
processed by the subject.70 
Reynolds’ view of justification fits well with my view of perception in that it accounts 
for the distinction between novice and expert recognizers, thus comporting with the idea that 
the content of perceptual knowledge admits of degrees depending on the subject’s linguistic 
grasp. The difference between whether a subject is engaging in perception and recognition 
would depend on the amount of recognitional skill she has, if Reynolds’ view is correct. 
Moreover, the idea that subjects get better at perception over time, and eventually can do it 
automatically, fits well with my theory that concepts are learned and slowly applied 
inferentially before they are automatically applied via recognition (see chapter 5, section 5.4). 
The question becomes then whether or not Reynolds’ view is a plausible account of 
justification and thus is a good view to adopt. 
It seems that, in Reynolds’ view, what does the justificatory work for perceptual 




68 Ibid., 289-290. 
 




71 Ibid., 282. 
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therefore an externalist view of justification (and therefore undesirable), with the exercise of 
a skill being an external action outside the cognitive purview of a knower, and justification 
merely relying on success rather than the subject’s cognitive grasp. However, Reynolds 
affirms internalism and seems to maintain that what makes his view internalist is that fact that 
a subject can reflect on the exercise of this skill and whether or not performance is going 
well.72 
Accepting that reflection on performance is an internal mental process, there still is a 
question of measuring success. This is important to Reynolds’ theory since he argues that 
success of a recognitional skill being exercised reinforces the correctness of performance and 
ensures that it will be repeated in the future. However, success isn’t measured via the ability 
to get at the truth, but by public feedback.73 This view of success is open to objections on the 
basis of relativism, which Reynolds acknowledges.74 As way of defense, he makes this 
charge: 
If my conjectures are roughly correct (and no doubt they need refinement), then, 
presumably, accepted epistemic practices which seem to us not to justify the resulting 
beliefs, fail to do so, in our opinion, because we think that some other pressures 
guided their adoption. They were adopted for some reason other than success in the 
resulting actions and the appropriate approval from the community. The dubious 
epistemic practices of primitive societies are seldom purely recognitional in 
character…Other societies’ adoption of epistemic norms which seem to us not to be 
justifying will also, on examination, be found to have been wrongly influenced, 
perhaps by religion or politics, and so to have been improperly learned. The skills 
approach will thus rule that these practices are not epistemically justifying.75 
 
Along with having an ethnocentric standard of justification, Reynold’s fails to account for 
objectivity. How can he claim subjects can be “wrongly” influenced when there’s no 
 
 
72 Ibid., 274, 281-282. 
 







objective standard by which to judge them? Justification, for Reynolds, seems to happen 
completely independently of truth. 
Where Reynolds thinks truth comes in is at the level of experience. This is because, 
for Reynolds, experience conveys information.76 However, since the exercise of recognitional 
skill is not measured in terms of the truth but of success, this explanation still fails to account 
for how it is that recognitional skill captures accurate information. If experience is infallible, 
this may work, but then there needs to be an explanation of how a subject can produce a false 
belief. If it is the case that, in the instance of a false belief, the subject failed in the exercising 
of recognitional skill (i.e., failed to exercise the skill well), then arguably the exercise of 
recognitional skill does aim at truth—as opposed to just mere success—and can be evaluated 
in terms of truth. 
Reynolds, however, dismisses this view of truth because he doesn’t believe perceiving 
subjects always have truth as a goal. He points out that piano students don’t always have 
beauty as a goal, and so it makes no sense to expect perceivers to have a goal.77 With this, it 
seems that Reynolds is backing off the heavily normative and teleological nature of having 
truth as a goal without even entertaining the possibility. However, appealing to this 
normativity and teleology is what I think will make Reynolds view most plausible. For even 
though not every student has the goal of beauty, they should have that goal, and in fact part of 
their instruction is teaching them to pursue this goal. Moreover, those formulating beliefs 
based on perception should have the goal of truth, and teaching children to recognize objects 
teaches them to pursue this goal in their interactions with the world. 
 Furthermore, contrary to Reynolds’ position, success correlates with truth not because 
success is measurable by community feedback from other subjects, but because it is 
 
76 Ibid., 291. 
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measurable by feedback from substances with causal power in the environment. For example, 
I am walking along the sidewalk and fail to recognize that the sidewalk is unevenly paved. I 
trip and fall. This causal feedback will teach me to be more attentive to uneven paving 
surfaces, and what they look like, and avoid tripping in such a manner in the future. Another 
example is a common toy that children use to learn three dimensional shapes and their 
relation to two dimensional shapes. There is a wooden box with round, square, and triangular 
holes, and, further, spherical, cubical, and prismatic blocks that the child is supposed to fit 
through the holes in order to get them in the box. The feedback the child will receive from 
doing this exercise incorrectly (she can’t put the wrong shape block into the wrong hole) will 
teach her the nature of the shapes involved. The success of her learning the true nature of 
these shapes is measured in the success of her overcoming causal obstacles and getting the 
shapes into the box. This better captures the consequential nature of objective truth than 
Reynolds’ theory about community feedback. 
 7.3.2 Justification Through Perceptual Content 
 Understandably, some may not want to accept a theory of justification that relies so 
heavily on a such a normative and teleological conception of the subject’s perceptual goals 
(i.e., those who may be put off by teleological explanations in general). As such, it may be 
beneficial to take a more intuitive route and advocate for a view of justification where the 
immediate content of perception itself does justificatory work. This notion of justification 
was already hinted at above in section 7.2 in the discussion of how pre-linguistic belief is 
warranted compared to post-linguistic. I will now develop this view further as a theory of 
justification via an analysis of the work of Carl Ginet and William Alston. 
Like the view being developed in this thesis, Ginet argues that knowledge is not 
always accompanied by the subject’s ability to express knowledge.78 Even some complex 
 
78 Ginet, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 25-26. 
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recognitional knowledge needs not be expressible by post-linguistic subjects in order for it to 
be considered knowledge: 
And we ourselves know many things that we would be at a loss to put into words…I 
know what the characteristic appearance of a certain person is that one may go by in 
recognizing him, as I show by recognizing him, or pictures of him, very well; but if I 
am asked to say just what that characteristic appearance is I am able only to point to 
him, or a picture of him, and say, ‘Well, it’s what can be seen there’ (though this 
might be fairly regarded as saying what he looks like).79 
 
Thus, Ginet’s view captures the complexity of my view of recognitional knowledge as well 
as its non-inferential nature. For indeed, if one was to infer their way to recognizing a face, 
they should be able to articulate the various features which allowed this inference. 
 Ginet also ties the ability to recognize to concept deployment, arguing that a subject 
will be able to perceptually recognize—and therefore know—that certain facts obtain so long 
as he possesses the relevant sort of concepts and is able to reflect on whether the facts do 
obtain.80 Additionally, Ginet points out that multiple propositional descriptions can fit a 
singular visual scene, for example, that a puddle of water under normal conditions looks 
exactly like a puddle of gasoline.81 This comports with my view that multiple concepts may 
be justifiably applied to the same perceptual experience, that the contents of knowledge may 
vary between subjects depending on how many or which accurate and relevant concepts have 
been applied, and that concepts can be justifiably but wrongly applied even by the 
knowledgeable. Thus, even amongst subjects with comparable linguistic skills and 
background knowledge, there may be disagreement. This would explain how objective moral 
properties can produce the same qualitative experience across subjects and yet would still 
result in wildly varying moral judgements between subjects. 
 
 
79 Ibid., 25. 
 
80 Ibid., 34. 
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Justification for belief comes by way of these recognized facts directly influencing a 
subject’s doxastic attitude. As Ginet explains: 
A fact can be part of what justifies S in being confident that p only if it is a fact that 
can directly influence S’s doxastic attitude towards that proposition. That is, S’s 
doxastic attitude at any given time towards any given proposition can be justified or 
unjustified only on the basis of what at that time requires only S’s effort of attention 
or consideration in order to influence his attitude.82 
 
Only those items that can influence his doxastic attitude which are accessible to the subject 
are relevant for justificatory purposes.83 Ginet also adds that, in order for justification to hold, 
the subject must lack a reason not to trust his perception.84  
However, it is unclear on Ginet’s view whether or not what does the justificatory 
work for a belief also needs to be known to the agent as a justifier. As Ginet states: 
The requirement of direct recognizability on justification for confidence (or 
justification for any other degree of belief)—that is, the requirement that any 
minimally sufficient condition for S’s having justification for being confident that p 
be directly recognizable to S—can be seen to hold by the following argument.  
Assuming that S has the concept of justification for being confident that p, S 
ought always to posses [sic] or lack confidence that p according to whether or not he 
has such justification. At least he ought always to withhold confidence unless he has 
justification. This is simply what is meant by having or lacking justification. But if 
this is what S ought to do in any possible circumstance, then it is what S can do in any 
possible circumstance. That is, assuming that he has the relevant concepts, S can 
always tell whether or not he has justification for being confident that p.85 
 
Thus, on one hand, Ginet argues that recognized facts influence a subject’s doxastic attitude, 
and thereby justify a subject’s belief. On the other hand, as this quote above states, in order 
for the subject to be justified in his belief, he needs to know that he is justified and recognize 
what makes him justified. This seem part of his justification, at least, if he has the concept of 
justification.  
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It is unclear, however, what happens to subjects who lack a concept for justification, 
like the pre-linguistic. Arguably, these subjects can be justified merely by the (non-
conceptual, non-propositional) features of the immediate visual scene. This seems to fit with 
Ginet’s earlier view that the perceived having a direct influence on doxastic attitudes is what 
confers justification. However, pre-linguistic subjects might not know that or how a scene 
confers justification given that they lack a concept for justification, and therefore their beliefs 
may not be ultimately justified under Ginet’s view reflected in the latter quote. The question 
becomes, do subjects need to know they are justified—and need to know what makes them 
justified—in order for them to be justified? To ask this question is not to cast doubt on 
internalism when it comes to justification. It is to ask whether the subject’s internal justifying 
state is the non-conceptual content—and any relevantly applied conceptual content—itself, or 
if it includes the subject’s awareness that the content justifies and how the content justifies. 
As Alston points out, the claim that the subject needs to know the epistemic status of 
her belief—in this case, that and why her belief is justified—can “be used against any claim 
to immediate knowledge.”86 It isn’t a fair defeat of immediate knowledge, however; 
demanding that the subject be self-reflective in order to be justified is, as Alston puts it, 
“confus[ing] epistemology with its own subject matter.”87 Alston argues that this problem 
comes by way of equivocating between being justified in one’s belief and justifying one’s 
belief, and believing that both need to obtain for a belief to be justified.88 However, for a 
belief to be justified, only the former needs to obtain. The latter is merely a communicable 
feature of justification possessed by post-linguistic subjects who possess the concept of 
justification. A subject, however, can be completely justified in her belief without knowing 
 
86 Alston, “What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?” 81. 
 
87 Ibid., 86.  
 
88 Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 85. 
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that she is justified or the reason why she is justified.89 So, just as a pre-linguistic subject can 
possess a belief without being able to express the belief, a pre-linguistic subject can also be 
justified without being able to express her justification. 
What does justification consist of? In other words, how are perceptual beliefs 
justified? Alston argues that perceptual beliefs are justified because they are reflective of the 
perceptual experience subjects undergo: 
We are able to justifiably form beliefs about the external environment on the basis of 
our perceptual experience because objects in the external environment appear to us in 
that experience in such a way as to be constitutive of the character of the experience. 
And the beliefs so formed are prima facie justified just because they register what is 
presented there, they “read it off of” experience, possibly corrected in the light of 
whatever independent knowledge we bring to bear.90 
 
According to Alston, the subject’s belief is either justified by the experience itself or because 
it arises from the experience. There is no need for a subject to know that she is undergoing a 
justificatory experience. It would be unreasonable to require that the subject has this kind of 
higher order knowledge anyway, since it is typical for subjects to solely attend to the content 
of their experiences and not to the having of experiences.91 
Alston also confirms that background knowledge does play a role in a perceptual 
belief being justified. The example he utilizes to demonstrate this is of going to someone’s 
house that we’ve gone to before. When looking for a house that we’ve been to before, 
especially on numerous occasions, we will recognize it by the way it appears. This, in 
addition to the (not necessarily conscious) knowledge that we are in the right neighborhood, 
etc., will justify us in believing we’ve found the right house when we see it.92  
 
89 Alston, “What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?” 75, 83-86, 90. 
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Alston’s view works well with the view of perceptual knowledge being developed 
here since it coheres with the notion that post-linguistic concept holders’ knowledge differs in 
content than the pre-linguistic, and, further, that the post-linguistic are held to different 
justificatory standards than the pre-linguistic considering the amount of background 
knowledge and concepts they possess. In other words, post-linguistic subjects are held 
epistemically accountable to the degree of background knowledge (including concepts) that 
they possess when they engage in an instance of forming perceptual knowledge. Since the 
beliefs that result from their perceptions are more complex, they require more justification in 
order to be justified. 
Contrary to the view being propagated here, however, Alston assumes that perceptual 
knowledge always has a conceptual element to it. Thus, on this basis he ignores the question 
of whether conceptualization is essential to perception.93 As already argued for in section 7.2, 
however, perceptual knowledge need not have a conceptual element in the pre-linguistic as 
long as we accept the knowledge they hold is very limited, possibly confined to the basic 
discrimination of qualities. For example, a young child may have knowledge of a particular 
quality she sees in a visual scene because she is able to discriminate it from other qualities. 
Hence, she can differentiate between green and red and have knowledge of the quality of 
each without possessing a concept for either.  
Also integral to perceptual justification is the absence of defeaters, including 
suspicions of abnormal perception and strong counter beliefs.94 If we have sufficient reason 
to doubt what we perceive to be true, then our belief loses justification. But as Alston points 
out, it isn’t that normal perception confers justification so that we need to be aware that our 
perceptions are normal in order to be justified. As Alston puts it, “normality considerations 
 
93 Ibid., 232. 
 
94 Ibid., 228; Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe with Justification,” 273. See also Michael Huemer, 
“Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 30. 
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can figure as possible overriders of prima facie justification, rather than as part of what 
confers prima facie justification.”95 The subject still can be justified in her belief without any 
higher-order awareness that her experience is normal if it isn’t abnormal. Thus, without 
sufficient reason to suspect otherwise, we are justified in taking our perceptions as true. 
A common objection to this view of justification is to point to hallucinations. If a 
hallucinating subject has no reason to suspect that his experiences are not veridical, then he 
would be justified in holding false beliefs under the view being advanced here. Moreover, 
there would be no reason to hold beliefs as justified under normal conditions since there’s no 
way of telling whether the experience is real or hallucinatory. The same goes with dreaming 
or any sensory state that occurs without external cause.96 Since we can never know whether 
our perceptions are veridical, our perceptions cannot justify our perceptual beliefs. 
Alston has two answers to this type of objection. The first is to say that the subject’s 
belief in the case of a hallucination is true, but it is a belief about a mental image, not 
anything external. Hence, the only thing I could be justified in is my belief about my own 
internal states. The second is to say experiences only justify that which is directly accessible 
to the subject, and given that whether or not an experience is real or hallucinatory is not 
accessible, what is justified is neutral in terms of whether it is real or hallucinatory.97 Thus, I 
can believe that there is an oak tree outside my window, and be justified in that belief, but 
this does not give credence to the idea that an oak tree is anything external to me. If these are 
the only solutions, then the theory here is undesirable, especially since what we are hoping to 
capture as true are states of affairs in the external world. 
 
95 Alston, “Perceptual Knowledge,” 228-229. 
 
96 See Ernest Sosa, “Skepticism and the Internal/External Divide,” in Epistemic Justification: 
Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, by Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 142. 
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Alston’s solution to this problem is to affirm that the contents of experience, and their 
ability to justify, is neutral in terms of whether the perception is real or hallucinatory, but that 
beliefs about anything directly accessible to the subject are prima facie justified unless the 
subject herself is justified in believing that what she is experiencing is a hallucination.98 
Hence, I am justified directly through experience in my belief about an oak tree outside my 
window, that it is a real external object, so long as I am not justified in believing I am 
hallucinating.  
I go a little further than this and argue that the external universe is more ordered and 
coherent than dreams and most hallucinations, and in obvious ways. Thus, the disordered 
nature and incoherence of false perceptions should be sufficient reason for any beliefs based 
upon them to be unjustified. Concerning forming beliefs on the basis of hallucinations that 
mimic reality in order and rationality, I take the subject to have formed a justified belief—
just not one that is true. Thus, in this case of a false justified belief, the subject lacks 
knowledge.  
I don’t think the concession of allowing for justified false beliefs works against the 
theory being put forward here, unless one wants to adopt extreme skepticism. For I don’t 
believe the existence of reality-mimicking hallucinations gives us a reason to doubt all of our 
perceptions, so that none can be trusted. Our causal interactions with the external world 
support the view that our perceptual capacity is, on the whole, reliable. If it wasn’t reliable, 
we would not be able to successfully navigate our environment. This reliability gives us 
justification to trust our senses. Therefore, the existence of hallucinations does not entail that 
perceptual experiences cannot directly justify perceptual beliefs. 
 
98 Ibid., 240.  
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Another objection along these same lines is that we are not always correct concerning 
what we perceive; we can be mistaken in our perceptions. Thus, perception cannot be 
immediate nor our perceptual beliefs directly justified by perception.99 However, like Alston, 
I affirm that the immediacy of perception doesn’t entail that perceptual beliefs are 
infallible.100 As Alston explains, immediacy has to do with the lack of mediation in 
awareness, not with unshakable assurance that an object is exactly as it appears or exactly as 
we interpret its appearance.101 Moreover, we know that appearances can be misleading, and if 
appearances were always or mostly misleading, then we would have reason to question the 
epistemic value of perception.102 But we know from our causal contact with the external 
world that our perceptions are typically reliable,103 so it is reasonable to conclude that our 
perceptions aren’t as on such shaky epistemic ground as this objection implies. 
7.4 Non-Conceptual Content and Justified Moral Perceptual Beliefs 
 So where does this discussion on non-conceptual content and justified perceptual 
beliefs leave us? Recall that in our theory of moral perception we wanted to make the case 
that phenomenal experience of moral properties was the same across agents regardless of 
their moral maturity, but where the morally immature could merely perceive moral 
phenomena, the morally mature could recognize moral phenomena. The difference between 
these—perception and recognition—was the deployment of relevant moral concepts on sight 
(i.e., without the aid of inference) by the subject: the recognizer possesses the relevant moral 
concepts, while the mere perceiver does not. 
 




101 Alston, “Back to the Theory of Appearing,” 183. 
 
102 Ibid.; Alston, “Perceptual Knowledge,” 233. 
 
103 Alston, “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” 73. 
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 This inability to deploy relevant concepts does not hinder the formation of justified 
belief. That is, in both cases of perception and recognition,104 perceptual knowledge is 
gained. However, what the inability to deploy the relevant concepts does hinder is the amount 
of moral perceptual knowledge that can be gained given a moral scene. Hence, perceptual 
knowledge across subjects varies in degrees depending on the background knowledge, 
including the concepts, possessed by each subject. For the morally immature who do not 
possess any relevant moral concepts, knowledge may only be limited to the moral qualities 
produced by the moral scene. For example, just like the young child whose perceptual 
knowledge of the color red only consists in knowing the quality of red and being able to 
differentiate it from the quality of green, the morally immature may only know what the 
quality of a moral scene is like (in a what-it-is-like sense) and be able to discriminate it from 
other qualities. In this case the morally immature are only able to engage in perception and 
not in any recognition. 
A slightly more morally mature subject who possesses the moral concept bad may 
recognize that the moral quality of the scene is bad. She would therefore be justified in 
knowing that it is bad, but still may lack the recourse to know why it is bad.  A more morally 
mature person, on the other hand, may have knowledge of what the moral quality is (e.g., it is 
a torture of a cat) and be able to employ all the background knowledge that the deployment 
of a relevant moral concept (in this case torture) carries into the scene. Thus, the more 
morally mature a subject is, the fuller her perceptual knowledge will be given the same 
perceptual scene. For the subject who possesses no moral concepts, their knowledge is 
justified completely through the immediate awareness of the moral phenomena. For the more 
 
104 Recall from chapter 5 that I explain that recognition is a type of perception, i.e., all recognition is 
perception, but not all perception is recognition. See chapter 5, section 5.4. 
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mature, it is justified both by immediate awareness and through background conceptual 
knowledge. 
 Thus, making sense of moral perceptual knowledge in this fashion allows an 
explanation for why different moral agents sometimes come to different moral judgments 
concerning the same moral scene even given such a robust phenomenal moral realism: 
different agents may possess full understanding of the concept (or concepts) necessary for 
complete recognition while others may only have partial understanding of a moral concept 
and thus only achieve partial recognition.105 For example, where someone may only 
recognize that an act is bad, another may recognize that an act is torture. The subject who 
only recognizes the badness of the moral scene may not understand why it is bad, only that it 
should not be happening. The subject who recognizes torture understands that the concept 
torture—along with it being bad—carries with it concern about sentient life and how it 
should and should not be treated. Thus, in the instance of coming across a scene of youths 
torturing a cat, both the subject who possess the concept torture and the subject who lacks it 
will gain perceptual moral knowledge of the scene. However, the content of that knowledge 
will differ for each.  
We also have an explanation for why virtuous agents have the ability to come to 
complex moral judgments so quickly given a moral situation: they have mastered and learned 
to deploy on sight many different kinds of complex moral concepts. With this, we can see 
why a more Reynoldsian approach to moral perception may also be fitting: in perceptual 
moral instances where the more morally immature would need to employ practical reasoning 
(i.e., methodically apply what they are learning to the moral situation at hand), a morally 
virtuous agent would be able to recognize immediately on sight the true nature of the moral 
 
105 This does not bar that instances of perceptual moral disagreement can and do stem from some 
agents just being wrong about what they see or deploying completely inappropriate concepts to the situation. 
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situation, reflexively come to the correct moral judgement, and spring reflexively into a 
fitting moral action. Because the virtuous agent has mastered such a moral recognitional skill, 
she would be, if we took a Reynoldsian approach, justified in her perceptual beliefs. In either 




 I had made the claim in the thesis introduction that the purpose of this thesis was to 
reconnect ethics and metaphysics in a serious way, that is, in a way that post-enlightenment 
moral philosophers largely fail to do. I also characterized this thesis as defending the notion 
that moral properties are a certain class of ordinary properties, and moreover, that they have 
their own sense-perceptible phenomenology. What I hope is now apparent is that human 
beings live in an inherently moral world which entails that they regularly commit moral 
actions and constantly possess moral obligations. Human beings cannot help but to live in 
this reality. 
 For one, we live in a world where substance causation holds true (chapter 1) and final 
causes bestow upon substances a normative causal trajectory (chapter 6). Human beings are 
substances with causal powers and free originators of causal chains (chapters 1, 2, and 4). 
Due to their causal abilities coupled with knowledge of the causal tendencies and normative 
trajectories of substances, human beings are morally culpable beings (chapter 6). Since 
human beings cannot fail to causally participate in an inherently causal universe, they cannot 
avoid moral action. This even includes those instances where human beings fail to act since 
their causal capabilities and knowledge could have resulted in a more morally desirable 
causal chain of events. This also includes instances where no causal activity is happening, 
since causally salient relations between moral agents and substances still exist and therefore 
moral obligations still apply (chapter 6).  
 Second, the moral properties that ground this moral realism are sense-perceptible. 
Like ordinary natural properties (and because they are ordinary natural properties), they have 
their own what-it-is-like (chapters 3, 5, and 6). Moral properties have this because they are 
relational properties; they are not sui-generis or supervenient, which would bar them from 
having their own externally generated phenomenology (chapter 5). Specifically, moral 
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properties are relational features of relations, i.e., the total complex states of affairs between 
one or more substances (chapter 6). Moreover, the perception of moral qualities is 
experienced by all normally functioning subjects and is enough for the formation of 
perceptual moral knowledge (chapters 5, 6, and 7). Differences in the content of moral 
perceptual knowledge between subjects can be accounted for through the background 
knowledge and moral concepts that subjects possess (chapter 5 and 7). 
 We can see now that the two oughts from the thesis introduction—of something ought 
to be done and the agent ought to do something about it—is grounded in the very fabric of 
the universe. The imperative arises via the nature of human beings—given their knowledge 
and causal capability—and the nature of reality—being so heavily causally constructed—that 
human beings just are moral creatures in a moral world. They are morally acting and acted 
upon daily, and constantly are in relations that entail moral obligations. This is the nature of 
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